Kosovo: Report to the UNSG on the March 17, 2007 Events in North Mitrovica

On May 21, 2008, Judge Francis M. Ssekandi delivered to the UN Security Council a report on his investigation into UNMIK's actions around the March 17, 2007 events in North Mitrovica.  On that date, UNMIK's Pristina HQ ordered the use of force against former Serbian court officials occupying the courthouse in the northern part of the city.  We in the region -- UNMIK, UN Police and the local NATO elements, had argued against pursuing that course of action.  The report has not, to my knowledge, ever been released.  But it highlights the need for the UN to not take sides in resolving political issues during its peacekeeping mission.  A former UN New York staff member gave me a copy some time ago. 

Judge Ssekendi interviewed me and many others for the report, which was the background to the UNSG's eventual decision to replace the top UNMIK leadership -- the SRSG and his principle deputy -- by not renewing their contracts.  The report contains some comments from the disgraced UNMIK leadership suggesting that I improperly was in contact with some member governments and passed my debacle report to the Serbs.  I did, of course, have frequent contacts with member state representatives -- especially with those from Security Council countries -- in an effort to help them understand the complexities of the north.  I made a special effort to do this with the US office in Pristina as its staff were forbidden to even visit north Mitrovica to see for themselves.  I did not release my debacle report to anyone not of the UN international staff in Kosovo and New York.  I learned later that one of my officers had done so because he thought it would prove useful in convincing the northern Kosovo Serbs that the UN staff in the north was not part of an effort to subject them to the new "independent" Kosovo government.  The Ssekandi report did in fact note UNMIK Pristina's apparent tilt toward using its UNSCR 1244 peacekeeping mandate to assist instead Pristina's efforts to subject the northern Serbs to its control, thus abandoning status neutrality.  UNMIK Pristina was pushed in this direction by the US, UK and Germany.

The Scekandi report noted that UNMIK HQ would have been better served by taking into account our warnings from the north.  But by the time of the March events, I had become a perceived problem in Pristina because of our repeated efforts to caution against use of force and instead urging dialogue with the K-Serbs and elements of the Serbian government in a position to assist in gaining a peaceful outcome to the court seizure.

Fears of a Kosovo Partition (July 2006)

By mid-2006, Western concern over the unstable Kosovo situation had come to take the form of UNMIK Pristina worrying over a possible move by the northern Kosovo Serbs to implement a "hard" partition of the north to preempt an expected unilateral move by the Kosovo Albanians south of the Ibar to declare independence from Serbia.  (In the event, the northern K-Serbs never did seek partition -- though they hoped, and still hope, that Belgrade would thus save them -- while the K-Albanians did take the first move by declaring independence in February 2008.)  UNMIK's HQ stood in the middle of the K-Albanian capital of Kosovo -- Pristina -- and was under the direct influence of the Western countries (and especially the US and UK) which fully supported the K-Albanian position.  (At the US Office's July 4th celebration that year, the head of the office publicly called the northerners that UNMIK Mitrovica worked with "troublemakers.)  Under those influences -- channeled by the Office of Political Affairs (OPA) -- the UNMIK leadership grew quite paranoid about a northern partition.  OPA prepared a strategy paper outlining how UNMIK might work to prevent it.  OPA drafted a Code Cable in July to be sent to New York to cover the paper.  I don't remember UNMIK Mitrovica being given the chance to be involved in the preparation.  However, the PDSRSG was not unaware of the realities of the north so the OPA paper had to recognize that UNMIK had little to work with beyond continued diplomacy and peacekeeping.  In the event, in late July, he and I had the opportunity in Vienna to brief senior Western officials and Martti Ahtisaari (the UNSG's Special Envoy for Kosovo negotiations, UNOSEK) on the north.  It became clear that the Western dictum against partition was little more than words.  The draft code cable follows.  (I'm not sure it was sent.)  The full draft strategy paper is too long to provide here.

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From my Journal for March 17 & 19: Dealing with Government treatment of darfur IDPs in Mayo Camp, Khartoum

March 17: Shit is getting pretty near hitting the fan here. Spent the evening hearing reports of police violence against Darfur displaced persons at a camp near Khartoum. We made plans to be part of a dip convoy to the camp first thing tomorrow morning. Then we hear that eight have been killed and the violence is continuing. Tried to reach someone in GOS to ask them to intercede. Nothing accomplished. Tomorrow, at nine, off we go. The thugs are out of the closet and daring us not to dance with them.

March 19: Been an interesting 24 hours. Began yesterday with meeting a group of Western diplomatic colleagues at the Dutch embassy. We rendezvoused and set off for Mayo Camp to see if there was anything we could do to help the Darfur refugees there. We heard that some were being taken elsewhere and that the violence had continued through the night. The government now admitted to three killed, two women and a man. But we had reports that 15 had been killed and more wounded. The government was clearly trying to get rid of the camp before it attracted any more attention to the war in Darfur. We – US, French, British, Dutch and others – wanted to get there before they could do any more harm or erase the evidence. We failed. A couple of miles or so from the camp, near a market on a road full of traffic, we ran into a police roadblock, laid just for us. Not waiting for the usual bullshit explanations, I jumped from the car and started walking down the road. The police caught up to me. They tried to tell me that I could not go on, that I did not have permission. As the others caught up to me – I also had my bodyguards – I explained that we did not need permission. I said I would continue walking down the road. They said they could not allow that. I said they would have to detain me to stop me and continued walking. The police began to threaten and I paused to allow my security to explain to them that they could not impede or touch a diplomat. Things got heated. I made some calls to government people who eventually told me that I had permission. I also took a picture of the police block. This led to the police seeking to take my camera away from me. I eventually agreed to erase the picture and before being physically assaulted by a plainclothes policeman who was threatening me – he was a thug – I gave the police a memory chip that I had switched for the real one. A police general arrived with a pickup full of plainclothes thugs. He explained that the police were carrying out an “operation” at the camp and needed more time to “clean up.” They could not allow us to go any further for our own security. He assured me everything would be okay in a few hours and we could return then. We then agreed to turn back. As we were doing this, a UN team got a bit closer to the camp via another route and smelled tear gas and saw people fleeing. Later, a team did reach the camp but found it by that time deserted. Also latter, the foreign minister passed a message saying he was angry with me for trying to force the police to let us through. I rejected his position and instead said that we were protesting our treatment by the police.

04 Khartoum 0271: Sudanese Exporting "Moderate" Islam?

Note:  The conversation reported in this cable was with then-Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail.

04 Khartoum 0254: Darfur Diplomacy Update

 Also, see note below.

From my journal of March 2:

"Had a pleasant and productive lunch with the Foreign Minister at his Blue Nile-side residence. With British ambassador and Dutch charge. Lasted three hours. We refined the formula for the meeting in Chad. When I got back, learned that USAID is still doing some free-lancing, except since they are in charge, they think it's me doing the free-lancing. But we appear to be on track. In the end, may have to bow out and let them take the seats and – they think – the glory. The way we do foreign policy has degraded mightily in the years I have been in the business."

04 Khartoum 0252: Government and Darfur Rebels Accept Chad Plus Meeting

Also, see note below.

Note:  The reference to an "external player" mentioned in para 2 was to political appointees from USAID.  They were trying to prevent a Darfur negotiation from moving forward unless it was folded into the North-South peace process.  These USAID officials were pro-SPLM and very much opposed to the Khartoum regime.  They saw bringing the Darfur conflict into the wider negotiations with the government as a way to increase pressure on it and perhaps further dismember Sudan.  These USAID appointees came from the Christian fundamentalist NGO community supportive of the SPLM as Christian black Africans vs Islamic Arabs.  They originally sought to keep Darfur off our agenda because they saw it as a distraction to the "main show."

The following is from my journal entry for March 8.  The "perfect storm" I was hoping to avoid was the reaction from USAID Washington to our joint EU/US effort to get Darfur talks going without bringing in extra issues.

"I think missed a weekend somewhere. I had 15 minutes of free time in the office today and didn't know what to do with it. Started at 8:15 with the UK ambassador and wound up at 8pm after a two hour meeting with a senior official. Along the way, spent another 1½ hours with the French Ambassador. Got home to a dark house and microwaved one of the dishes James left for me. Of course, at least I have a cook and don't have to clean my own dishes.

I've been doing a bunch of stuff – to avoid a “perfect storm” – without DC reaction. Won't have any until tomorrow given time difference. Another consequence of not having a weekend."

Journal Entry for February 26, 2004: Trying to Catch Up with USAID

Started the day running a bit late because I actually slept until my alarm. Checked the email, used my exercise bike and took a shower, leaving a bare 15 minutes for breakfast. At ten, I met the leaders of the new SPLM office in Khartoum. They were clandestine but now the youth and women’s section had become open. I made them feel welcome (and reported same). Bright, committed and focused. It was a pleasure to meet them. For lunch, I went to [my military attaché's] house to meet a couple of Sudanese generals and the local military attaches. Spent some time talking with the PLO attaché. He was polite and likable. I am glad I don’t defend US policy on Palestine for a living. Spoke to Pasquale a couple of times by phone to do him a favor – get extra pages into his passport – and about leaving for the Nile on Sunday. Did some office work and eventually wound up at the British ambassador’s place to hear from him – he was just back from Kenya – what USAID policy on Darfur is. What I mean by that, is that USAID – one part of the USG – is not telling the State Department – another part of the USG – what it is doing about meeting Darfur rebels but is talking to Her Majesty’s Government. After leaving, and on the way to the Japanese Ambassador’s for dinner, I managed to call Nairobi via Washington and transmit the intelligence on USAID to my State Department boss soon to arrive in Kenya. (He had earlier called me from Amsterdam to see what I knew.) Dinner was quite excellent Japanese food including sushi and tempura. The Ambassador had actually brought a Japanese chef with him, the only one to apply for the job. Also at dinner were the Libyan, quite jovial, and his wife, a UN person from Yemen and the Greek Ambassador. The Greek looks dour all the time but is simply Greek – cynical about everything but also with a happy appreciation of the absurd. The Yemeni had a simply endless list of problems that would make the peace process in Sudan “much more difficult than everyone believes.” Another day in the life.

Journal Entry for February 18, 2004: Deep Inside Normal Khartoum "Diplomacy:

Ended the day at the British ambassador's residence, meeting with him, the Dutch Charge and the UN Special Representative (a Norwegian). I was sipping some fine scotch as we compared notes and talked about serious Sudan stuff. It was approaching six and, as usual, we had all probably had almost nothing to eat since breakfast. Often don't have time to eat. We therefore made quick work of the cashews and chips that had been provided with the drinks. The Ambassador's wife offered her husband to refill the bowls. He, understanding we'd make a meal of any choice snack foods he set out in front of us, sensibly, if quietly, declined his wife's offer. We kept drinking and talking but eventually I gave in and thought I'd try one of the wrapped things in the bowl in the center of the small table in front of us. Unwrapped it and since it looked soft, popped it into my mouth. I immediately realized that it was not soft but, in fact, hard as steel. It may never have been soft but clearly had also been in that bowl for some time. Because it is what diplomats do, I soldiered on as best I could. It was too big to discreetly get rid of anywhere. I thought of letting it slip into my drink but realized that could not pass unnoticed. I had no napkin. So I downed some more scotch in the hope of dissolving it and eventually ground it down to swallowing size. Needless to say, I did not contribute much to the conversation during this period.

The Ambassador noted my situation. An attentive host, he made a mental note to get rid of the wrapped stuff at first opportunity. However, the UN Special Representative did not notice. After my ordeal was finally over and I could speak again, he reached for a wrapped thing. The Ambassador, torn by a sense of responsibility and also embarrassment, mumbled a warning about it being "hard candy" but took no further action. The Norwegian popped it into his mouth just as his phone rang. He got up and wandered into the hall to talk. A few moments latter, I got up to leave. Said goodbyes and went into the hall where I stuck out my hand to the Norwegian. By the rules of diplomacy, he had no choice. He had to shake my hand too. One of his hands was holding his phone so he stuck out the other. In the middle of his palm was his discarded hard candy thing. It was there in the middle as our hands clasped. Fortunately, he was re-wrapped by this time. It's these moments that make this all bearable.

04 Khartoum 0162 -- EU Pressing on Darfur, Meeting Rebels

04 Khartoum 0098 -- EU approach on Sudan

Note:  Visiting Ministers were from the Netherlands.

Back to Sudan: 03 Khartoum 1049 plus journal entry

From my December 8 journal entry: Well, on top of the historic visit of the (Christian/animist) SPLM to Khartoum now unfolding, Franklin Graham (son of Billy) is here to give out Xmas gifts. The Christians have landed. Just came back from dinner in his honor given by the (Islamic) government. Rev. Graham gave a very nice speech at dinner showing faith, cultural sensitivity and understanding. Very sincere man. I told him that I saw his father preach in Madison Square Garden many years ago. He said his father will give his last "talk" there next year. (Must mean he is retiring, not ascending.) Tomorrow morn, I go with him to the airport to see the big Russian plane deliver the presents. So far no one has asked me to actually pray.