Kosovo: The March 17, 2008 Coutrthouse Debacle

Despite our warning to UNMIK HQ Pristina  (acting according to guidance from the US) and to UN DPKO New York (unwilling to "second guess" the clueless leaders of UNMIK), UNMIK launched an action on March 17, 2008 to retake the courthouse in north Mitrovica.  Here follows my email the following day sent to everyone in UNMIK and DPKO I could think of to make clear the damage done to our peacekeeping efforts in the north and along the Ibar and to forestall further ill-considered actions.  

Balkanalysis.com has my fuller account of the background events leading up to what happened that day.

 

Kosovo 2007: Understanding the North

Following up the previous entry, from my journal for November 27, 2007.:


Had to go to Pristina today for lunch with the chief DPKO guy for Europe, who encouraged me to keep doing what we are doing and to let them know when UNMIK HQ strays into anything that will upset the apple cart in the north. They liked my dissent messages and share our view that the basic thing is to get the UN out of here before the real crisis hits. That means before Kosovo becomes a failed state and the north fully partitions. The UN New York plan is to somehow squeeze between competing pressures from the West and Russia to leave five months after the UDI expected in the 2nd half of January, turning things essentially over to the EU, before it fully understands what it will be getting. I suggested we won't be able to last five months.


The second code cable I drafted follows here:

May 2007 Vienna Meeting on Kosovo

Went to Vienna at the end of May, 2007 to take part in a meeting of UNMIK & KFOR (NATO in Kosovo) top command with the person designated to be chief of the International Community Office (ICO) mission formed by the US and EU and meant to replace UNMIK after the UN leaves.  (Note:  The UN is still there.). Subject, northern Kosovo.  UNMIK North had spent some months trying to educate the EU on the need for a gradual approach and fending off their efforts to get us to do some difficult "chores" -- like dealing with the local Serb's using dinars and Serbian license plates -- before we hand over to them.  I met Pieter Fieth, who would be the head man, when he visited Khartoum as EU envoy for Darfur.  He said he remembered me well.  But I also heard that he did not like Americans.  In any case, once he took over, and with the help of NATO, he proved to believe the best way to "tame" the north was to use force.  (See:  http://www.transconflict.com/2011/11/kosovo-quint-brinksmanship-241/,  http://www.transconflict.com/2011/09/kosovo-nato-actions-illegal-illogical-and-immoral-309/  and related pieces at http://www.transconflict.com/author/gerard-gallucci/.
Here follows the text of the agenda for the Vienna meeting with my annotations for my use as talking points:

Brainstorming on the north of Kosovo

Date: 31 May

Location: Vienna

Participants:

EU

- Pieter Feith, Yves de Kermabon

- Stefan Lehne, Pedro Serrano

- Torbjorn Sohlstrom, Casper Klynge

UN

- Joachim Ruecker

NATO

- Pardew, Naples, COMKFOR

US

- Fletcher Burton

Agenda

1) Preventing hard partition (lead UNMIK+KFOR)

Questions to answer:

• Are all partners fully prepared for all possible scenarios? Basic issue: If northerners try to hard partition (e.g., by crossing UNMIK’s three red lines not simply through rhetoric), choice is to counter it through diplomacy and political work or to assume IC military/administrative control of the north. In the latter case it becomes how many troops and police, readiness to counter/arrest/shoot those who resist and appropriate human and financial resources to administer the north for whatever period of time it takes to find locals and local resources to do it.
• What actions might be necessary during the transition period? How can we ensure full IC support?
• Belgrade handling?
• UNMIK actions to prepare for status implementation, e.g. establishment of new municipality of N. Mitrovica. Underway but need direct and practical support of EU and US to focus UNMIK.

2) Integrating the north over time (lead ICR+ESDP+IMP).

Questions to answer:

• Which measures are needed to integrate the north/parallel structures? Patient diplomacy and political work with local and central officials plus the resources to offer practical cooperation with IC and between communities and to replace over time resources supplied by Belgrade.
• How should these measures be paced and timed?
• Which positive, reassuring, or face-saving measures can be used to accompany ‘hard’ measures? How in the world will you do any “hard” measures without using force? And what will “face saving” look like after taking away ‘their country” and using force to make them submit to the Albanians (which is how they will see it). This strikes me as dangerous thinking because based more on a conception of how things should go rather than an understanding of reality.)
• When and how should the ICR announce the ‘red lines’ for the north? Should there be a clear signal of strength at the start? I think you “signal strength” quietly through presence. Much more useful will be clear signal of understanding and readiness to work with all communities on practical cooperation. The essential redline to signal directly and quietly – within context of assurances of continued cooperation – is that if local Serb officials refuse to engage with ICO at working level, IC will have no alternative but to consider assuming direct control.
• How does the ICR ensure international support for his plan and for measures to be taken?
• Which measures need to be taken vis-à-vis Belgrade, and by whom?
• How does the ICR deal with a full boycott by the north? Having made clear the above redline, a little patience during the “testing” phase of a “boycott” to see how serious they are or if it is just for form sake and how much and quickly it will “leak.”
• Agreed end states after 6 or 12 months?
• How to use the regional EU perspective?
• How to involve donors at an early stage? With money for QIPs on both sides of River and some infrastructure/job creation activity using private sector.

Intelligence: how do we make sure that ICR and ESDP HoM have good intel? Best way is people on the ground in each municipality – including internationals – with locals who will need to be carefully “milked” by their international colleagues.

PR: benefits (and limits) of an information campaign?

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