Kosovo: Report to the UNSG on the March 17, 2007 Events in North Mitrovica

On May 21, 2008, Judge Francis M. Ssekandi delivered to the UN Security Council a report on his investigation into UNMIK's actions around the March 17, 2007 events in North Mitrovica.  On that date, UNMIK's Pristina HQ ordered the use of force against former Serbian court officials occupying the courthouse in the northern part of the city.  We in the region -- UNMIK, UN Police and the local NATO elements, had argued against pursuing that course of action.  The report has not, to my knowledge, ever been released.  But it highlights the need for the UN to not take sides in resolving political issues during its peacekeeping mission.  A former UN New York staff member gave me a copy some time ago. 

Judge Ssekendi interviewed me and many others for the report, which was the background to the UNSG's eventual decision to replace the top UNMIK leadership -- the SRSG and his principle deputy -- by not renewing their contracts.  The report contains some comments from the disgraced UNMIK leadership suggesting that I improperly was in contact with some member governments and passed my debacle report to the Serbs.  I did, of course, have frequent contacts with member state representatives -- especially with those from Security Council countries -- in an effort to help them understand the complexities of the north.  I made a special effort to do this with the US office in Pristina as its staff were forbidden to even visit north Mitrovica to see for themselves.  I did not release my debacle report to anyone not of the UN international staff in Kosovo and New York.  I learned later that one of my officers had done so because he thought it would prove useful in convincing the northern Kosovo Serbs that the UN staff in the north was not part of an effort to subject them to the new "independent" Kosovo government.  The Ssekandi report did in fact note UNMIK Pristina's apparent tilt toward using its UNSCR 1244 peacekeeping mandate to assist instead Pristina's efforts to subject the northern Serbs to its control, thus abandoning status neutrality.  UNMIK Pristina was pushed in this direction by the US, UK and Germany.

The Scekandi report noted that UNMIK HQ would have been better served by taking into account our warnings from the north.  But by the time of the March events, I had become a perceived problem in Pristina because of our repeated efforts to caution against use of force and instead urging dialogue with the K-Serbs and elements of the Serbian government in a position to assist in gaining a peaceful outcome to the court seizure.

Kosovo: Meeting of the Mitrovica Focus Group, 19 April 2006

This was an attempt to bring together the north Kosovo Serbian community with the Pristina diplomatic community to reengage on practical issues of local concern.  Not all of the internationals felt comfortable doing this on their own.  The Americans did not feel safe even going into the north.  The meeting was held in our UNMIK Mitrovica HQ.  (I did not draft these minutes.) 

UNMIK Participants: Gerard Gallucci, RR Mitrovica; Andrei Efimov, SPA Mitrovica; Detlef Beisiegel, MR Leposavic; Jean-Luc Sintes, MR Zubin Potok; Alex Melbourne, OIC MR Zvecan, michail Krasnoshchekov, PAO/SRSG, Svetlana Pencheva , PED, Mitrovica, LtCol. Noel Joyce, Senior MLO Mitrovica, Lt.Col. LeMarec, KFOR.

Serbian participants: Momir Kaslovic, Head of regional CCK, Srbrolujb Milenkovic, Chairperson of UAM Advisory Board, Dragisa Milovic, MAP Zvecan, Slavisa Ristic, MAP Zubin Potok; Velimir Bojovic, MAP Leposavic

Participants of International Liaison offices: Zoltan Balazs, Deputy Head of Office, Hungary; Ruairi O’Connel, Deputy Head of Mission, Bristish office; Ann-Sofie Nilsson, Head of office, Sweden; Gloria Di Luca, Deputy head of office, Italy; Wim Peeters, Head of Mission, Belgium; Margriet Struijf, Head of Office, Netherland; Sergey Bazdnikin, Head of Chancery, Russuan Federation; Yvana Enzler, Head of Mission, Swiss LO; Wolfgang Koeth, EC Office; T. Kirk McBride, Chief Political and economic Affairs, USA; Heidi Hakone L Barrachina, PO, US Office, Eugen Wollfarth, Head of German LO, Pierri Johan Kuan, Norweegian LO, Rodolphe Richard, Deputy head French LO, Christos Tzavaras, Head of Greek LO, Christian Siegl, Deputy Head of Austrian LO.

The Regional Representative of Mitrovica Mr. Gerard Gallucci welcome international participants at the first part (without locals) of the meeting of the Mitrovica Focus Group (MFG). He said that the MFG is seen as continuation of the initiative “Friends of Mitrovica” that commenced in early 2004. The MFG is a group with focus on Mitrovica region, the stickiest problem of Kosovo and it is good to see international stakeholders with an interest what the international community can do to keep the place calm and peaceful. MFG is not focused specifically on the north. The next meeting hopefully will embrace all six MAPs of the region. The CA in Mitrovica has been developing relationship with the three northern municipalities and UAM and keeping the relationship with Albanian from the south part of the region. CA is seeking to develop relationship of engaging them positively with the International Community and even offer them some solutions related to the every day problems of local communities. The population in the region has problems with insufficient drinking water usage, and K-Serbs and K-Albanians have found it possible to meet and talk to each other to address this issue. We want your engagement and financial support and we are particularly interested in dialogue between northerners and the international community.Our concern is how to hold the north, which we find to work with us. Serbia might advise them to cease cooperation as it happened with Education. We find it important to give the northerners opportunity to be heard, listening has had positive effect, a focus helping them with a practical concern. They have been advice to keep politics to a minimum when coming here. They will be bringing with them a list of priority quick impact projects of most immediate impact. (QIP). The international community is a good listener and a positive partner.

At the second part of the meeting K-Serbs joined it. The RR gives the floor to K-Serbian participants for brief presentations:

Miomir Kasalovic, Head of Regional CCK. He welcomes participants in his name and on behalf of Sanda Raskovic-Ivic. He presented issues in his opinion comprising the biggest burden for the population in Northern Kosovo:

• Internally displaced persons ( IDPs). There is no adequate accommodation for them and we would like to provide such for everyone.
  • Roma IDPs. It’s one of the huge burdens, for which we need to find solution.
• Employment. It is much needed for IDPs, to have jobs and provide incomes for their families. The CCK is doing as much as possible, but its recourses are rather limited.
• Infrastructure. The road network is in worse state than in 1999. Even what we had has been damaged by heavy KFOR vehicles. We want to improve the road network and to have investments in the road infrastructure

These problems are problems of all ethnicities. I am not going to count everything else we miss and need, but let us start from the basic issues.

Dragisa Milovic, MAP, Zvecan. He welcomes participants. He is MAP of a municipality with 17,000 populations. All problems which have been mentioned by Mr. Kasalovic are common for all northern municipalities. For the first time we stay around the table with people who are willing to help us. More attention has been paid until now to the Albanian community.

• Infrastructure. If you have visited northern municipalities you should have seen the condition of roads there. The infrastructure needs to be improved. The municipality has put efforts but its resources are strongly insufficient.

• IDPs. There are 4,000 IDPs for which only the municipality takes care. Not much has been done for providing decent conditions for IDPs. We fully support new UNMIK approach that allows people to choose to live where they feel comfortable.
• Employment. There is 3,000 unemployed in the municipality, many of them former Trepca workers. We see the solution in opening mines and creation of small and medium size enterprises with 10-50 employees. There are good conditions in the municipality for stock breeding, fruit production, and tourism. Municipality Zvecan has prepared projects and can offer solutions for all these.
• Tourism. Favourable conditions for tourism stay with Banjska mineral spa, where 5,000 people were coming yearly for treatment and rehabilitation till 1999
• Sports facilities. There are not such facilities in the northern part of Kosovo and they are much needed especially for the young generations. To keep young people away from drugs we need to offer them employment, jobs and alternative activities.
• Available experts in all fields. We have experts in all fields who are currently unemployed. What is needed -- a little support and chance to do what they can. We have relevant projects and you may wish to look at them.

Salvias Rustic, MAP Cubin Pothook. He thanks for the opportunity to talk to internationals on practical matters without touching upon politics. If we succeed to solve problems of people for their every day life we shall solve also the political problems. I am MAP of North-West municipality, which had just 10,000 populations till 1999, now the number is much bigger due to many Dips that settled there from other places like Croatia and Bosnia. There is one KA village in the municipality Qabra with 1,200 inhabitants. Zubin Potok had its economic development till 1999. It has resources for pure drinking water for half of Kosovo population. It has plans for development of tourism: we have the lake and the mountain Mokra Gora. There is a hydro station and electric energy is produced in the municipality. The problems in Zubin Potok are:

• Unemployed young people-key problem of the municipality. We want Zubuin Potok to get help in opening new jobs.
• We need a Health House (polyclinic) to improve health care and for emergency cases of patients, because the hospital in North Mitrovica is very far.
• Problems with local road infrastructure. There 64 villages in Zubin Potok in the mountains. Their connection with roads is very bad. In past years some roads have been damaged by heavy KFOR vehicles. The state of streets within Zubin Potok is similar and we need to improve this.
• We need 100 accommodations for IDPs and vulnerable families and individuals.

Velimir Bojovic , MAP Leposavic. The problems in my municipality are the same like mentioned by my colleagues. Leposavic has 20,000 inhabitants. There are 3 Albanian villages, factory for small metal parts in Lesak, “ Parva petiletka” factory in Leposavic, and factory “ Hrast”. Trepca is operational only in Leposavic, where there are two mines. In the past there were several thousand workers in Trepca, but today only 520. Problems we are facing in Leposavic:

• Some problems are related to Belgrade’s policy.Raw materials are imported from Serbia and final products are exported back to Serbia, so custom duties are paid twice.
• There are very good resources for cattle breeding, fruit and berry production, people are interested to work in this field. However, there is no equipment for storage and also credits with favourable conditions are needed.
• There are excellent conditions for tourism. Nothing has been yet constructed on the southern part of Kopaonik Mountain and there are 200 days of snow there, favourable for winter sports.
• There is a spa which waters are favourable for skin diseases near Socanica in the village Kievcice, Elernska reka.
• Other needs are new schools, kindergarten and sports facilities. Leposavic has very good achievements in sports and we would like to provide opportunities for our young generations.
• We have completed the Strategic development plan for Leposavic- (the Development Agenda under mitrovica Initiative project).
• Unemployment levels exceed 3,000. there are experts in all fields. We need minimum conditions and credits to generate income.

Srbroljub Milenkovic, UAM. He welcomes participants. What are needed in the north are 200 accommodations and 1,000 jobs. Our share of municipal capital investment is 10,000 only and we cannot do much with it. The northern part of Mitrovica comprises 1/5 and there are approximately 20,000 inhabitants of which 5,000 IDPs from all over Kosovo. The northern part of Mitrovica is highly multiethnic with Albanians, Turks, Bosnjaks and Gorani living there. However, all economy after 1999 has remained in the south. All facilities such as Cultural centre and sports facilities have been built in the south and there is nothing in the north. In the same time we need these strongly. We also need schools, especially secondary, a Trade centre, green market and kiosk market in order to create favourable conditions for trade and create new jobs. We cannot do much because of very limited budget: for capital investments this year we have only 10 000Euro. These all are important for creating working places. We have very good experience with EAR which funded 2 million heating plant located in the north bur providing heating for both parts of Mitrovica. Under existing financial conditions we even cannot order technical design of a project. Just imagine we will spend all our money for design but afterwards fail to generate donors’ support for its realization.

Representative of EU informed the meeting that the Union committed for 2006 10,5 million Euro for Mitrovica and Zvecan and is prepared to provide 7 million Euro for infrastructure projects in Kosovo. He advised MAPs to consider best options to join these projects. However, he reminded that in accordance with EU rules all proposed projects should contribute to EU integration of Kosovo and for multiethnic links.

MAP Zvecan assured that there will be full transparency and control over donated money. He also stressed that infrastructure definitely relates to all communities.

Momir Kasalovic, asked by RR to provide assessment of political situation, said that there are a lot of concerns on K-Serbian side. Regarding security (explosions during last four days), regarding statements about independence of diplomats representing important countries, regarding lack of returns, regarding “double standards” applied by IC for different communities. It is all unacceptable for K-Serbs. However, they are trying their best to maintain contacts with IC in order to decrease tension (the last meeting was with Frank Wisner). Especially good understanding exists on regional level in Mitrovica.

Kosovo: November 30, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  Here follows the minutes of the fifth meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force to continue EU "coordination" with the United Nations.  I don't seem to have any record of follow up meetings, if any occurred.  But I do have a copy of the OSCE report (a 62 page document) and it can be found here.

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting

30 November 2007

Paricipants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Santillan-Luzuriaga, Butchart Livingson, Strohal (all OSCE), Stadler, Boura, Battista, Carver (all ICO PT), Guehenneux, (KFOR), Zuuccarini (EUPT), Thornton (US Office)

OSCE Preview of Report on Parallel Structures: observed the difficulty in obtaining accurate information from such structures. Noted that approximately 50 individuals serve as “bridge watchers,” who can be reinforced by another 50-250 people at any time. Also noted the dilemma of double jeopardy given the parallel courts and the questionable validity of documents issued by such courts.

Financial Flows: UNMIK estimated that 85 million euros in dinars come across the administrative border from Serbia to finance salaries, pensions, and parallel institutions in the north. Any clampdown on transfers would have to cover the entire border, not just the gates. If the IC were to seize cash transfers, it would have to consider having a distribution network established to allocate the funds to legitimate recipients. Otherwise, potential for unrest (fueled by hard-line propaganda) would increase. Worth exploring a dialogue with Belgrade on how the boycott of PISG is working.

Hospital: Run under Serbia’s Ministry of Health; likely no K/A’s on staff; has refused funding from Pristina; no formal professional ties with K/A medical personnel; not secure for K/A’s to travel to hospital although a few cases of emergency treatment of K/A’s are known; likewise for IC personnel; IC should consider ensuring that medical imports from Serbia are exempted from taxes at border.

University: New rector told UNMIK he is open to dialogue; rector does not appear to be working toward accreditation of diplomas; university budget approx. 12 million euros (no financial links to Pristina); serves 5,000-8,000 students, including in K/S enclaves south of the Ibar (many of these students study in the enclaves and travel to Mitrovica just for exams); university leadership refers to institution as “University of Pristina in Mitrovica” (consensus was that this should be acceptable and downplayed as an issue); some ethnic Albanians from Montenegro enrolled; encourage European Commission to find ways to link the Mitrovica and Pristina universities via Brussels (possible if election of rector of Mitrovica U. meets Bologna standards). OSCE noted that legitimate election of rector only requirement for accreditation. UNMIK will raise informally with Mitrovica U. issue of Bosniaks with PISG diplomas seeking enrollment in Mitrovica U.

General Conclusion: Attempts to dismantle parallel institutions in the early stages of settlement implementation could prove counterproductive.

Next meeting: Thursday, 7 December, 11:00 a.m., ICO PT Office, Pristina

Kosovo: November 9, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  Here follows the minutes of the second meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force to continue EU "coordination" with the United Nations. (Note: CRC refers to Crowd & Riot Control.  I believe ESDP may refer to European Security and Defence Policy operations.)

November 9, 2006

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting (2)

Participants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Butchart Livingston (OSCE), Carver, Stadler (both ICO PT), Zuccarini (EUPT), Guehenneux, Denis (KFOR), Urny (UN Police)

Guests: Moskowitz, Ciaravolo, Rolando (DOJ), Neisse (ICO PT), ??? (US office)

Ad 1) CRC

EUPT informed about tasking to engage also in the CRC planning, while noting that in the overall concept of the future mission the primary responsibility lies with the local authorities, i. e. KPS for the police. Some argued that ESDP needs its own CRC; if not, KFOR needs to stay on the bridge, sending a wrong message contrary to the policy of “towards normalization”. The TF agreed that divided Mitrovica poses a special challenge and therefore identified a need of a standing element to be able to respond to any deterioration of the security situation. A possibility of non-implementation of the status settlement was also noted in this context. 

In general, chain of response is: KPS – IC-police – KFOR. Taking into account the specific situation in Mitrovica, where divisions occur also in KPS, the TF thought that IC-police should remain to stand ready, with KFOR ultimate back-up when necessary / opportune. ICOM’s security should therefore rely on the IC engagement.

Coordination of the IC actors should work through LOs to ICOM. Concerning CRC, there was thinking that the Unit should be led by an IC-commander, with direct links to KPS, to HoICOM and to ICO HQ in Pristina.

Ad 2) The Administrative Border with Serbia

The TF reviewed the current model, where KFOR provides security in the northern Kosovo, but does not directly operate on the boundary. It was noted that it is important that KFOR maintains its presence in the Nothing Hill base and continues with the current approach – also in a support to the future ESDP mission. EUPT foresees permanent presence of the ESDP mission on the gates 1 and 31, while noting that with the new UNSC Resolution KPS will be allowed to engage on the boundary / border with Serbia. Additionally, they plan for mobile teams covering the rest of the area.

Ad 3) Ibar and the bridges

The TF anticipated potential increase of a security risk (as Ad 1). To prevent any adverse incidents, a very determined and clear mechanism will be needed for a hand-over from UNMIK Police to the ESDP mission. A need for a firm mandate was also raised, as the only approach to prevent partition scenario. 

The majority voiced the preference of no (visible) changes of the IC police deployment and engagement in the area, pointing out a need for fixed locations / check points of the ESDP mission on potentially critical locations (bridges, Three Towers, Bosniak Mahala).

Ad 4) KFOR / IMP

KFOR informed that no changes in deployment are envisaged for a period of 6 months after the status settlement.

Ad 5) ESDP Rule of Law Mission

EUPT briefed on the planning process, pointing out limited retention of executive powers for police and justice. The TF identified some particular problems for Mitrovica: location of the higher-level court (secure access, security in the court), property claims, the issue of personal documents and the parallel structures. The TF supported that vetting process should be completed before ESDP takes over.

Ad 6) What should be role of the KPS?

In Mitrovica, KPS performs only basic police tasks, but not the “ethnicity”-related ones. It was noted that the northern KPS has no capacities for sensitive or more sophisticated jobs, such as forensics, crime-investigation, etc (conversely, parallel structures do). KPS of other ethnicity therefore needs special protection if their job takes place in the North.

Additionally, a problem of potential non-cooperation of the northern KPS was raised upon the status announcement (change of uniforms, not following the orders). The TF supported that the issue should be raised with Belgrade in advance.

Ad 7) How to address information-sharing?

The TF agreed that there is a need for permanent mechanisms among the IC players, sensitive / confidential info included. Information flow can be channeled through: LOs to ICOM, permanent dialogue on different levels and adequate reporting.

Ad 8) Any coordinated public outreach (is there a PISG plan)?

The TF agreed there is a need to demonstrate coordinated international posture during transition and after status. It should be two-fold: 1.) informing officials (on status implementation) and 2.) campaign for people (need to ensure translations of the status settlement proposal with “frequently asked questions” as soon as the status settlement document becomes public).

Ad 9) Role of OSCE?

OSCE sees their role of “eyes and ears” of the ICO in the field all over Kosovo, including reporting on the status implementation. Although it can be assumed that general reporting can be shared and the focus of it determined locally (i. e. by actors in Pristina), the TF supported a more formal arrangement on the issue. Modalities should be discussed asap on the level of HoMs in Pristina first, followed by talks with OSCE in Vienna.

Ad 10) Evacuation planning during transition / post-status?

Till UNSCR 1244 in place, there is the existing UN evacuation plan (with KFOR support if needed so) for all IC players. It was noted that there is no support to local staff (remark: sensitive issue in the case of Mitrovica!).

Ad 11) What is status of transition plans for above areas?

While PISG and IC consult and plan for the transition and following status implementation for the whole Kosovo, particular plans for the North do not exist. As a particular point in this context, DOJ raised the issue of transition of the on-going trials (question of keeping the composition of same panels).

Ad 12) The next TF meeting will take place on November 16 at 11:00 a.m., UNMIK Regional HQ in southern Mitrovica (3^rd floor). Topical focus: returns, property and Trepca privatization.

Kosovo: The March 17, 2008 Coutrthouse Debacle

Despite our warning to UNMIK HQ Pristina  (acting according to guidance from the US) and to UN DPKO New York (unwilling to "second guess" the clueless leaders of UNMIK), UNMIK launched an action on March 17, 2008 to retake the courthouse in north Mitrovica.  Here follows my email the following day sent to everyone in UNMIK and DPKO I could think of to make clear the damage done to our peacekeeping efforts in the north and along the Ibar and to forestall further ill-considered actions.  

Balkanalysis.com has my fuller account of the background events leading up to what happened that day.

 

2011: Kosovo: Time for a New Approach

I left Kosovo in October 2008 with some encouragement from the UNMIK leadership and DPKO.  (I transferred to UNMIT in East Timor as chief of staff.)  But I continued to follow events in Kosovo, contributing pieces to TransConflict, and had visited northern Kosovo in June, 2011.  I can't quite remember how the invitation came up to testify in November to the US Congress on Kosovo but I did.  Here follows the text of my comments to the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representative.  (Note:  The Quint refers to the Contact Group on Kosovo -- the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia -- without Russia, which opposed Kosovo independence.  EULEX is the EU's rule of law entity in Kosovo and its police.)

(Note:  All documents posted in this space can be and enlarged and downloaded by clicking on them.)



 

May 2007 Vienna Meeting on Kosovo

Went to Vienna at the end of May, 2007 to take part in a meeting of UNMIK & KFOR (NATO in Kosovo) top command with the person designated to be chief of the International Community Office (ICO) mission formed by the US and EU and meant to replace UNMIK after the UN leaves.  (Note:  The UN is still there.). Subject, northern Kosovo.  UNMIK North had spent some months trying to educate the EU on the need for a gradual approach and fending off their efforts to get us to do some difficult "chores" -- like dealing with the local Serb's using dinars and Serbian license plates -- before we hand over to them.  I met Pieter Fieth, who would be the head man, when he visited Khartoum as EU envoy for Darfur.  He said he remembered me well.  But I also heard that he did not like Americans.  In any case, once he took over, and with the help of NATO, he proved to believe the best way to "tame" the north was to use force.  (See:  http://www.transconflict.com/2011/11/kosovo-quint-brinksmanship-241/,  http://www.transconflict.com/2011/09/kosovo-nato-actions-illegal-illogical-and-immoral-309/  and related pieces at http://www.transconflict.com/author/gerard-gallucci/.
Here follows the text of the agenda for the Vienna meeting with my annotations for my use as talking points:

Brainstorming on the north of Kosovo

Date: 31 May

Location: Vienna

Participants:

EU

- Pieter Feith, Yves de Kermabon

- Stefan Lehne, Pedro Serrano

- Torbjorn Sohlstrom, Casper Klynge

UN

- Joachim Ruecker

NATO

- Pardew, Naples, COMKFOR

US

- Fletcher Burton

Agenda

1) Preventing hard partition (lead UNMIK+KFOR)

Questions to answer:

• Are all partners fully prepared for all possible scenarios? Basic issue: If northerners try to hard partition (e.g., by crossing UNMIK’s three red lines not simply through rhetoric), choice is to counter it through diplomacy and political work or to assume IC military/administrative control of the north. In the latter case it becomes how many troops and police, readiness to counter/arrest/shoot those who resist and appropriate human and financial resources to administer the north for whatever period of time it takes to find locals and local resources to do it.
• What actions might be necessary during the transition period? How can we ensure full IC support?
• Belgrade handling?
• UNMIK actions to prepare for status implementation, e.g. establishment of new municipality of N. Mitrovica. Underway but need direct and practical support of EU and US to focus UNMIK.

2) Integrating the north over time (lead ICR+ESDP+IMP).

Questions to answer:

• Which measures are needed to integrate the north/parallel structures? Patient diplomacy and political work with local and central officials plus the resources to offer practical cooperation with IC and between communities and to replace over time resources supplied by Belgrade.
• How should these measures be paced and timed?
• Which positive, reassuring, or face-saving measures can be used to accompany ‘hard’ measures? How in the world will you do any “hard” measures without using force? And what will “face saving” look like after taking away ‘their country” and using force to make them submit to the Albanians (which is how they will see it). This strikes me as dangerous thinking because based more on a conception of how things should go rather than an understanding of reality.)
• When and how should the ICR announce the ‘red lines’ for the north? Should there be a clear signal of strength at the start? I think you “signal strength” quietly through presence. Much more useful will be clear signal of understanding and readiness to work with all communities on practical cooperation. The essential redline to signal directly and quietly – within context of assurances of continued cooperation – is that if local Serb officials refuse to engage with ICO at working level, IC will have no alternative but to consider assuming direct control.
• How does the ICR ensure international support for his plan and for measures to be taken?
• Which measures need to be taken vis-à-vis Belgrade, and by whom?
• How does the ICR deal with a full boycott by the north? Having made clear the above redline, a little patience during the “testing” phase of a “boycott” to see how serious they are or if it is just for form sake and how much and quickly it will “leak.”
• Agreed end states after 6 or 12 months?
• How to use the regional EU perspective?
• How to involve donors at an early stage? With money for QIPs on both sides of River and some infrastructure/job creation activity using private sector.

Intelligence: how do we make sure that ICR and ESDP HoM have good intel? Best way is people on the ground in each municipality – including internationals – with locals who will need to be carefully “milked” by their international colleagues.

PR: benefits (and limits) of an information campaign?

_________

99 Brasilia 02534: Brazil Very Cool to Argentina Proposal to Become Associate Member of NATO