Kosovo: November 30, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  Here follows the minutes of the fifth meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force to continue EU "coordination" with the United Nations.  I don't seem to have any record of follow up meetings, if any occurred.  But I do have a copy of the OSCE report (a 62 page document) and it can be found here.

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting

30 November 2007

Paricipants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Santillan-Luzuriaga, Butchart Livingson, Strohal (all OSCE), Stadler, Boura, Battista, Carver (all ICO PT), Guehenneux, (KFOR), Zuuccarini (EUPT), Thornton (US Office)

OSCE Preview of Report on Parallel Structures: observed the difficulty in obtaining accurate information from such structures. Noted that approximately 50 individuals serve as “bridge watchers,” who can be reinforced by another 50-250 people at any time. Also noted the dilemma of double jeopardy given the parallel courts and the questionable validity of documents issued by such courts.

Financial Flows: UNMIK estimated that 85 million euros in dinars come across the administrative border from Serbia to finance salaries, pensions, and parallel institutions in the north. Any clampdown on transfers would have to cover the entire border, not just the gates. If the IC were to seize cash transfers, it would have to consider having a distribution network established to allocate the funds to legitimate recipients. Otherwise, potential for unrest (fueled by hard-line propaganda) would increase. Worth exploring a dialogue with Belgrade on how the boycott of PISG is working.

Hospital: Run under Serbia’s Ministry of Health; likely no K/A’s on staff; has refused funding from Pristina; no formal professional ties with K/A medical personnel; not secure for K/A’s to travel to hospital although a few cases of emergency treatment of K/A’s are known; likewise for IC personnel; IC should consider ensuring that medical imports from Serbia are exempted from taxes at border.

University: New rector told UNMIK he is open to dialogue; rector does not appear to be working toward accreditation of diplomas; university budget approx. 12 million euros (no financial links to Pristina); serves 5,000-8,000 students, including in K/S enclaves south of the Ibar (many of these students study in the enclaves and travel to Mitrovica just for exams); university leadership refers to institution as “University of Pristina in Mitrovica” (consensus was that this should be acceptable and downplayed as an issue); some ethnic Albanians from Montenegro enrolled; encourage European Commission to find ways to link the Mitrovica and Pristina universities via Brussels (possible if election of rector of Mitrovica U. meets Bologna standards). OSCE noted that legitimate election of rector only requirement for accreditation. UNMIK will raise informally with Mitrovica U. issue of Bosniaks with PISG diplomas seeking enrollment in Mitrovica U.

General Conclusion: Attempts to dismantle parallel institutions in the early stages of settlement implementation could prove counterproductive.

Next meeting: Thursday, 7 December, 11:00 a.m., ICO PT Office, Pristina

Kosovo: November 23, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  Here follows the minutes of the fourth meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force to continue EU "coordination" with the United Nations. (Note:  Compare the comments on the courthouse and parallel institutions to what actually happened after the unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence in 2008. For example, the courthouse debacle and my congressional testimony from 2011.)

   

November 23, 2006

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting

Participants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Chevrir (UNMIK – CIVPOL), Irvine, Simion (UNMIK - DOJ), Daca, Strohal (both OSCE), Stadler, Boura, Carver (all ICO PT), Denis, Moerman (KFOR), Svensson, Lukits (both EUPT)

TF reviewed the Mitrovica Court and the Mitrovica Detention Center. UNMIK noted the repatriation of prisoners agreement between Serbia and Kosovo and the possibility that Serbia might not continue implementation of it after status. UNMIK – DOJ noted that individuals were transferred in armored personnel carriers to the Detention Center and described times when KFOR had to intercede to ensure that the vehicle (surrounded by hostile crowd) could proceed. UNMIK noted ethnic mix of staff and prisoners and that 4 of the 5 “Category A” prisoners were ethnic Albanians. The TF noted no major ethnicity-related problems among staff members (staff cohesion remained intact even through March 2004 riots). There are no IC prison guards. Prison guards (KCS) are unarmed; a Special Police Unit (SPU) is responsible for perimeter security. KFOR noted its contingency plan for evacuation of the Detention Center personnel and prisoners should situation so warrant and said it could develop similar plans for the Court. They also noted that all the evacuation plans follow the certain priority listings. EUPT noted it had plans for internal security of Detention Center. The TF noted that in the case of the overall K/S boycott of the status settlement, the Serb members of KCS would follow it. If the Court and Detention Center remain in the North as mixed institutions, the challenges for transition would be: security of the facilities and transportation of the local staff.

UNMIK raised a problem of previous lack of 24/7 security at the Mitrovica Regional Court (serious implications for evidence & records). Currently private security firm provides night-time coverage (KPS or other providing day-time coverage). UNMIK noted that UNMIK Criminal Court has no effective “parallel” rival. Parallel civil courts, however, continue to exist. IC/PISG may want to review the salaries policy as a mean of discouraging staff from accepting salaries from Serbia.

Discussion turned to the general issue of parallel structures. UNMIK noted two scenarios: (1) parallel structures openly declare themselves Serbian institutions and (2) parallel structures continue to operate as “open secrets.” In second scenario, best case could be establishing a dialogue between Pristina and local parallel structures. If this is not possible, IC should have dialogue with parallel structures. Establishing contact with these structures’ personnel is critical in eventually obtaining records and convincing personnel to shift to central institutions.

ICO PT reviewed its concept for ICO in Mitrovica (ICOM), plans for staffing and monitoring settlement with possible use of corrective powers. ICO PT emphasized openness to suggestions and criticism and urged formal and informal dialogue with other IC actors. UNMIK stressed ICOM’s role as facilitating settlement implementation. Discussion turned to supporting dialogue between ethnic groups, among Kosovo Serbs, and between Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade. OSCE noted its and various NGO outreach plans in this regard.

TF agreed to review: (1) Mitrovica Hospital, (2) Mitrovica University, (3) financial flows, and potentially also the ICO-OSCE cooperation at its next meeting, Thursday, November 30, at 11:00 a.m. at the ICO PT office in Pristina. TF also agreed to review infrastructure (including utilities) and related economic issues at a meeting on Thursday, December 7, at 11:00 a.m. at the ICO PT office in Pristina. Specific agendas will be distributed ahead of those meetings.

Kosovo: November 16, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  Here follows the minutes of the third meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force to continue EU "coordination" with the United Nations. (Note: HPD refers to the Housing and Property Directorate and handled KPA issues in Mitrovica.)

 

November 16, 2006

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting (3)

Participants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Butchart Livingston (OSCE), Boura, Carver, Stadler (all ICO PT), Zuccarini (EUPT), Guehenneux, Denis (KFOR), Urny (UN Police)

Guests: Nunan (HPD Mitrovica), Rolando (DOJ), Oliver (UNMIK)

UNMIK noted the large potential problem of 6 – 7.000 K/A wanting/trying to return to N. Mitrovica and also assessed that there will be likely about 2.000 K/A living in the north once the settlement, with potential adjustments of municipal boundaries, is implemented. A very close link to the property issue was noted. Several participants stressed that K/S living in the north would conversely not return/move to the south after settlement implementation.

KPA outlined the Administration and Repossession property programs. So far, there have been 1250 claims by K/A for their properties in the north, whereas one fifth of those are destroyed houses. KPA stressed that its policy is to avoid evicting IDPs and ensuring that no one is rendered homeless as a result of eviction. The CCK agreed to evictions as long as people were not put out on the streets.

UNMIK and KPA emphasized that the stock of housing is not sustainable given the demand for repossession, particularly in light of further sales of property ethnic Albanians claim. High prices (under market conditions) of such properties were noted. A few ways of helping prevent this phenomenon from becoming a major problem are: (1) to promote a few returns of ethnic Albanians to the north (ex. Doctors’ Valley); (2) to create a plan for gradual addressing this issue over time (1 year and beyond); and (3) to fund an international housing agency/program from the donors’ conference to help provide additional housing. All those should be accompanied with effective dialogue and explanations to both sides: K/A and K/S. CCK’s efforts to add to the housing stock should not be prevented. KPA also outlined its rental and social housing scheme, noting that rents for properties in northern Mitrovica were necessarily below market value and should remain so in any similar future program. Security assurances, linked to the repossession of property and potential returns, should be addressed accordingly.

Participants noted the need to address housing for the Roma community. While UNDP is to cover the Roma Mahala project (in cooperation with the municipality), the Osterode camp, currently managed by UNMIK DCA, will need to be taken over (future local municipality issue?, with ensured funding?).

Participants noted problems with cadastral records and the insufficient capacity to adjudicate property claims.

There has been no privatization in the North, where the Trepca complex remains the main issue. UNMIK, as the protector of Trepca against creditors, turned reluctant to prolong such approach which causes unrest among K/A and K/S. Participants noted the lack of clarity regarding ownership, PISG’s determination to decide about the administration of the complex and whether Trepca would be liquidated (Supreme Court to handle the case!).

Related issues that will need to be addressed (preferably by the Kosovo Government) include:

• Pensions for Trepca workers – who pays them (PISG, CCK?),
• necessity of maintaining the pension and salary system,
• dealing with the claims for unpaid salaries / pensions (cca. 18.000 claims at municipal courts),
• Similar complaints from elsewhere, f. ex. dismissed workers in Obiliq/c,
• Discriminatory provisions for participation in privatization for K/S workers (in 3 last years almost no K/S allowed to work),
• Access to the courts to file in complaints.

The TF will meet November 23 at 11:00 a.m. at the ICO PT Office in Pristina* to discuss (1) Penal Management in the north; (2) the ICO PT’s concept of the ICO and its mission in the region, including regarding (a) the functioning of municipalities and (b) Issues that the Joint Board could address, inter alia, to foster inter-ethnic cooperation.

* The venue of the next meeting has been changed meanwhile; the next meeting on 23 Nov will take place in Mitrovica.

Kosovo: November 9, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  Here follows the minutes of the second meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force to continue EU "coordination" with the United Nations. (Note: CRC refers to Crowd & Riot Control.  I believe ESDP may refer to European Security and Defence Policy operations.)

November 9, 2006

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting (2)

Participants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Butchart Livingston (OSCE), Carver, Stadler (both ICO PT), Zuccarini (EUPT), Guehenneux, Denis (KFOR), Urny (UN Police)

Guests: Moskowitz, Ciaravolo, Rolando (DOJ), Neisse (ICO PT), ??? (US office)

Ad 1) CRC

EUPT informed about tasking to engage also in the CRC planning, while noting that in the overall concept of the future mission the primary responsibility lies with the local authorities, i. e. KPS for the police. Some argued that ESDP needs its own CRC; if not, KFOR needs to stay on the bridge, sending a wrong message contrary to the policy of “towards normalization”. The TF agreed that divided Mitrovica poses a special challenge and therefore identified a need of a standing element to be able to respond to any deterioration of the security situation. A possibility of non-implementation of the status settlement was also noted in this context. 

In general, chain of response is: KPS – IC-police – KFOR. Taking into account the specific situation in Mitrovica, where divisions occur also in KPS, the TF thought that IC-police should remain to stand ready, with KFOR ultimate back-up when necessary / opportune. ICOM’s security should therefore rely on the IC engagement.

Coordination of the IC actors should work through LOs to ICOM. Concerning CRC, there was thinking that the Unit should be led by an IC-commander, with direct links to KPS, to HoICOM and to ICO HQ in Pristina.

Ad 2) The Administrative Border with Serbia

The TF reviewed the current model, where KFOR provides security in the northern Kosovo, but does not directly operate on the boundary. It was noted that it is important that KFOR maintains its presence in the Nothing Hill base and continues with the current approach – also in a support to the future ESDP mission. EUPT foresees permanent presence of the ESDP mission on the gates 1 and 31, while noting that with the new UNSC Resolution KPS will be allowed to engage on the boundary / border with Serbia. Additionally, they plan for mobile teams covering the rest of the area.

Ad 3) Ibar and the bridges

The TF anticipated potential increase of a security risk (as Ad 1). To prevent any adverse incidents, a very determined and clear mechanism will be needed for a hand-over from UNMIK Police to the ESDP mission. A need for a firm mandate was also raised, as the only approach to prevent partition scenario. 

The majority voiced the preference of no (visible) changes of the IC police deployment and engagement in the area, pointing out a need for fixed locations / check points of the ESDP mission on potentially critical locations (bridges, Three Towers, Bosniak Mahala).

Ad 4) KFOR / IMP

KFOR informed that no changes in deployment are envisaged for a period of 6 months after the status settlement.

Ad 5) ESDP Rule of Law Mission

EUPT briefed on the planning process, pointing out limited retention of executive powers for police and justice. The TF identified some particular problems for Mitrovica: location of the higher-level court (secure access, security in the court), property claims, the issue of personal documents and the parallel structures. The TF supported that vetting process should be completed before ESDP takes over.

Ad 6) What should be role of the KPS?

In Mitrovica, KPS performs only basic police tasks, but not the “ethnicity”-related ones. It was noted that the northern KPS has no capacities for sensitive or more sophisticated jobs, such as forensics, crime-investigation, etc (conversely, parallel structures do). KPS of other ethnicity therefore needs special protection if their job takes place in the North.

Additionally, a problem of potential non-cooperation of the northern KPS was raised upon the status announcement (change of uniforms, not following the orders). The TF supported that the issue should be raised with Belgrade in advance.

Ad 7) How to address information-sharing?

The TF agreed that there is a need for permanent mechanisms among the IC players, sensitive / confidential info included. Information flow can be channeled through: LOs to ICOM, permanent dialogue on different levels and adequate reporting.

Ad 8) Any coordinated public outreach (is there a PISG plan)?

The TF agreed there is a need to demonstrate coordinated international posture during transition and after status. It should be two-fold: 1.) informing officials (on status implementation) and 2.) campaign for people (need to ensure translations of the status settlement proposal with “frequently asked questions” as soon as the status settlement document becomes public).

Ad 9) Role of OSCE?

OSCE sees their role of “eyes and ears” of the ICO in the field all over Kosovo, including reporting on the status implementation. Although it can be assumed that general reporting can be shared and the focus of it determined locally (i. e. by actors in Pristina), the TF supported a more formal arrangement on the issue. Modalities should be discussed asap on the level of HoMs in Pristina first, followed by talks with OSCE in Vienna.

Ad 10) Evacuation planning during transition / post-status?

Till UNSCR 1244 in place, there is the existing UN evacuation plan (with KFOR support if needed so) for all IC players. It was noted that there is no support to local staff (remark: sensitive issue in the case of Mitrovica!).

Ad 11) What is status of transition plans for above areas?

While PISG and IC consult and plan for the transition and following status implementation for the whole Kosovo, particular plans for the North do not exist. As a particular point in this context, DOJ raised the issue of transition of the on-going trials (question of keeping the composition of same panels).

Ad 12) The next TF meeting will take place on November 16 at 11:00 a.m., UNMIK Regional HQ in southern Mitrovica (3^rd floor). Topical focus: returns, property and Trepca privatization.

Kosovo: November 2, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  In UNMIK Mitrovica's first meetings with the EUPT in Pristina, it was clear that the the EU people believed they were the knights on white horses sent to clean up the mess left by the UN.  They were not much interested in our views and wanted from us only what was necessary to leave the stage for them.  Things didn't work out that way and as of February 2019, both UNMIK and the EU are still there.  Indeed, it was only years later that the EU was allowed to place staff (other than police) in the north.  Here follows the minutes of the first meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force formed to start planning for the establishment of the EU''s International Civilian Office (ICO) that they saw becoming the new boss in Mitrovica.  They proved to be clueless.  (Two more meetings were held and those minutes will follow.)

November 2, 2006

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting

Participants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Daca (OSCE), Carver, Stadler (both ICO PT), Zuccarini (EUPT), Guehenneux, Bruno (KFOR)

Ad 2) The Task Force (TF) agreed on its main goals: to identify and analyze key issues in the region that needed international attention regarding the transition and status periods, and to present policy-makers with options (“TO DO” list) for addressing those issues, namely in 3 areas: 1. list of potential breaches of the status settlement (i. e. parallel structures), 2. list of priorities of implementation of the settlement in the North and 3. tool-box to enforce the implementation (sticks and carrots).

Ad 3) The TF identified and reviewed advantages and disadvantages to locating the International Civilian Office - Mitrovica (ICOM) on either side of the Ibar. Several participants noted the need for access and the value of exposing the two major ethnic groups to each other, which could be more easily achieved by an office in southern Mitrovica. Some participants voiced concern that locating an office in northern Mitrovica could be interpreted as endorsing a partition of Kosovo. Others thought that an office in the northern part sends more proper political message, since the ICOM’s target population would mostly be K/S. The TF agreed that it is difficult to judge the physical security advantages of either location without knowing what the security environment will be under status. It was noted that good coordination with EUPT will be needed when deciding on the physical location of ICOM to plan and deploy ESDP component accordingly.

Ad 4) The TF reviewed possible numbers of ICOM staff members and discussed the option of maintaining ICO personnel in each of the northern municipalities. TF members observed that such a presence could provide the ICO more and better opportunities to intervene in status implementation issues; besides it would actually offer direct help and guidance to K/S locally. Such an ICO presence could also reassure Albanian minorities in those municipalities as well as demonstrate that the ICO would not allow partition of the north from the rest of Kosovo. TF agreed that ICOM would be the only communication link between Pristina and the North. Some participants noted the double standard of maintaining a presence in the northern municipalities while not doing so in the southern ones. The majority of participants supported the option of co-locating one ICO advisor in the OSCE field office in each of the municipalities at least part of every work day with the ICO branch office located in northern Mitrovica.

Ad 5) The TF identified several issues for possible review in future meetings (ranking below does not necessarily correspond to accurate prioritizing):

- property: linked to returns (particularly of K/A to the North), including social housing and rental schemes;

- privatization, with the core case of Trepca, linked to pensions;

- economic decentralization with infrastructure and utilities (electricity, water, phone lines, media transmission);

- economic development and job creation;

- freedom of movement (returns and security issues); transportation; travel documents and licence plates;

- security and the rule of law mission (core case of the Bridge);

- financial transactions and money flows; currency;

- modalities of implementation of the new decentralization: replacing the UAM;

- the university and the hospital: any new arrangements;

- the parallel courts and police;

- future of the KPC (in the North);

- facilitation of inter-ethnic contacts and cooperation;

- public communication strategy and access to the media.

Ad 6) The TF agreed to meet Thursday, November 9, 11:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m., in the ICO PT offices in Pristina to discuss security issues.

Kosovo: Answering Some Questions in 2010

After I left Kosovo in 2008 (and East Timor in 2010), I continued to follow events there and to respond to questions and comment.  The three items below are the responses to questions from someone doing a masters thesis and from the European Voice plus a lette to the European Voice.  (I believe the European Voice is now defunt.) If the last item was ever published, I don't have it. (Btw, you can click on these documents to read them in full original and download them.)

 

2011: Kosovo: Time for a New Approach

I left Kosovo in October 2008 with some encouragement from the UNMIK leadership and DPKO.  (I transferred to UNMIT in East Timor as chief of staff.)  But I continued to follow events in Kosovo, contributing pieces to TransConflict, and had visited northern Kosovo in June, 2011.  I can't quite remember how the invitation came up to testify in November to the US Congress on Kosovo but I did.  Here follows the text of my comments to the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representative.  (Note:  The Quint refers to the Contact Group on Kosovo -- the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia -- without Russia, which opposed Kosovo independence.  EULEX is the EU's rule of law entity in Kosovo and its police.)

(Note:  All documents posted in this space can be and enlarged and downloaded by clicking on them.)



 

The 2013 Brussels Agreement and the Implementation Plan

As noted in Wikipedia, the Brussels Agreement was made between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo on the normalization of their relations. It was negotiated and concluded, although not signed by either party, in Brussels under the auspices of the European Union. The negotiations were led by Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, and mediated by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. The agreement was concluded on 19 April 2013.

Actually there does seem to have been an Implementation Plan initialed by the two leaders.  (I think it's them, but see for yourself below).  And relations have not be fully normalized until now and the plan never implemented.

May 2007 Vienna Meeting on Kosovo

Went to Vienna at the end of May, 2007 to take part in a meeting of UNMIK & KFOR (NATO in Kosovo) top command with the person designated to be chief of the International Community Office (ICO) mission formed by the US and EU and meant to replace UNMIK after the UN leaves.  (Note:  The UN is still there.). Subject, northern Kosovo.  UNMIK North had spent some months trying to educate the EU on the need for a gradual approach and fending off their efforts to get us to do some difficult "chores" -- like dealing with the local Serb's using dinars and Serbian license plates -- before we hand over to them.  I met Pieter Fieth, who would be the head man, when he visited Khartoum as EU envoy for Darfur.  He said he remembered me well.  But I also heard that he did not like Americans.  In any case, once he took over, and with the help of NATO, he proved to believe the best way to "tame" the north was to use force.  (See:  http://www.transconflict.com/2011/11/kosovo-quint-brinksmanship-241/,  http://www.transconflict.com/2011/09/kosovo-nato-actions-illegal-illogical-and-immoral-309/  and related pieces at http://www.transconflict.com/author/gerard-gallucci/.
Here follows the text of the agenda for the Vienna meeting with my annotations for my use as talking points:

Brainstorming on the north of Kosovo

Date: 31 May

Location: Vienna

Participants:

EU

- Pieter Feith, Yves de Kermabon

- Stefan Lehne, Pedro Serrano

- Torbjorn Sohlstrom, Casper Klynge

UN

- Joachim Ruecker

NATO

- Pardew, Naples, COMKFOR

US

- Fletcher Burton

Agenda

1) Preventing hard partition (lead UNMIK+KFOR)

Questions to answer:

• Are all partners fully prepared for all possible scenarios? Basic issue: If northerners try to hard partition (e.g., by crossing UNMIK’s three red lines not simply through rhetoric), choice is to counter it through diplomacy and political work or to assume IC military/administrative control of the north. In the latter case it becomes how many troops and police, readiness to counter/arrest/shoot those who resist and appropriate human and financial resources to administer the north for whatever period of time it takes to find locals and local resources to do it.
• What actions might be necessary during the transition period? How can we ensure full IC support?
• Belgrade handling?
• UNMIK actions to prepare for status implementation, e.g. establishment of new municipality of N. Mitrovica. Underway but need direct and practical support of EU and US to focus UNMIK.

2) Integrating the north over time (lead ICR+ESDP+IMP).

Questions to answer:

• Which measures are needed to integrate the north/parallel structures? Patient diplomacy and political work with local and central officials plus the resources to offer practical cooperation with IC and between communities and to replace over time resources supplied by Belgrade.
• How should these measures be paced and timed?
• Which positive, reassuring, or face-saving measures can be used to accompany ‘hard’ measures? How in the world will you do any “hard” measures without using force? And what will “face saving” look like after taking away ‘their country” and using force to make them submit to the Albanians (which is how they will see it). This strikes me as dangerous thinking because based more on a conception of how things should go rather than an understanding of reality.)
• When and how should the ICR announce the ‘red lines’ for the north? Should there be a clear signal of strength at the start? I think you “signal strength” quietly through presence. Much more useful will be clear signal of understanding and readiness to work with all communities on practical cooperation. The essential redline to signal directly and quietly – within context of assurances of continued cooperation – is that if local Serb officials refuse to engage with ICO at working level, IC will have no alternative but to consider assuming direct control.
• How does the ICR ensure international support for his plan and for measures to be taken?
• Which measures need to be taken vis-à-vis Belgrade, and by whom?
• How does the ICR deal with a full boycott by the north? Having made clear the above redline, a little patience during the “testing” phase of a “boycott” to see how serious they are or if it is just for form sake and how much and quickly it will “leak.”
• Agreed end states after 6 or 12 months?
• How to use the regional EU perspective?
• How to involve donors at an early stage? With money for QIPs on both sides of River and some infrastructure/job creation activity using private sector.

Intelligence: how do we make sure that ICR and ESDP HoM have good intel? Best way is people on the ground in each municipality – including internationals – with locals who will need to be carefully “milked” by their international colleagues.

PR: benefits (and limits) of an information campaign?

_________

04 Khartoum 0252: Government and Darfur Rebels Accept Chad Plus Meeting

Also, see note below.

Note:  The reference to an "external player" mentioned in para 2 was to political appointees from USAID.  They were trying to prevent a Darfur negotiation from moving forward unless it was folded into the North-South peace process.  These USAID officials were pro-SPLM and very much opposed to the Khartoum regime.  They saw bringing the Darfur conflict into the wider negotiations with the government as a way to increase pressure on it and perhaps further dismember Sudan.  These USAID appointees came from the Christian fundamentalist NGO community supportive of the SPLM as Christian black Africans vs Islamic Arabs.  They originally sought to keep Darfur off our agenda because they saw it as a distraction to the "main show."

The following is from my journal entry for March 8.  The "perfect storm" I was hoping to avoid was the reaction from USAID Washington to our joint EU/US effort to get Darfur talks going without bringing in extra issues.

"I think missed a weekend somewhere. I had 15 minutes of free time in the office today and didn't know what to do with it. Started at 8:15 with the UK ambassador and wound up at 8pm after a two hour meeting with a senior official. Along the way, spent another 1½ hours with the French Ambassador. Got home to a dark house and microwaved one of the dishes James left for me. Of course, at least I have a cook and don't have to clean my own dishes.

I've been doing a bunch of stuff – to avoid a “perfect storm” – without DC reaction. Won't have any until tomorrow given time difference. Another consequence of not having a weekend."

04 Khartoum 0215: The Darfur Rebels Call*

*  This cable posted a bit out of sequence.

04 Khartoum 0162 -- EU Pressing on Darfur, Meeting Rebels

04 Khartoum 0098 -- EU approach on Sudan

Note:  Visiting Ministers were from the Netherlands.

04 Khartoum 0075 -- Darfur Policy Recommendations

Journal Entry for December 2, 2003

Sitting here at 8am on December 2 with a nice breeze waifing in Khartoum air. The scent is a bit musky but not unpleasant and it is cool. Opened the windows in the middle of the night and turned the AC off. Yahoo says the temp will range from 65 to 89 today and it'll get into the high 50's for lows this week. Beats Belize by miles. Woke up to birds singing and the occasional cry of a distant hawk.

Went to Nyala, capital of Southern Darfur yesterday. Took 3 1/2 hours of flying each way. Went with UK and EU Ambassadors to highlight our concern over the conflict there. The Wali (governor), a tough military man (and possible war criminal) had stopped the UK ambassador and me from making previous tries to get there. He was absent yesterday.

We met with state government officials, NGOs and then with a group of tribal leaders. The Wali had tried to stop us from meeting them but we insisted. The leaders of the two main Darfur opponents -- Arab nomad tribes and the Fur tribe (African farmers) -- both gave us their sides. We encouraged them to make peace. (The Arab nomads have been trying to drive the African farmers from their land. Both are Moslem.)

Some of our group went to a camp of people displaced by the war. They are in bad shape. Darfur from the air looks absolutely barren and it we'd call it desert.* But Greater Darfur has 6 million people and as the Sahara spreads south, they have less good space and thus fight for it. I find it hard when I am in such a place to grasp how the people who live there and the people who live in the First World, North America or Europe, could possibly be on the same planet. The distance between realities is so great.

*2014 Note:  Darfur does look very arid to an outsider.  But it gets just enough rain when the Inter-tropical Convergence Zone moves north.  The Jebel Marra region sticks up into the clouds and can get enough rain for agriculture and pasture.  It's thus worth having.