After I left Kosovo in 2008 (and East Timor in 2010), I continued to follow events there and to respond to questions and comment. The three items below are the responses to questions from someone doing a masters thesis and from the European Voice plus a lette to the European Voice. (I believe the European Voice is now defunt.) If the last item was ever published, I don't have it. (Btw, you can click on these documents to read them in full original and download them.)
US State Department cables from places I have served plus items from my time as a UN peacekeeper. To increase public awareness of how diplomacy and peacekeeping are (were) actually done. All cables cleared by USG FOIA procedure. Cables are mostly those sent under my name from my posts but also others in which I was directly involved. UN documents and other items will also include occasional notes and background. Most recent in series on top with cables under the new series of UN documents.
Showing posts with label international relations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international relations. Show all posts
Thursday, December 20, 2018
Friday, November 16, 2018
2011: Kosovo: Time for a New Approach
I left Kosovo in October 2008 with some encouragement from the UNMIK leadership and DPKO. (I transferred to UNMIT in East Timor as chief of staff.) But I continued to follow events in Kosovo, contributing pieces to TransConflict, and had visited northern Kosovo in June, 2011. I can't quite remember how the invitation came up to testify in November to the US Congress on Kosovo but I did. Here follows the text of my comments to the Subcommittee on Europe and
Eurasia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representative. (Note: The Quint refers to the Contact Group on Kosovo -- the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia -- without Russia, which opposed Kosovo independence. EULEX is the EU's rule of law entity in Kosovo and its police.)
(Note: All documents posted in this space can be and enlarged and downloaded by clicking on them.)
(Note: All documents posted in this space can be and enlarged and downloaded by clicking on them.)
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Saturday, November 10, 2018
Kosovo 2007: Understanding the North
Following up the previous entry, from my journal for November 27, 2007.:
Had to go to Pristina today for lunch with the chief DPKO guy for Europe, who encouraged me to keep doing what we are doing and to let them know when UNMIK HQ strays into anything that will upset the apple cart in the north. They liked my dissent messages and share our view that the basic thing is to get the UN out of here before the real crisis hits. That means before Kosovo becomes a failed state and the north fully partitions. The UN New York plan is to somehow squeeze between competing pressures from the West and Russia to leave five months after the UDI expected in the 2nd half of January, turning things essentially over to the EU, before it fully understands what it will be getting. I suggested we won't be able to last five months.
The second code cable I drafted follows here:
Had to go to Pristina today for lunch with the chief DPKO guy for Europe, who encouraged me to keep doing what we are doing and to let them know when UNMIK HQ strays into anything that will upset the apple cart in the north. They liked my dissent messages and share our view that the basic thing is to get the UN out of here before the real crisis hits. That means before Kosovo becomes a failed state and the north fully partitions. The UN New York plan is to somehow squeeze between competing pressures from the West and Russia to leave five months after the UDI expected in the 2nd half of January, turning things essentially over to the EU, before it fully understands what it will be getting. I suggested we won't be able to last five months.
The second code cable I drafted follows here:
Friday, October 26, 2018
Fears of a Kosovo Partition (July 2006)
By
mid-2006, Western concern over the unstable Kosovo situation had come to take the form of UNMIK Pristina worrying over a possible move by the northern Kosovo Serbs to implement a "hard" partition of the north to preempt an expected unilateral move by the Kosovo Albanians south of the Ibar to declare independence from Serbia. (In the event, the northern K-Serbs never did seek partition -- though they hoped, and still hope, that Belgrade would thus save them -- while the K-Albanians did take the first move by declaring independence in February 2008.) UNMIK's HQ stood in the middle of the K-Albanian capital of Kosovo -- Pristina -- and was under the direct influence of the Western countries (and especially the US and UK) which fully supported the K-Albanian position. (At the US Office's July 4th celebration that year, the head of the office publicly called the northerners that UNMIK Mitrovica worked with "troublemakers.) Under those influences -- channeled by the Office of Political Affairs (OPA) -- the UNMIK leadership grew quite paranoid about a northern partition. OPA prepared a strategy paper outlining how UNMIK might work to prevent it. OPA drafted a Code Cable in July to be sent to New York to cover the paper. I don't remember UNMIK Mitrovica being given the chance to be involved in the preparation. However, the PDSRSG was not unaware of the realities of the north so the OPA paper had to recognize that UNMIK had little to work with beyond continued diplomacy and peacekeeping. In the event, in late July, he and I had the opportunity in Vienna to brief senior Western officials and Martti Ahtisaari (the UNSG's Special Envoy for Kosovo negotiations, UNOSEK) on the north. It
became clear that the Western dictum against partition was little more than words. The draft code cable follows. (I'm not sure it was sent.) The full draft strategy paper is too long to provide here.
________________________________________________________________________
Tuesday, October 9, 2018
2007 -- Recommendation for a Stepped Process to Kosovo Independence
By mid-2007, it seemed clear that the Kosovo status stalemate could not hold much longer before the K-Albanians took action on their own. This seemed so to me, though responsible for the K-Serb majority north, as it was to the US, which alone could hold the leash on Pristina. In consultation with the PDSRSG (the principle deputy -- and a former US general -- to the UNMIK SRSG, a hapless German), I drew an outline for a series of steps the K-Albanian leadership could take leading up to a declaration of independence in 2008. They emphasized peaceful, reassuring moves making clear that Kosovo could not wait forever. We hoped at the time that it would coincide with an agreement to implement the Ahtisaari proposals for a unified Kosovo with local autonomy for the K-Serbs. That didn't happen and in February 2008, the Albanians did declare independence unilaterally. I discussed the situation with the south Mitrovica (K-Albanian) city manager and passed him the "stepped process" paper in August. (He later became a minister in the Pristina government.) This was neither a UN nor US initiative but sanctioned unofficially by the PDSRSG. The paper as passed follows:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Stepped Process
The
current situation of no status and no sure way forward is unstable.
An uncertain process apparently going nowhere – or worse yet
perhaps seen leading to partition or continued association to Serbia
– increasingly unsustainable vis-Ã -vis Albanian majority. Maybe
by miracle, the parties will reach agreement or the Europeans will
discover they cannot simply sit back and let things drift into the
rocks. Otherwise, K-Albanian frustration with the lack of prospects
– political but also economic, for jobs, electricity, heat, etc –
will make control ever more problematic for everyone. Most Albanians
will be thinking about how to force events. Some may look to threats
and violence, others hopefully for a political way forward. The
essential political option would appear UDI.
UDI
is a huge step. The Albanians were led to believe they would win
independence through the Ahtisaari process and they would have EU and
US support at the end. For UDI, they face moving forward without
this support. The US cannot act alone and it cannot give a “green
light" to unilateral moves by the K-Albanians if it does not
have at least minimum support from the Europeans. However, perhaps
the US could – however reluctantly – use warnings from the
Albanians of intended unilateral moves to push the Europeans forward
into the critical mass necessary for a successful launch. The
Europeans will only respond to crisis; the key is creating a
controlled one unfolding gradually
to give the US the leverage and the time to use it diplomatically.
The path to UDI means the Albanians must make clear to all that
action is necessary but the process will unfold in a way that gives
time for diplomacy to produce a UNSC resolution or US/European
agreement if possible.
The
K-Albanian leadership would have to be united – indeed formation of
a new government of national unity (forget elections) would loudly
signal seriousness of purpose – and resolute to convince the US and
others that they will respond to the political realities of Kosovo
even if it means going it alone or with whatever friends they have.
Nothing should be presented as a threat but simply as a political
course of action forced by events – “we
must respond somehow to the dead-end we have been led into”
– and to preempt
other, less helpful alternatives.
The leadership must accept that threats – of violence in Kosovo or
Presevo and Tetevo – is exactly the wrong strategy for
them (and
only serves Belgrade). The right strategy would be a controlled,
steady, stepped process emphasizing the maturity of the Albanian
leadership and people and their readiness to join the European
community. Every move forward would be with open hands to the
K-Serbs and accompanied by clear and complete commitment to the
Ahtisaari plan. All PISG actions would not only have to adhere
strictly to the Standards but be seen as consistent with, and aimed
at, implementing the Ahtisaari plan in word and spirit. The goal,
the mantra, would be creation of an "independent, fair and just
Kosovo for all its people" with full adherence to the Ahtisaari
plan including the ICO mission.
To
be successful, this strategy requires complete control on the
Albanian side and sufficient steps and time to allow everyone to
react as positively as possible. The united leadership would signal
that they are prepared to take a series of steps leading to the
desired end state (no need to constantly say “independence” since
all know that) no matter what. Each step would have to be broadcast
clearly and ahead of time and carried out in a united, mature, and
responsible manner consistent with strong adherence to carrying out
the Ahtisaari plan and by doing all possible to pro-actively reach
out to and provide for the minority communities. (Bad example new
decision on KS plates/KEK.) All
other goals must be subject to these.
Tactically,
the leadership must remain disciplined and focused. Obsessing about
partition or whatever other “trial-balloons” (such as
confederation) are raised must be avoided in order to maintain
control of the negotiating and broader agenda. Any attempt do divert
attention such as these – even if from some in the IC – must be
seen as provocations and avoided as such.
Possible Steps
First
15 days
-
Reconfirm willingness to hear whatever Serbia has to offer and to judge that on basis of what Kosovo people want and need. Avoid any appearance of conditions for talks. Note special interest in how to best serve interests of non-Albanian communities. (Maybe suggest working group on mechanisms for implementing decentralization/linkages in which K-Serbs, especially from south, might take lead.) Let realities of what can be negotiated or not to emerge from the talks themselves. Go anywhere and raise no procedural problems.
-
Stop talking about possible violence or “instability” and about concerns over partition, etc. Start talking about pressing need to begin dealing practically with Kosovo’s political and economic realities to ensure a peaceful future for all.
-
Begin visible and genuine effort to form all-inclusive “technical” government, suggest this might take place of near-term elections. Suggest this national unity government will remain in place until Status is achieved.
-
Explain quietly to US, Brits, EU, Germans and French – perhaps in that order – that political realities and especially pressure for breaking impasse cannot be put off indefinitely. “We will have to begin responding in a visible way – and participating in elections will not be enough by itself – or risk losing control of the situation. We are exploring political options (not to be specified at this point) but including the “technical government.” We’d appreciate your support for this.” Avoid suggesting deadlines at this point.
Second
15 days
-
Continue serious engagement with Troika but be privately honest with US and others about progress or lack in the “negotiations.” Avoid much public comment.
-
Announce formation of technical government and decision to not hold elections until Status is achieved. (This is first “unilateral” step and no one can complain if you don’t.)
-
Tell US alone what you plan to be doing next few months and explain that it is an effort to manage the process until end-of-year holidays but that this cannot be maintained much longer than beginning of New Year. Tensions will soon outweigh ability to keep things together. US should use this period to get the Europeans ready for declaration.
-
Begin holding series of town meetings in various parts of Kosovo (nowhere provocative though) to “learn the people’s concerns.” Keep the IC out of it (including UNMIK-P) and do whatever is necessary to avoid large crowds or events that get out of control. Reps from all parties can attend or they can be delegated on basis of local politics to represent everyone. (Second “unilateral” step.)
-
Announce that consultations with the people will continue through early December, so that a clear view will be obtained of public concerns and sentiments. (But don’t once say “about independence.” Very important at this phase is what is not said.)
Next 60 days
-
Continue engagement in negotiations.
-
Continue town-hall meetings (with perhaps break for Ramadan days, calling for everyone to reflect about the future and the need for peaceful chance during these days, Imams preaching this will be very effective).
-
Concentrate fully on making technical government work. Work as much as possible – and as visibly as possible – with the EU and ICO on getting ready to implement Ahtisaari plan. Do as much as possible on getting ready to implement new municipalities. (Perhaps allow UNMIK creation of North Mitrovica as first step and sign of seriousness.) Avoid public disagreements on anything remotely related to status.
-
Do everything possible to make Serbs, especially south of the River, as happy as possible. Support any realistic returns project. Resolve any procedural issues, use all possibilities for practical cooperation
-
Focus all resources possible on preparing for the winter.
-
Keep US and others privately apprised of your views on Troika process. If the process is visibly moribund or going nowhere at some point, urgently ask US and others “what do we do now” but make clear if necessary – and not through the press – that the CG principles cannot be abandoned without great political cost for all.
Next
30 days
-
Wrap up town hall meetings in time to prepare a “report” that will go to the national assembly on December 6. Announce that the Assembly will take up consideration of how to respond to what has been learned from these consultations with the people and the results of the negotiations. Give no date.
-
Give US and others frank, but private, view of value of negotiations. Explain that you have been working hard to manage political process but things must begin moving forward one way or another early next year.
-
Allow “spontaneous” but absolutely controlled public rallies (by party and/or region) in favor of taking next steps, in favor of independence. As large as can be safely held with NO incidents whatever. These must be seen as mature displays of readiness for assuming control over own future. No threatening words or actions.
-
Announce travel of unity team (all government parties) to major capitals to consult on next steps consistent with Ahtisaari plan early in new year.
-
Encourage and help everyone to enjoy the coming holidays.
-
Tell US alone (and maybe Brits) that national assembly will go into session to discuss next steps after holidays and to begin drafting a declaration of independence. You are prepared to discuss but this step will be inevitable. Process will include further consultations and town meetings to vet the document. Declaration would be made sometime early spring. If meanwhile, EU or even UNSC can make decision, so much the better.
-
Show IC calm determination. Continue to exercise control, resist all provocations (especially from north) and give UNMIK and KFOR full support for their efforts.
January
2008
-
At beginning of month, inform other key countries that Assembly will begin drafting declaration by month’s end.
-
Assembly reconvenes and finishes discussion of previous consultations with focus on next steps in line with Ahtisaari plan. All views aired, visibly gauge public reaction.
-
By month’s end, national unity government announces that Assembly will next take up task of drafting a declaration of independence while awaiting possible UNSC action. (Big unilateral step but still not the final one).
February
2008
-
Make it privately clear to US and Europeans that you have done all possible to give them time but with or without them, you must take next steps to preserve stability. You will do your part to maintain security and to prepare for implementation of Ahtisaari plan. They must get ready to play theirs. Reaffirm your adherence to CG three principles and remind them of theirs. No one can be allowed to veto this process. Declaration – date certain – will be in April.
-
Process of drafting Declaration enshrining commitment to Kosovo for all its people and to Ahtisaari plan starts in Assembly. No rallies or demonstrations at this point put serious discussion throughout the land.
March
2008
-
Draft declaration is approved and published. New series of town meeting held to consult with the people.
-
Continued efforts to publicly reassure and reach-out to non-Albanians.
-
Absolute control necessary. No violence, threats or incidents. Resist all provocations while supporting KPS, UNMIK and KFOR as necessary.
-
US and others informed of date in April for declaration. Message: the public process so far has helped to channel and contain public sentiments, process cannot now be stopped.
April
2008
-
Announce elections for four months after declaration (as called for in Ahtisaari plan).
-
Be ready for crisis appeals/demands from IC to give negotiations “another chance.”
-
More large but controlled spontaneous marches and rallies for declaration.
-
April 23 (?), declaration approved by Assembly.
end text
Wednesday, May 9, 2018
Friday, May 4, 2018
Thursday, April 12, 2018
Thursday, March 29, 2018
Friday, March 23, 2018
Tuesday, March 6, 2018
Tuesday, February 27, 2018
Tuesday, February 13, 2018
Friday, February 9, 2018
Tuesday, January 30, 2018
Wednesday, December 20, 2017
Tuesday, October 31, 2017
Thursday, October 19, 2017
99 Brasilia 04136: Community of Democracies: Brazil Uncommitted*
* Due to the initial jump in entering cables, this one actually follows Brasilia 04125, found here.
Tuesday, October 3, 2017
Tuesday, September 26, 2017
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