Kosovo: Report to the UNSG on the March 17, 2007 Events in North Mitrovica

On May 21, 2008, Judge Francis M. Ssekandi delivered to the UN Security Council a report on his investigation into UNMIK's actions around the March 17, 2007 events in North Mitrovica.  On that date, UNMIK's Pristina HQ ordered the use of force against former Serbian court officials occupying the courthouse in the northern part of the city.  We in the region -- UNMIK, UN Police and the local NATO elements, had argued against pursuing that course of action.  The report has not, to my knowledge, ever been released.  But it highlights the need for the UN to not take sides in resolving political issues during its peacekeeping mission.  A former UN New York staff member gave me a copy some time ago. 

Judge Ssekendi interviewed me and many others for the report, which was the background to the UNSG's eventual decision to replace the top UNMIK leadership -- the SRSG and his principle deputy -- by not renewing their contracts.  The report contains some comments from the disgraced UNMIK leadership suggesting that I improperly was in contact with some member governments and passed my debacle report to the Serbs.  I did, of course, have frequent contacts with member state representatives -- especially with those from Security Council countries -- in an effort to help them understand the complexities of the north.  I made a special effort to do this with the US office in Pristina as its staff were forbidden to even visit north Mitrovica to see for themselves.  I did not release my debacle report to anyone not of the UN international staff in Kosovo and New York.  I learned later that one of my officers had done so because he thought it would prove useful in convincing the northern Kosovo Serbs that the UN staff in the north was not part of an effort to subject them to the new "independent" Kosovo government.  The Ssekandi report did in fact note UNMIK Pristina's apparent tilt toward using its UNSCR 1244 peacekeeping mandate to assist instead Pristina's efforts to subject the northern Serbs to its control, thus abandoning status neutrality.  UNMIK Pristina was pushed in this direction by the US, UK and Germany.

The Scekandi report noted that UNMIK HQ would have been better served by taking into account our warnings from the north.  But by the time of the March events, I had become a perceived problem in Pristina because of our repeated efforts to caution against use of force and instead urging dialogue with the K-Serbs and elements of the Serbian government in a position to assist in gaining a peaceful outcome to the court seizure.

Kosovo: November 30, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  Here follows the minutes of the fifth meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force to continue EU "coordination" with the United Nations.  I don't seem to have any record of follow up meetings, if any occurred.  But I do have a copy of the OSCE report (a 62 page document) and it can be found here.

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting

30 November 2007

Paricipants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Santillan-Luzuriaga, Butchart Livingson, Strohal (all OSCE), Stadler, Boura, Battista, Carver (all ICO PT), Guehenneux, (KFOR), Zuuccarini (EUPT), Thornton (US Office)

OSCE Preview of Report on Parallel Structures: observed the difficulty in obtaining accurate information from such structures. Noted that approximately 50 individuals serve as “bridge watchers,” who can be reinforced by another 50-250 people at any time. Also noted the dilemma of double jeopardy given the parallel courts and the questionable validity of documents issued by such courts.

Financial Flows: UNMIK estimated that 85 million euros in dinars come across the administrative border from Serbia to finance salaries, pensions, and parallel institutions in the north. Any clampdown on transfers would have to cover the entire border, not just the gates. If the IC were to seize cash transfers, it would have to consider having a distribution network established to allocate the funds to legitimate recipients. Otherwise, potential for unrest (fueled by hard-line propaganda) would increase. Worth exploring a dialogue with Belgrade on how the boycott of PISG is working.

Hospital: Run under Serbia’s Ministry of Health; likely no K/A’s on staff; has refused funding from Pristina; no formal professional ties with K/A medical personnel; not secure for K/A’s to travel to hospital although a few cases of emergency treatment of K/A’s are known; likewise for IC personnel; IC should consider ensuring that medical imports from Serbia are exempted from taxes at border.

University: New rector told UNMIK he is open to dialogue; rector does not appear to be working toward accreditation of diplomas; university budget approx. 12 million euros (no financial links to Pristina); serves 5,000-8,000 students, including in K/S enclaves south of the Ibar (many of these students study in the enclaves and travel to Mitrovica just for exams); university leadership refers to institution as “University of Pristina in Mitrovica” (consensus was that this should be acceptable and downplayed as an issue); some ethnic Albanians from Montenegro enrolled; encourage European Commission to find ways to link the Mitrovica and Pristina universities via Brussels (possible if election of rector of Mitrovica U. meets Bologna standards). OSCE noted that legitimate election of rector only requirement for accreditation. UNMIK will raise informally with Mitrovica U. issue of Bosniaks with PISG diplomas seeking enrollment in Mitrovica U.

General Conclusion: Attempts to dismantle parallel institutions in the early stages of settlement implementation could prove counterproductive.

Next meeting: Thursday, 7 December, 11:00 a.m., ICO PT Office, Pristina

Kosovo: The March 17, 2008 Coutrthouse Debacle

Despite our warning to UNMIK HQ Pristina  (acting according to guidance from the US) and to UN DPKO New York (unwilling to "second guess" the clueless leaders of UNMIK), UNMIK launched an action on March 17, 2008 to retake the courthouse in north Mitrovica.  Here follows my email the following day sent to everyone in UNMIK and DPKO I could think of to make clear the damage done to our peacekeeping efforts in the north and along the Ibar and to forestall further ill-considered actions.  

Balkanalysis.com has my fuller account of the background events leading up to what happened that day.

 

2011: Kosovo: Time for a New Approach

I left Kosovo in October 2008 with some encouragement from the UNMIK leadership and DPKO.  (I transferred to UNMIT in East Timor as chief of staff.)  But I continued to follow events in Kosovo, contributing pieces to TransConflict, and had visited northern Kosovo in June, 2011.  I can't quite remember how the invitation came up to testify in November to the US Congress on Kosovo but I did.  Here follows the text of my comments to the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representative.  (Note:  The Quint refers to the Contact Group on Kosovo -- the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia -- without Russia, which opposed Kosovo independence.  EULEX is the EU's rule of law entity in Kosovo and its police.)

(Note:  All documents posted in this space can be and enlarged and downloaded by clicking on them.)



 

Fears of a Kosovo Partition (July 2006)

By mid-2006, Western concern over the unstable Kosovo situation had come to take the form of UNMIK Pristina worrying over a possible move by the northern Kosovo Serbs to implement a "hard" partition of the north to preempt an expected unilateral move by the Kosovo Albanians south of the Ibar to declare independence from Serbia.  (In the event, the northern K-Serbs never did seek partition -- though they hoped, and still hope, that Belgrade would thus save them -- while the K-Albanians did take the first move by declaring independence in February 2008.)  UNMIK's HQ stood in the middle of the K-Albanian capital of Kosovo -- Pristina -- and was under the direct influence of the Western countries (and especially the US and UK) which fully supported the K-Albanian position.  (At the US Office's July 4th celebration that year, the head of the office publicly called the northerners that UNMIK Mitrovica worked with "troublemakers.)  Under those influences -- channeled by the Office of Political Affairs (OPA) -- the UNMIK leadership grew quite paranoid about a northern partition.  OPA prepared a strategy paper outlining how UNMIK might work to prevent it.  OPA drafted a Code Cable in July to be sent to New York to cover the paper.  I don't remember UNMIK Mitrovica being given the chance to be involved in the preparation.  However, the PDSRSG was not unaware of the realities of the north so the OPA paper had to recognize that UNMIK had little to work with beyond continued diplomacy and peacekeeping.  In the event, in late July, he and I had the opportunity in Vienna to brief senior Western officials and Martti Ahtisaari (the UNSG's Special Envoy for Kosovo negotiations, UNOSEK) on the north.  It became clear that the Western dictum against partition was little more than words.  The draft code cable follows.  (I'm not sure it was sent.)  The full draft strategy paper is too long to provide here.

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2007 -- Recommendation for a Stepped Process to Kosovo Independence

By mid-2007, it seemed clear that the Kosovo status stalemate could not hold much longer before the K-Albanians took action on their own.  This seemed so to me, though responsible for the K-Serb majority north, as it was to the US, which alone could hold the leash on Pristina.  In consultation with the PDSRSG (the principle deputy -- and a former US general -- to the UNMIK SRSG, a hapless German), I drew an outline for a series of steps the K-Albanian leadership could take leading up to a declaration of independence in 2008.  They emphasized peaceful, reassuring moves making clear that Kosovo could not wait forever.  We hoped at the time that it would coincide with an agreement to implement the Ahtisaari proposals for a unified Kosovo with local autonomy for the K-Serbs.  That didn't happen and in February 2008, the Albanians did declare independence unilaterally.  I discussed the situation with the south Mitrovica (K-Albanian) city manager and passed him the "stepped process" paper in August.  (He later became a minister in the Pristina government.)  This was neither a UN nor US initiative but sanctioned unofficially by the PDSRSG. The paper as passed follows:
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A Stepped Process

The current situation of no status and no sure way forward is unstable. An uncertain process apparently going nowhere – or worse yet perhaps seen leading to partition or continued association to Serbia – increasingly unsustainable vis-à-vis Albanian majority. Maybe by miracle, the parties will reach agreement or the Europeans will discover they cannot simply sit back and let things drift into the rocks. Otherwise, K-Albanian frustration with the lack of prospects – political but also economic, for jobs, electricity, heat, etc – will make control ever more problematic for everyone. Most Albanians will be thinking about how to force events. Some may look to threats and violence, others hopefully for a political way forward. The essential political option would appear UDI.

UDI is a huge step. The Albanians were led to believe they would win independence through the Ahtisaari process and they would have EU and US support at the end. For UDI, they face moving forward without this support. The US cannot act alone and it cannot give a “green light" to unilateral moves by the K-Albanians if it does not have at least minimum support from the Europeans. However, perhaps the US could – however reluctantly – use warnings from the Albanians of intended unilateral moves to push the Europeans forward into the critical mass necessary for a successful launch. The Europeans will only respond to crisis; the key is creating a controlled one unfolding gradually to give the US the leverage and the time to use it diplomatically. The path to UDI means the Albanians must make clear to all that action is necessary but the process will unfold in a way that gives time for diplomacy to produce a UNSC resolution or US/European agreement if possible.

The K-Albanian leadership would have to be united – indeed formation of a new government of national unity (forget elections) would loudly signal seriousness of purpose – and resolute to convince the US and others that they will respond to the political realities of Kosovo even if it means going it alone or with whatever friends they have. Nothing should be presented as a threat but simply as a political course of action forced by events – “we must respond somehow to the dead-end we have been led into” – and to preempt other, less helpful alternatives. The leadership must accept that threats – of violence in Kosovo or Presevo and Tetevo – is exactly the wrong strategy for them (and only serves Belgrade). The right strategy would be a controlled, steady, stepped process emphasizing the maturity of the Albanian leadership and people and their readiness to join the European community. Every move forward would be with open hands to the K-Serbs and accompanied by clear and complete commitment to the Ahtisaari plan. All PISG actions would not only have to adhere strictly to the Standards but be seen as consistent with, and aimed at, implementing the Ahtisaari plan in word and spirit. The goal, the mantra, would be creation of an "independent, fair and just Kosovo for all its people" with full adherence to the Ahtisaari plan including the ICO mission.

To be successful, this strategy requires complete control on the Albanian side and sufficient steps and time to allow everyone to react as positively as possible. The united leadership would signal that they are prepared to take a series of steps leading to the desired end state (no need to constantly say “independence” since all know that) no matter what. Each step would have to be broadcast clearly and ahead of time and carried out in a united, mature, and responsible manner consistent with strong adherence to carrying out the Ahtisaari plan and by doing all possible to pro-actively reach out to and provide for the minority communities. (Bad example new decision on KS plates/KEK.) All other goals must be subject to these.

Tactically, the leadership must remain disciplined and focused. Obsessing about partition or whatever other “trial-balloons” (such as confederation) are raised must be avoided in order to maintain control of the negotiating and broader agenda. Any attempt do divert attention such as these – even if from some in the IC – must be seen as provocations and avoided as such.

Possible Steps

First 15 days

• Reconfirm willingness to hear whatever Serbia has to offer and to judge that on basis of what Kosovo people want and need. Avoid any appearance of conditions for talks. Note special interest in how to best serve interests of non-Albanian communities. (Maybe suggest working group on mechanisms for implementing decentralization/linkages in which K-Serbs, especially from south, might take lead.) Let realities of what can be negotiated or not to emerge from the talks themselves. Go anywhere and raise no procedural problems.
• Stop talking about possible violence or “instability” and about concerns over partition, etc. Start talking about pressing need to begin dealing practically with Kosovo’s political and economic realities to ensure a peaceful future for all.
• Begin visible and genuine effort to form all-inclusive “technical” government, suggest this might take place of near-term elections. Suggest this national unity government will remain in place until Status is achieved.
• Explain quietly to US, Brits, EU, Germans and French – perhaps in that order – that political realities and especially pressure for breaking impasse cannot be put off indefinitely. “We will have to begin responding in a visible way – and participating in elections will not be enough by itself – or risk losing control of the situation. We are exploring political options (not to be specified at this point) but including the “technical government.” We’d appreciate your support for this.” Avoid suggesting deadlines at this point.

Second 15 days

• Continue serious engagement with Troika but be privately honest with US and others about progress or lack in the “negotiations.” Avoid much public comment.
• Announce formation of technical government and decision to not hold elections until Status is achieved. (This is first “unilateral” step and no one can complain if you don’t.)
• Tell US alone what you plan to be doing next few months and explain that it is an effort to manage the process until end-of-year holidays but that this cannot be maintained much longer than beginning of New Year. Tensions will soon outweigh ability to keep things together. US should use this period to get the Europeans ready for declaration.
• Begin holding series of town meetings in various parts of Kosovo (nowhere provocative though) to “learn the people’s concerns.” Keep the IC out of it (including UNMIK-P) and do whatever is necessary to avoid large crowds or events that get out of control. Reps from all parties can attend or they can be delegated on basis of local politics to represent everyone. (Second “unilateral” step.)
• Announce that consultations with the people will continue through early December, so that a clear view will be obtained of public concerns and sentiments. (But don’t once say “about independence.” Very important at this phase is what is not said.)

Next 60 days

• Continue engagement in negotiations.
• Continue town-hall meetings (with perhaps break for Ramadan days, calling for everyone to reflect about the future and the need for peaceful chance during these days, Imams preaching this will be very effective).
• Concentrate fully on making technical government work. Work as much as possible – and as visibly as possible – with the EU and ICO on getting ready to implement Ahtisaari plan. Do as much as possible on getting ready to implement new municipalities. (Perhaps allow UNMIK creation of North Mitrovica as first step and sign of seriousness.) Avoid public disagreements on anything remotely related to status.
• Do everything possible to make Serbs, especially south of the River, as happy as possible. Support any realistic returns project. Resolve any procedural issues, use all possibilities for practical cooperation
• Focus all resources possible on preparing for the winter.
• Keep US and others privately apprised of your views on Troika process. If the process is visibly moribund or going nowhere at some point, urgently ask US and others “what do we do now” but make clear if necessary – and not through the press – that the CG principles cannot be abandoned without great political cost for all.

Next 30 days

• Wrap up town hall meetings in time to prepare a “report” that will go to the national assembly on December 6. Announce that the Assembly will take up consideration of how to respond to what has been learned from these consultations with the people and the results of the negotiations. Give no date.
• Give US and others frank, but private, view of value of negotiations. Explain that you have been working hard to manage political process but things must begin moving forward one way or another early next year.
• Allow “spontaneous” but absolutely controlled public rallies (by party and/or region) in favor of taking next steps, in favor of independence. As large as can be safely held with NO incidents whatever. These must be seen as mature displays of readiness for assuming control over own future. No threatening words or actions.
• Announce travel of unity team (all government parties) to major capitals to consult on next steps consistent with Ahtisaari plan early in new year.
• Encourage and help everyone to enjoy the coming holidays.
• Tell US alone (and maybe Brits) that national assembly will go into session to discuss next steps after holidays and to begin drafting a declaration of independence. You are prepared to discuss but this step will be inevitable. Process will include further consultations and town meetings to vet the document. Declaration would be made sometime early spring. If meanwhile, EU or even UNSC can make decision, so much the better.
• Show IC calm determination. Continue to exercise control, resist all provocations (especially from north) and give UNMIK and KFOR full support for their efforts.

January 2008

• At beginning of month, inform other key countries that Assembly will begin drafting declaration by month’s end.
• Assembly reconvenes and finishes discussion of previous consultations with focus on next steps in line with Ahtisaari plan. All views aired, visibly gauge public reaction.
• By month’s end, national unity government announces that Assembly will next take up task of drafting a declaration of independence while awaiting possible UNSC action. (Big unilateral step but still not the final one).

February 2008

• Make it privately clear to US and Europeans that you have done all possible to give them time but with or without them, you must take next steps to preserve stability. You will do your part to maintain security and to prepare for implementation of Ahtisaari plan. They must get ready to play theirs. Reaffirm your adherence to CG three principles and remind them of theirs. No one can be allowed to veto this process. Declaration – date certain – will be in April.
• Process of drafting Declaration enshrining commitment to Kosovo for all its people and to Ahtisaari plan starts in Assembly. No rallies or demonstrations at this point put serious discussion throughout the land.

March 2008

• Draft declaration is approved and published. New series of town meeting held to consult with the people.
• Continued efforts to publicly reassure and reach-out to non-Albanians.
• Absolute control necessary. No violence, threats or incidents. Resist all provocations while supporting KPS, UNMIK and KFOR as necessary.
• US and others informed of date in April for declaration. Message: the public process so far has helped to channel and contain public sentiments, process cannot now be stopped.

April 2008

• Announce elections for four months after declaration (as called for in Ahtisaari plan).
• Be ready for crisis appeals/demands from IC to give negotiations “another chance.”
• More large but controlled spontaneous marches and rallies for declaration.
• April 23 (?), declaration approved by Assembly.

end text

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A Map for a New North Mitovica municipality in 2006

I prepared this map in 2006 for Martti Ahtisaari, the UNSG Special Envoy for the negotiations over Kosovo status between Belgrade and Pristina.  I was serving as the UNMIK Regional Representative for Mitrovica (and northern Kosovo).  I had met Ahtisaari some 20 years previously while working on Angola.  We met in June in UNMIK HQ in Pristina and had other meetings during the summer.  One of his staff asked me to prepare the map which I delivered to Ahtisaari's team before the year's end.  It was supposed to balance the ethnic realities by giving the K-Albanian South Mitrovica a bit of the north while dividing the territory in a way acceptable to the majority K-Serbs in the north.  It was predicated on an eventual agreement in the UN Security Council on the status of Kosovo, some acceptable form of autonomy or "independence."  Despite Ahtisaari's best efforts, the US and Russia could not agree.  Pristina declared independence unilaterally in February 2008.  Ahtisaari later became President of Finland.

The light red line was the existing border of Mitrovica (which spanned the Ibar River).  The darker red line would have been the new border with the Serb majority North Mitrovica to the east and a mixture of Albanian and Serb villages as part of South Mitrovica to the west.  The area north of the Ibar were other Serb-majority municipalities 

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