91 STATE 388774: DAVIDOW HAVANA MEETING WITH GPRA DELEGATION

 

89 Harare 0599: MATABELELAND: STILL WAITING FOR THE FUTURE

 

Kosovo: November 9, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  Here follows the minutes of the second meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force to continue EU "coordination" with the United Nations. (Note: CRC refers to Crowd & Riot Control.  I believe ESDP may refer to European Security and Defence Policy operations.)

November 9, 2006

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting (2)

Participants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Butchart Livingston (OSCE), Carver, Stadler (both ICO PT), Zuccarini (EUPT), Guehenneux, Denis (KFOR), Urny (UN Police)

Guests: Moskowitz, Ciaravolo, Rolando (DOJ), Neisse (ICO PT), ??? (US office)

Ad 1) CRC

EUPT informed about tasking to engage also in the CRC planning, while noting that in the overall concept of the future mission the primary responsibility lies with the local authorities, i. e. KPS for the police. Some argued that ESDP needs its own CRC; if not, KFOR needs to stay on the bridge, sending a wrong message contrary to the policy of “towards normalization”. The TF agreed that divided Mitrovica poses a special challenge and therefore identified a need of a standing element to be able to respond to any deterioration of the security situation. A possibility of non-implementation of the status settlement was also noted in this context. 

In general, chain of response is: KPS – IC-police – KFOR. Taking into account the specific situation in Mitrovica, where divisions occur also in KPS, the TF thought that IC-police should remain to stand ready, with KFOR ultimate back-up when necessary / opportune. ICOM’s security should therefore rely on the IC engagement.

Coordination of the IC actors should work through LOs to ICOM. Concerning CRC, there was thinking that the Unit should be led by an IC-commander, with direct links to KPS, to HoICOM and to ICO HQ in Pristina.

Ad 2) The Administrative Border with Serbia

The TF reviewed the current model, where KFOR provides security in the northern Kosovo, but does not directly operate on the boundary. It was noted that it is important that KFOR maintains its presence in the Nothing Hill base and continues with the current approach – also in a support to the future ESDP mission. EUPT foresees permanent presence of the ESDP mission on the gates 1 and 31, while noting that with the new UNSC Resolution KPS will be allowed to engage on the boundary / border with Serbia. Additionally, they plan for mobile teams covering the rest of the area.

Ad 3) Ibar and the bridges

The TF anticipated potential increase of a security risk (as Ad 1). To prevent any adverse incidents, a very determined and clear mechanism will be needed for a hand-over from UNMIK Police to the ESDP mission. A need for a firm mandate was also raised, as the only approach to prevent partition scenario. 

The majority voiced the preference of no (visible) changes of the IC police deployment and engagement in the area, pointing out a need for fixed locations / check points of the ESDP mission on potentially critical locations (bridges, Three Towers, Bosniak Mahala).

Ad 4) KFOR / IMP

KFOR informed that no changes in deployment are envisaged for a period of 6 months after the status settlement.

Ad 5) ESDP Rule of Law Mission

EUPT briefed on the planning process, pointing out limited retention of executive powers for police and justice. The TF identified some particular problems for Mitrovica: location of the higher-level court (secure access, security in the court), property claims, the issue of personal documents and the parallel structures. The TF supported that vetting process should be completed before ESDP takes over.

Ad 6) What should be role of the KPS?

In Mitrovica, KPS performs only basic police tasks, but not the “ethnicity”-related ones. It was noted that the northern KPS has no capacities for sensitive or more sophisticated jobs, such as forensics, crime-investigation, etc (conversely, parallel structures do). KPS of other ethnicity therefore needs special protection if their job takes place in the North.

Additionally, a problem of potential non-cooperation of the northern KPS was raised upon the status announcement (change of uniforms, not following the orders). The TF supported that the issue should be raised with Belgrade in advance.

Ad 7) How to address information-sharing?

The TF agreed that there is a need for permanent mechanisms among the IC players, sensitive / confidential info included. Information flow can be channeled through: LOs to ICOM, permanent dialogue on different levels and adequate reporting.

Ad 8) Any coordinated public outreach (is there a PISG plan)?

The TF agreed there is a need to demonstrate coordinated international posture during transition and after status. It should be two-fold: 1.) informing officials (on status implementation) and 2.) campaign for people (need to ensure translations of the status settlement proposal with “frequently asked questions” as soon as the status settlement document becomes public).

Ad 9) Role of OSCE?

OSCE sees their role of “eyes and ears” of the ICO in the field all over Kosovo, including reporting on the status implementation. Although it can be assumed that general reporting can be shared and the focus of it determined locally (i. e. by actors in Pristina), the TF supported a more formal arrangement on the issue. Modalities should be discussed asap on the level of HoMs in Pristina first, followed by talks with OSCE in Vienna.

Ad 10) Evacuation planning during transition / post-status?

Till UNSCR 1244 in place, there is the existing UN evacuation plan (with KFOR support if needed so) for all IC players. It was noted that there is no support to local staff (remark: sensitive issue in the case of Mitrovica!).

Ad 11) What is status of transition plans for above areas?

While PISG and IC consult and plan for the transition and following status implementation for the whole Kosovo, particular plans for the North do not exist. As a particular point in this context, DOJ raised the issue of transition of the on-going trials (question of keeping the composition of same panels).

Ad 12) The next TF meeting will take place on November 16 at 11:00 a.m., UNMIK Regional HQ in southern Mitrovica (3^rd floor). Topical focus: returns, property and Trepca privatization.

Kosovo: SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities on December 7, 2006*

Memorandum of Conversation

Internal Memorandum

Subject: SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities

Date: 7 December 2006

Venue: Zvečan/Zvecan Municipality

Municipal Assembly Presidents:

Mr. Dragisa Milovic (DM) – Municipal Assembly President of Zvečan/Zvecan; Mr. Slavisa Ristic (SR) - Municipal Assembly President of Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok; Mr. Velimir Bojovic (VB) - Municipal Assembly President of Leposavic/Leposaviq.

UNMIK participants:

Mr. Joachim Ruecker, Mr. Gerard Gallucci, Mr. Dennis Besedic, Ms. Myriam Dessables, Mr. Juozas Kazlas, Mr. Andrei Efimov, Mr. Jean-Luc Sintes, Ms. Lilia Galieva, Mr. Kerim Bardad-Daidj.

DM welcomed the SRSG and introduced his colleagues.

SRSG expressed appreciation of this opportunity to discuss some practical issues with the presidents for the first time since he assumed his current post. He acknowledged a significant number of visitors to the north recently, including SE and representatives of CG and assessed this as a positive development. SRSG then gave a briefing regarding the status process. He explained that UNMIK does not have a direct role in the process but rather acts as facilitator and “voice from the ground” for UNOSEK. He mentioned that he will deliver his next report on Standards Implementation to New York on 13 December. It can be expected that the SE will present status package right after elections in Serbia. Regarding elections UNMIK - like in the past - will neither support nor hinder relevant activities in Kosovo while ensuring FOM, safe and secure environment as it does in any other period of time. As soon as the package is tabled, consultations are envisioned in Belgrade and Pristina followed by presentation of the package in New York. Timely conclusion of the process is expected. The period between the Resolution and “the Status Day” will be transition from UNMIK to a follow-on International Civilian Office which should be well prepared. It can take three-six months. The substantial part of the status package will include decentralization, establishment of new municipalities, protection of cultural sites and minorities, especially of their vital rights. UNMIK can be engaged in explaining these things, particularly the importance of decentralization, which is not yet understood everywhere. The SRSG’s experience as a mayor in Germany showed that decentralization will mean strengthening of local self-government, but also strengthening the cohesion of Kosovo. It will include establishment of new municipalities. The latest Pristina proposal stipulates that up to 90% of K-Serbs will live in predominantly Serbian municipalities in southern and northern Kosovo. It seems that IC accepted “asymmetric” competences, which will be exercised more by K-S municipalities. IC’s intention is to make K-Serbs largely self-governed within Kosovo and managing its everyday life as well as its heritage.

Speaking about practical issues SRSG mentioned that UNMIK had been trying to engage IC more in the northern municipalities, to bring donors to the north. The estimated amount of recent IC funding is about 1.5 million Euros. It could be even more if not for non-acceptance of funding from PISG valued roughly at two million Euros in wages and salaries for healthcare and education, QIPs and some other KCB budget lines. SRSG encouraged the presidents to reconsider this stance because that money belongs to Serbian community. He stressed importance of participation of northern municipalities in 2007 budget process.

SRSG also touched upon the issue of returns. He emphasized the imminent completion of reconstruction in Svinjare and the need not to leave the new houses uninhabited during winter.

DM started from the last topic. He emphasized that the problem of returns exists not only for K-Serb IDPs from Svinjare but also from Obilic, and not only from 2004 but also from 1999. The PISG and the International Community failed to facilitate returns of both. He opined that this situation should be objectively reported in the upcoming UNMIK Standards Report. He also stressed the very difficult situation with regard to those IDPs located in the two unfinished buildings in Zvecan and hoped that the SRSG could help in this regard. DM mentioned that at the same time there are some returns of K-Albanian to their reconstructed houses in the municipality.

DM fully shared SRSG’s opinion regarding importance of decentralization, especially of strengthened local self-governance.

With regard to the municipal funding, DM stressed that despite the fact that part of the budget for 2006 was not spent due to boycott of PISG institutions, this money belongs to the Municipality as it comes from tax collection and border taxation. Furthermore, the northern MAPs have proposed a solution that could be acceptable for both sides and that is to deposit the money in special alternative municipal bank accounts, but UNMIK did not accept this option, though it worked well for EAR, USAID and “Mercy Corp”.

DM added that the only acceptable solution for Serbs with regard to Kosovo Status is a one of compromise between Pristina and Belgrade and that he disagrees with the statement made by the SE that a negotiated solution is not possible between the two parties. Any imposed solution would be unacceptable for K-Serbs, and negotiations should continue. The SCR should embrace basic principles of SCR 1244.

DM thanked the SRSG for his time and his visit and expressed wish to have more of these meetings in the future.

SR, while supporting main points made by the Zvecan MAP, expressed concern that not only UNMIK is not playing role in status process but also IC is not effectively involved. He opined that the entire process is left to the SE who seems not to be interested in finding of negotiated solution. Both K-Serbs and K-Albanians depend on the substance of the status package and it should not be in hands of one individual. It is rather a paradoxical situation: for many years Serbs have been pressured to participate in dialogue and criticized for lack of enthusiasm in this regard, and now they are told that a solution cannot be found through dialogue.

SR pointed out importance of economic decentralization. He cited one example – numerous times explained to previous SRSGs - how Zubin Potok had been economically exploited and discriminated. As we first reported in 2005, the local Serbs believe that company "Ibar Lepenac"-- based in Pristina and made up of K-Albanians -- wrongly claims to represent the Ibar Company which actually runs the Gazivode Dam and Hydro plant in Zubin Potok. “Ibar Lepenac” is nothing more that a group of former Ibar employees who misrepresented themselves as the proper management of Ibar in order to collect the 10 million euros a year in payments for the water and power from Gazivode. In return, the people who actually run the Dam get nothing other than funds for 40 of the 200 people who work for Ibar in the north. SR suggested that “Ibar Lepenac” should be moved to Zubin Potok, where it can manage the supply and distribution network for both sides of the River. SR noted that the Serbs had never thought of stopping the water flow into the south, though they were sure the Albanians would have done it if the situation were vice-versa.

VB noted that they had a number of meetings with the internationals, where they presented their problems and their solutions for those problems. However, the results were not tangible. He reiterated that the IC had stated that first standards should be reached in order to get the status. From all the standards, only the standard which concerns creating of the KPC was achieved. The rest of the standards, such as Freedom of Movement, Returns etc. have not been fulfilled.

Referring to SRSG statement that he would present his report on Kosovo to SC on 13 December, VB pleaded that he present a real picture of Kosovo. He gave an example of a recent celebration of Flag Day by Albanians in the South of Kosovo and in Serbia (Bujanovac), where Serb flag was replaced by Albanian flag.

Regarding the influx of international funding to the North, VB stated that it was true that there had been an increase of funding to the North from IC; however, if it was compared to the funding in the South during the last seven years, the proportion was negligible.

As an example of skewed investments toward Albanian citizens, he presented a case of a return project in three Albanian villages in Leposavic Municipality (so called KBC villages). VB said that according to one Albanian from those villages, some beneficiaries were not real owners of the houses. They left the village after the war, because they had killed some forest man in that area, but now they got the houses as returnees. Also the infrastructure was not installed in proper way. The roads were put along the ridge of the hill, in the opposite direction from Leposavic. Having once served in the military, he could tell that the road had been constructed with a different purpose.

As for the Serb IDPs, nothing was done. Without support from Serbian Government, CCK and Red Cross, all those people would have died. Roma returns have been also discussed for seven years. Mr. Pedersen gave even the date when they would be back, but nothing was done. Currently, Municipality of Leposavic is constructing a kindergarten in the town, and the location is next to a Roma camp. Nobody could guarantee hygienic standards in the kindergarten under those conditions. VB asked that SRSG solve the problem, as his position enabled him to do that.

In regards to final status, VB stated that it should be based on compromise. He further elaborated, that any other decision would not pass. IC can try to convince K-Serbs that cohabitation between K-Serbs and K-Albanians is possible, but not ethnically mixed settlements.

VB also commented that there was an agreement that there would no be customs established on the border crossing, however, currently there is a big sign “Customs Zone”. IC should be honest and see the reality. K-Serbs could not survive if they were left to live together with Albanians. There will be no survival of K-Serbs in the South, regardless of decentralization arrangements. Even now we are witnessing disappearance of Serbs from the South.

SRSG disagreed with the notion that the SE is not interested in negotiations. There were 10 months of intensive negotiations mainly on four topics. Issues like split of former Yugoslavia’s debts had been discussed in great details, a mutually acceptable solution was found, and there was no need for further discussions. SRSG opined that K-Serbs should be interested in keeping momentum and finding solutions instead of maintaining a state of uncertainty.

SRSG also rejected the statement that “nothing had been done” by UNMIK on specific issues mentioned. Regarding unsolved criminal cases, he informed that investigation is ongoing and some arrests had been made and soon UNMIK will be able to report progress. However it also depends on cooperation of people with Police. There are indications that not all of them are ethnically motivated, although that does not make them any better, nor does it mean that we do not need to solve them.

DM fully agreed with the SRSG that there was no sound evidence that the security incidents that took place in April and May, and which led to municipal assembly decisions to suspend all cooperation with the central PISG, were ethnically motivated. However, the concern is that the number of security incidents increased, be they ethically motivated or not, and that none of these cases was solved. They need information, whatever it is.

Speaking about returns, SRSG stated that there was increase in returns after the Protocol between UNMIK and Belgrade was signed in June 2006. While acknowledging regretable delays in Roma return, he informed interlocutors that in January 2007 actual returns to Roma Mahalla could start and there is a need of good cooperation with the K-Serbian community.

With regard to “Ibar Lepenac”(whose HQ apparently has always been in Pristina), SRSG stressed that UNMIK cannot do anything outside institutions. Even if valid, this case should be brought to the KTA Board, where a seat is reserved for a K-Serb and a possibility of consensus decisions exists. This particular case has never been discussed there. It can be fixed not outside of institutions but inside when your voice is heard. It would also be better if privatization of SOEs could have started in the northern municipalities.

DM explained that when saying “nothing” they meant tangible results regarding returns.

About participation in Kosovo institutions, he expressed view that participation of K-Serbs in the past resulted in March 2004. The only outcome of an appointment of K-Serb as minister of MCR was embezzlement of few million Euros and no returns. DM reiterated that K-Serbs would like to take part in institutions that would be democratic and where they won’t be outvoted by the majority community and where they will not simply serve as decoration.

DM raised issue of electricity. He referred to confusing information regarding present status of negotiations in Belgrade between CCK and UNMIK on a possibility for K-Serbs to receive donation of electricity from Serbia. In this regard, SRSG stressed that the negotiations between KEK and CCK are still on-going, despite some premature statements from CCK. However, there is a fairly good chance that an agreement between CCK and KEK will be reached. K-Serbs have been receiving electricity for a long time. The agreement should also deal with this situation. DM fully agreed that K-Serbs should be paying with some special arrangements for IDPs, unemployed and other social cases. But it also true that consumers should have a right to choose distributor, which is impossible with the existing monopoly. Serbs in the north suggested somebody else who could deal with payments and distribution. Kosovo could be an exporter of electricity, but with the way how KEK is running business it cannot provide efficient power even within Kosovo. DM also mentioned problem of telephone communication.

SRSG commended desire to pay for electricity and reassured interlocutors that in accordance with The Athens Agreement there will be a consumers’ choice in Kosovo. He also explained procedure for “Electrokosmet” to start operations in Kosovo: first, it should apply for license; receive license, and then begin operational activities. This process can take time. The same applies for telephone communications: 063 and 064 should apply for license.

In closing, participants agreed on the importance of continued dialogue and committed themselves to further meetings.

(Drafted by xxxxxxxxxxxx, SPA, Mitrovica RHQ, 8 December 2006)

* Note:  See previous for the briefing memo prepared for this meeting:   https://realdiplomacy.blogspot.com/2019/01/kosovo-briefing-note-for-new-srsgs.html

2011: Kosovo: Time for a New Approach

I left Kosovo in October 2008 with some encouragement from the UNMIK leadership and DPKO.  (I transferred to UNMIT in East Timor as chief of staff.)  But I continued to follow events in Kosovo, contributing pieces to TransConflict, and had visited northern Kosovo in June, 2011.  I can't quite remember how the invitation came up to testify in November to the US Congress on Kosovo but I did.  Here follows the text of my comments to the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representative.  (Note:  The Quint refers to the Contact Group on Kosovo -- the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia -- without Russia, which opposed Kosovo independence.  EULEX is the EU's rule of law entity in Kosovo and its police.)

(Note:  All documents posted in this space can be and enlarged and downloaded by clicking on them.)



 

Kosovo 2007: UNMIK HQ Gets the North wrong

From my 2007 journal:

October 23:  Today was a difficult day.  Went down to Pristina early to meet the DPKO Assistant Secretary General and brief him on the way up for meeting in Mitrovica.  I think the briefing -- which I used to broach the perceptions of reality from up here and how they differ from UNHQ Pristina -- and the meetings -- in which he could see and feel the intractable situation we face -- went well.  But I have been blindsided before by a polite hearing that hid an already established agenda.  Yesterday I saw a "code cable" to New York that was blatantly misleading about Serb "parallel institutions.  I had the ASG meet with my whole senior staff so he could hear from them.  He encouraged me to put our views down on paper through a cable to NY.  I already keep a number of NY people on my email list.  He is inviting me to help correct the picture before a Nov 6 meeting to be chaired by the Secretary General.  All and all, I'd say we are reaching some internal "cleansing of the spears."  

November 5: ... Had an inconclusive meeting with the SRSG this afternoon.  He is clueless but not absolutely stupid.  He understands that I cannot be run down or over but still doesn't know what to do with me and still doesn't understand the depth of the lake of shit all around us and what we need to do to keep from having it flood the little Potemkin village we live in.

I drafted two code cables per the ASG's suggestion, the first follows below the second will be in the next post.  Both were sent.
 

 

2007 -- Recommendation for a Stepped Process to Kosovo Independence

By mid-2007, it seemed clear that the Kosovo status stalemate could not hold much longer before the K-Albanians took action on their own.  This seemed so to me, though responsible for the K-Serb majority north, as it was to the US, which alone could hold the leash on Pristina.  In consultation with the PDSRSG (the principle deputy -- and a former US general -- to the UNMIK SRSG, a hapless German), I drew an outline for a series of steps the K-Albanian leadership could take leading up to a declaration of independence in 2008.  They emphasized peaceful, reassuring moves making clear that Kosovo could not wait forever.  We hoped at the time that it would coincide with an agreement to implement the Ahtisaari proposals for a unified Kosovo with local autonomy for the K-Serbs.  That didn't happen and in February 2008, the Albanians did declare independence unilaterally.  I discussed the situation with the south Mitrovica (K-Albanian) city manager and passed him the "stepped process" paper in August.  (He later became a minister in the Pristina government.)  This was neither a UN nor US initiative but sanctioned unofficially by the PDSRSG. The paper as passed follows:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A Stepped Process

The current situation of no status and no sure way forward is unstable. An uncertain process apparently going nowhere – or worse yet perhaps seen leading to partition or continued association to Serbia – increasingly unsustainable vis-à-vis Albanian majority. Maybe by miracle, the parties will reach agreement or the Europeans will discover they cannot simply sit back and let things drift into the rocks. Otherwise, K-Albanian frustration with the lack of prospects – political but also economic, for jobs, electricity, heat, etc – will make control ever more problematic for everyone. Most Albanians will be thinking about how to force events. Some may look to threats and violence, others hopefully for a political way forward. The essential political option would appear UDI.

UDI is a huge step. The Albanians were led to believe they would win independence through the Ahtisaari process and they would have EU and US support at the end. For UDI, they face moving forward without this support. The US cannot act alone and it cannot give a “green light" to unilateral moves by the K-Albanians if it does not have at least minimum support from the Europeans. However, perhaps the US could – however reluctantly – use warnings from the Albanians of intended unilateral moves to push the Europeans forward into the critical mass necessary for a successful launch. The Europeans will only respond to crisis; the key is creating a controlled one unfolding gradually to give the US the leverage and the time to use it diplomatically. The path to UDI means the Albanians must make clear to all that action is necessary but the process will unfold in a way that gives time for diplomacy to produce a UNSC resolution or US/European agreement if possible.

The K-Albanian leadership would have to be united – indeed formation of a new government of national unity (forget elections) would loudly signal seriousness of purpose – and resolute to convince the US and others that they will respond to the political realities of Kosovo even if it means going it alone or with whatever friends they have. Nothing should be presented as a threat but simply as a political course of action forced by events – “we must respond somehow to the dead-end we have been led into” – and to preempt other, less helpful alternatives. The leadership must accept that threats – of violence in Kosovo or Presevo and Tetevo – is exactly the wrong strategy for them (and only serves Belgrade). The right strategy would be a controlled, steady, stepped process emphasizing the maturity of the Albanian leadership and people and their readiness to join the European community. Every move forward would be with open hands to the K-Serbs and accompanied by clear and complete commitment to the Ahtisaari plan. All PISG actions would not only have to adhere strictly to the Standards but be seen as consistent with, and aimed at, implementing the Ahtisaari plan in word and spirit. The goal, the mantra, would be creation of an "independent, fair and just Kosovo for all its people" with full adherence to the Ahtisaari plan including the ICO mission.

To be successful, this strategy requires complete control on the Albanian side and sufficient steps and time to allow everyone to react as positively as possible. The united leadership would signal that they are prepared to take a series of steps leading to the desired end state (no need to constantly say “independence” since all know that) no matter what. Each step would have to be broadcast clearly and ahead of time and carried out in a united, mature, and responsible manner consistent with strong adherence to carrying out the Ahtisaari plan and by doing all possible to pro-actively reach out to and provide for the minority communities. (Bad example new decision on KS plates/KEK.) All other goals must be subject to these.

Tactically, the leadership must remain disciplined and focused. Obsessing about partition or whatever other “trial-balloons” (such as confederation) are raised must be avoided in order to maintain control of the negotiating and broader agenda. Any attempt do divert attention such as these – even if from some in the IC – must be seen as provocations and avoided as such.

Possible Steps

First 15 days

• Reconfirm willingness to hear whatever Serbia has to offer and to judge that on basis of what Kosovo people want and need. Avoid any appearance of conditions for talks. Note special interest in how to best serve interests of non-Albanian communities. (Maybe suggest working group on mechanisms for implementing decentralization/linkages in which K-Serbs, especially from south, might take lead.) Let realities of what can be negotiated or not to emerge from the talks themselves. Go anywhere and raise no procedural problems.
• Stop talking about possible violence or “instability” and about concerns over partition, etc. Start talking about pressing need to begin dealing practically with Kosovo’s political and economic realities to ensure a peaceful future for all.
• Begin visible and genuine effort to form all-inclusive “technical” government, suggest this might take place of near-term elections. Suggest this national unity government will remain in place until Status is achieved.
• Explain quietly to US, Brits, EU, Germans and French – perhaps in that order – that political realities and especially pressure for breaking impasse cannot be put off indefinitely. “We will have to begin responding in a visible way – and participating in elections will not be enough by itself – or risk losing control of the situation. We are exploring political options (not to be specified at this point) but including the “technical government.” We’d appreciate your support for this.” Avoid suggesting deadlines at this point.

Second 15 days

• Continue serious engagement with Troika but be privately honest with US and others about progress or lack in the “negotiations.” Avoid much public comment.
• Announce formation of technical government and decision to not hold elections until Status is achieved. (This is first “unilateral” step and no one can complain if you don’t.)
• Tell US alone what you plan to be doing next few months and explain that it is an effort to manage the process until end-of-year holidays but that this cannot be maintained much longer than beginning of New Year. Tensions will soon outweigh ability to keep things together. US should use this period to get the Europeans ready for declaration.
• Begin holding series of town meetings in various parts of Kosovo (nowhere provocative though) to “learn the people’s concerns.” Keep the IC out of it (including UNMIK-P) and do whatever is necessary to avoid large crowds or events that get out of control. Reps from all parties can attend or they can be delegated on basis of local politics to represent everyone. (Second “unilateral” step.)
• Announce that consultations with the people will continue through early December, so that a clear view will be obtained of public concerns and sentiments. (But don’t once say “about independence.” Very important at this phase is what is not said.)

Next 60 days

• Continue engagement in negotiations.
• Continue town-hall meetings (with perhaps break for Ramadan days, calling for everyone to reflect about the future and the need for peaceful chance during these days, Imams preaching this will be very effective).
• Concentrate fully on making technical government work. Work as much as possible – and as visibly as possible – with the EU and ICO on getting ready to implement Ahtisaari plan. Do as much as possible on getting ready to implement new municipalities. (Perhaps allow UNMIK creation of North Mitrovica as first step and sign of seriousness.) Avoid public disagreements on anything remotely related to status.
• Do everything possible to make Serbs, especially south of the River, as happy as possible. Support any realistic returns project. Resolve any procedural issues, use all possibilities for practical cooperation
• Focus all resources possible on preparing for the winter.
• Keep US and others privately apprised of your views on Troika process. If the process is visibly moribund or going nowhere at some point, urgently ask US and others “what do we do now” but make clear if necessary – and not through the press – that the CG principles cannot be abandoned without great political cost for all.

Next 30 days

• Wrap up town hall meetings in time to prepare a “report” that will go to the national assembly on December 6. Announce that the Assembly will take up consideration of how to respond to what has been learned from these consultations with the people and the results of the negotiations. Give no date.
• Give US and others frank, but private, view of value of negotiations. Explain that you have been working hard to manage political process but things must begin moving forward one way or another early next year.
• Allow “spontaneous” but absolutely controlled public rallies (by party and/or region) in favor of taking next steps, in favor of independence. As large as can be safely held with NO incidents whatever. These must be seen as mature displays of readiness for assuming control over own future. No threatening words or actions.
• Announce travel of unity team (all government parties) to major capitals to consult on next steps consistent with Ahtisaari plan early in new year.
• Encourage and help everyone to enjoy the coming holidays.
• Tell US alone (and maybe Brits) that national assembly will go into session to discuss next steps after holidays and to begin drafting a declaration of independence. You are prepared to discuss but this step will be inevitable. Process will include further consultations and town meetings to vet the document. Declaration would be made sometime early spring. If meanwhile, EU or even UNSC can make decision, so much the better.
• Show IC calm determination. Continue to exercise control, resist all provocations (especially from north) and give UNMIK and KFOR full support for their efforts.

January 2008

• At beginning of month, inform other key countries that Assembly will begin drafting declaration by month’s end.
• Assembly reconvenes and finishes discussion of previous consultations with focus on next steps in line with Ahtisaari plan. All views aired, visibly gauge public reaction.
• By month’s end, national unity government announces that Assembly will next take up task of drafting a declaration of independence while awaiting possible UNSC action. (Big unilateral step but still not the final one).

February 2008

• Make it privately clear to US and Europeans that you have done all possible to give them time but with or without them, you must take next steps to preserve stability. You will do your part to maintain security and to prepare for implementation of Ahtisaari plan. They must get ready to play theirs. Reaffirm your adherence to CG three principles and remind them of theirs. No one can be allowed to veto this process. Declaration – date certain – will be in April.
• Process of drafting Declaration enshrining commitment to Kosovo for all its people and to Ahtisaari plan starts in Assembly. No rallies or demonstrations at this point put serious discussion throughout the land.

March 2008

• Draft declaration is approved and published. New series of town meeting held to consult with the people.
• Continued efforts to publicly reassure and reach-out to non-Albanians.
• Absolute control necessary. No violence, threats or incidents. Resist all provocations while supporting KPS, UNMIK and KFOR as necessary.
• US and others informed of date in April for declaration. Message: the public process so far has helped to channel and contain public sentiments, process cannot now be stopped.

April 2008

• Announce elections for four months after declaration (as called for in Ahtisaari plan).
• Be ready for crisis appeals/demands from IC to give negotiations “another chance.”
• More large but controlled spontaneous marches and rallies for declaration.
• April 23 (?), declaration approved by Assembly.

end text

• 
  

00 Brasilia 0331: Inching Along GOB Reforms Advance Slowly *

* Note:  This was the last substantive cable sent under my name and the last of the Brazil series of cable to be posted here.  (I departed Brasilia on February 1, 2000.) f anything redacted in this series strikes interest, you can always do a FOIA request of your own. 

00 Brasilia 0242: FM Lampreia Meets With Inter-American Dialogue, Discusses FTAA and Colombia

00 Brasilia 0236: Inter-American Dialogue Meets With Forthright FHC

00 Brasilia 0219: Defense Minister Alvares Falls; Replacement Named

99 Brasilia 04465: Brazilian Congress Forgives Electoral Fines

99 Brasilia 04380: Security Chief Resigns After Demonstrator Dies At Brasilia Public Works Agency

99 Brasilia 04371: Opposition Worker's Party Congress: Moderates Gain (But Don't Press) the Advantage