Judge Ssekendi interviewed me and many others for the report, which was the background to the UNSG's eventual decision to replace the top UNMIK leadership -- the SRSG and his principle deputy -- by not renewing their contracts. The report contains some comments from the disgraced UNMIK leadership suggesting that I improperly was in contact with some member governments and passed my debacle report to the Serbs. I did, of course, have frequent contacts with member state representatives -- especially with those from Security Council countries -- in an effort to help them understand the complexities of the north. I made a special effort to do this with the US office in Pristina as its staff were forbidden to even visit north Mitrovica to see for themselves. I did not release my debacle report to anyone not of the UN international staff in Kosovo and New York. I learned later that one of my officers had done so because he thought it would prove useful in convincing the northern Kosovo Serbs that the UN staff in the north was not part of an effort to subject them to the new "independent" Kosovo government. The Ssekandi report did in fact note UNMIK Pristina's apparent tilt toward using its UNSCR 1244 peacekeeping mandate to assist instead Pristina's efforts to subject the northern Serbs to its control, thus abandoning status neutrality. UNMIK Pristina was pushed in this direction by the US, UK and Germany.
The Scekandi report noted that UNMIK HQ would have been better served by taking into account our warnings from the north. But by the time of the March events, I had become a perceived problem in Pristina because of our repeated efforts to caution against use of force and instead urging dialogue with the K-Serbs and elements of the Serbian government in a position to assist in gaining a peaceful outcome to the court seizure.
