Kosovo: Briefing Note for the new SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities on December 7, 2006*

UNITED NATIONS United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIK

NATIONS UNIES Mission d’Administration Intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo

MEETING WITH

Municipal Assembly Presidents of Zvečan/Zvecan, Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok, Leposavic/Leposaviq

Location: Zvečan/Zvecan Municipal Assembly Building

Time: 10:30 – 11:45

Date: Thursday, 7 December 2006

Participants:

Dragisa MILOVIC – Municipal Assembly President of Zvečan/Zvecan

Slavisa RISTIC - Municipal Assembly President of Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok

Velimir BOJOVIC - Municipal Assembly President of Leposavic/Leposaviq

UNMIK

SRSG

Gerard Gullucci - UNMIK Regional Representative

Juozas Kazlas - UNMIK Deputy Regional Representative

Kerim Bardad-Daidj – UNMIK OIC Zvečan/Zvecan

Jean-Luc Sintes - UNMIK Municipal Representative Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok

Lilia Galieva – UNMIK Municipal Representative Leposavic/Leposaviq

Background

There is strong unity between three northern Municipal Presidents (MAP). With very few exceptions, they come out with consolidated positions on main issues (security, freedom of movement, cooperation/non-cooperation with PISG, etc) usually guided by Belgrade and the SNC. Such conformity not only relates to their affiliation with the same political party (DSS) but also to similarity of every day problems they face. As of June 2006, following several security related incidents against K-Serbs, presented by the SNC as inter-ethnic, all three municipalities introduced boycott of PISG. Boycott stalled developing relations with central level and, together with non-acceptance of salaries from PISG, cost local population some two million Euros. The boycott also led them to mostly refuse SRSG Contingency Fund support (though Zubin Potok accepted and is utilizing).

Talking Points

SRSG message: now and through transition period UNMIK will continue to work with all communities helping them to address daily problems

Status process and continued role of UNMIK

• UNMIK not part of the negotiations process but is assisting the Special Envoy.
• SE postponed submission of his proposals until after Serbian Elections
• UNMIK will neither support nor prevent the elections to the extent it does not endanger calm and public order; we expect local authorities to exercise responsibility and mature behavior during this and following period.
• UNMIK will continue working with local authorities during the coming month and through transitional period, and support them in tackling practical issues important for every day life of all communities.
• Other priorities for UNMIK include decentralization, transfer of authority, security sector review, restructuring, ensuring stability.
• Emerging package will include substantial decentralization, new municipalities (including north Mitrovica), protection for cultural sites, minority rights and continued involvement of international community.
• UNMIK will continue efforts to bring attention of international donors to the north. So far we have been successful in this regard and managed to generate more than 1.5 millions Euros for economic development in northern municipalities.
• We believe that continued dialogue and cooperation will be essential after the status determination and pledge our readiness to do so.
• What else do you feel you need to remain secure and increase your well-being in your communities?

Cooperation between northern Municipalities and PISG

• UNMIK did not react politically to your boycott of PISG despite our strong disapproval of this action. Not only UNMIK but IC as well has been encouraging you to revisit this decision.
• Since June 2006, the International Security Presence in Kosovo has introduced additional measures to enhance security arrangements in Kosovo and specifically in minority areas. You have seen these changes in the north as well.
• It should be recognized that the general security situation has improved. The specific cases that you cited in your decision to cut ties with PISG remain very much under investigation.
• Meanwhile, the northern community has lost some two million Euros from the Kosovo budget during this period. This money is not “Albanian” or “Serb” but everyone’s.
• It is regretful that you did not accept funding for Quick Impact Projects from SRSG’s Contingency Fund. This was not even from. KCB.
• Against this backdrop, we ask that you reconsider your decision regarding the boycott at least partially, regarding budgeting. We are ready to assist.

Electricity

• In line with UNMIK’s general efforts to improve every day life of local communities one of greatest concerns is power supply especially during coming winter.
• UNMIK has been engaged in series of consultations with Belgrade authorities to address electricity issue more broadly. Recent contacts in this regard proved to be encouraging and in the near future most probably you will see practical results.

Return to Svinjare (Background: All essential repairs and reconstruction are on track to be completed by 14 December, following which, on 15 December, there is scheduled to be the final Svinjarë/Svinjare Decision Making Board held in Svinjarë/Svinjare, signalling the successful completion of the project. However, few IDPs appear willing to return at this time).

• Reconstruction of houses in Svinjare is almost complete. Next week IDPs can start returns and this is a very good development. The OKPCC will be able to provide those who return this year with wood stoves, firewood, and fencing. Necessary security arrangements will be in place. It’s time for the IDPs to make up their mind.
• No one can question their right to make a choice in good will and without intimidation. They can return, or sell, or use those houses for rent.
• A realistic concern, however, is that if the houses are left unoccupied over the winter, they will be vulnerable to thefts and weather damage. Such scenario is not acceptable. By finishing reconstruction and handing over the premises to the owners, UNMIK will complete its part of the job and will not carry further responsibilities of maintaining them in order or with regard to additional renovation after the winter.
• We are ready to assist IDPs in every reasonable way as soon as they make decision. It may be possible, for example, to facilitate a rental scheme for those properties. This way the houses will be taken care of, but IDPs would maintain the right to return to their property.

Return to Roma Mahalla

• After many years of delay Roma Mahalla reconstruction is developing in a very satisfactory way. The actual return could start in January 2007.
• Municipal authorities in Mitrovice/a actively cooperate to help the process.
• UNMIK expects that K-Serbian community can contribute to the ERA returns in positive way.

Reactive (municipal concerns likely to be raised during the meeting)

Security (Background: MAPs continuously criticize lack of progress in investigation of incidents which happened earlier this year (killing of one K-Serb from Zitkovac and shooting at two young Serbs at gas station, attack of a Priest and his family, throwing of a hand grenade to a family in Rudare, hand grenade attack at “Dolce Vita” Café); they claim that this situation presumes impunity for K-Albanians and provides grounds for new attacks. They may also criticize KPS for lack of professionalism, experience, and equipment, for presence of K-Albanian KPS in the north especially near the administrative boundaries in the north and in traffic control unit).

Suggested response:

• Security related issues top priority for UNMIK.
• But security issues should be separated from politics.
• In order to perform effectively, Police needs support and cooperation from local leaders and community.
• There are a lot of cases when investigation cannot be done properly because of lack of cooperation from locals.

Zubin Potok MAP may raise the long-standing issue of Water/Electric Company "Ibar Lepenac" (Background: the local Serbs believe that this company -- based in Pristina and made up of K-Albanians -- wrongly claims to represent the Ibar Company which actually runs the Gazivode Dam and Hydro plant in Zubin Potok. According to the MAP, Ibar Lepenac is nothing more that a group of former Ibar employees who misrepresented themselves as the proper management of Ibar in order to collect the EU10 million a year in payments for the water and power from Gazivode. In return, the people who actually run the Dam get nothing other than funds for 40 of the 200 people who work for Ibar in the north [the rest getting salaries from Serbia].)

Suggested response:

• UNMIK has done the best it can on economic and business issues but much needs the clarity that future status will bring.
• We are look into the issue you raise.

MAPs may raise issue of unspent funds due to boycott of KCB municipal budget and quire about possible ways of spending it next year or suggest deposit into a separate bank account.

Suggested response:

• UNMIK must follow established procedures and you have had time to consider for yourselves the implication of the refusal to accept your money through the KCB.
• However, with our basic approach of helping UNMIK can consider your official request to make an exemption from the established deadline.

Additionally MAPs may rise questions related to privatization (allegedly unfair for Serbs), cuts of telephone lines in enclaves. 

*NOTE:  The Memorandum of Conversation will be in next post. 

2011: Kosovo: Time for a New Approach

I left Kosovo in October 2008 with some encouragement from the UNMIK leadership and DPKO.  (I transferred to UNMIT in East Timor as chief of staff.)  But I continued to follow events in Kosovo, contributing pieces to TransConflict, and had visited northern Kosovo in June, 2011.  I can't quite remember how the invitation came up to testify in November to the US Congress on Kosovo but I did.  Here follows the text of my comments to the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representative.  (Note:  The Quint refers to the Contact Group on Kosovo -- the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia -- without Russia, which opposed Kosovo independence.  EULEX is the EU's rule of law entity in Kosovo and its police.)

(Note:  All documents posted in this space can be and enlarged and downloaded by clicking on them.)



 

Fears of a Kosovo Partition (July 2006)

By mid-2006, Western concern over the unstable Kosovo situation had come to take the form of UNMIK Pristina worrying over a possible move by the northern Kosovo Serbs to implement a "hard" partition of the north to preempt an expected unilateral move by the Kosovo Albanians south of the Ibar to declare independence from Serbia.  (In the event, the northern K-Serbs never did seek partition -- though they hoped, and still hope, that Belgrade would thus save them -- while the K-Albanians did take the first move by declaring independence in February 2008.)  UNMIK's HQ stood in the middle of the K-Albanian capital of Kosovo -- Pristina -- and was under the direct influence of the Western countries (and especially the US and UK) which fully supported the K-Albanian position.  (At the US Office's July 4th celebration that year, the head of the office publicly called the northerners that UNMIK Mitrovica worked with "troublemakers.)  Under those influences -- channeled by the Office of Political Affairs (OPA) -- the UNMIK leadership grew quite paranoid about a northern partition.  OPA prepared a strategy paper outlining how UNMIK might work to prevent it.  OPA drafted a Code Cable in July to be sent to New York to cover the paper.  I don't remember UNMIK Mitrovica being given the chance to be involved in the preparation.  However, the PDSRSG was not unaware of the realities of the north so the OPA paper had to recognize that UNMIK had little to work with beyond continued diplomacy and peacekeeping.  In the event, in late July, he and I had the opportunity in Vienna to brief senior Western officials and Martti Ahtisaari (the UNSG's Special Envoy for Kosovo negotiations, UNOSEK) on the north.  It became clear that the Western dictum against partition was little more than words.  The draft code cable follows.  (I'm not sure it was sent.)  The full draft strategy paper is too long to provide here.

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The 2013 Brussels Agreement and the Implementation Plan

As noted in Wikipedia, the Brussels Agreement was made between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo on the normalization of their relations. It was negotiated and concluded, although not signed by either party, in Brussels under the auspices of the European Union. The negotiations were led by Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, and mediated by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. The agreement was concluded on 19 April 2013.

Actually there does seem to have been an Implementation Plan initialed by the two leaders.  (I think it's them, but see for yourself below).  And relations have not be fully normalized until now and the plan never implemented.

A Map for a New North Mitovica municipality in 2006

I prepared this map in 2006 for Martti Ahtisaari, the UNSG Special Envoy for the negotiations over Kosovo status between Belgrade and Pristina.  I was serving as the UNMIK Regional Representative for Mitrovica (and northern Kosovo).  I had met Ahtisaari some 20 years previously while working on Angola.  We met in June in UNMIK HQ in Pristina and had other meetings during the summer.  One of his staff asked me to prepare the map which I delivered to Ahtisaari's team before the year's end.  It was supposed to balance the ethnic realities by giving the K-Albanian South Mitrovica a bit of the north while dividing the territory in a way acceptable to the majority K-Serbs in the north.  It was predicated on an eventual agreement in the UN Security Council on the status of Kosovo, some acceptable form of autonomy or "independence."  Despite Ahtisaari's best efforts, the US and Russia could not agree.  Pristina declared independence unilaterally in February 2008.  Ahtisaari later became President of Finland.

The light red line was the existing border of Mitrovica (which spanned the Ibar River).  The darker red line would have been the new border with the Serb majority North Mitrovica to the east and a mixture of Albanian and Serb villages as part of South Mitrovica to the west.  The area north of the Ibar were other Serb-majority municipalities