Kosovo: November 9, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  Here follows the minutes of the second meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force to continue EU "coordination" with the United Nations. (Note: CRC refers to Crowd & Riot Control.  I believe ESDP may refer to European Security and Defence Policy operations.)

November 9, 2006

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting (2)

Participants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Butchart Livingston (OSCE), Carver, Stadler (both ICO PT), Zuccarini (EUPT), Guehenneux, Denis (KFOR), Urny (UN Police)

Guests: Moskowitz, Ciaravolo, Rolando (DOJ), Neisse (ICO PT), ??? (US office)

Ad 1) CRC

EUPT informed about tasking to engage also in the CRC planning, while noting that in the overall concept of the future mission the primary responsibility lies with the local authorities, i. e. KPS for the police. Some argued that ESDP needs its own CRC; if not, KFOR needs to stay on the bridge, sending a wrong message contrary to the policy of “towards normalization”. The TF agreed that divided Mitrovica poses a special challenge and therefore identified a need of a standing element to be able to respond to any deterioration of the security situation. A possibility of non-implementation of the status settlement was also noted in this context. 

In general, chain of response is: KPS – IC-police – KFOR. Taking into account the specific situation in Mitrovica, where divisions occur also in KPS, the TF thought that IC-police should remain to stand ready, with KFOR ultimate back-up when necessary / opportune. ICOM’s security should therefore rely on the IC engagement.

Coordination of the IC actors should work through LOs to ICOM. Concerning CRC, there was thinking that the Unit should be led by an IC-commander, with direct links to KPS, to HoICOM and to ICO HQ in Pristina.

Ad 2) The Administrative Border with Serbia

The TF reviewed the current model, where KFOR provides security in the northern Kosovo, but does not directly operate on the boundary. It was noted that it is important that KFOR maintains its presence in the Nothing Hill base and continues with the current approach – also in a support to the future ESDP mission. EUPT foresees permanent presence of the ESDP mission on the gates 1 and 31, while noting that with the new UNSC Resolution KPS will be allowed to engage on the boundary / border with Serbia. Additionally, they plan for mobile teams covering the rest of the area.

Ad 3) Ibar and the bridges

The TF anticipated potential increase of a security risk (as Ad 1). To prevent any adverse incidents, a very determined and clear mechanism will be needed for a hand-over from UNMIK Police to the ESDP mission. A need for a firm mandate was also raised, as the only approach to prevent partition scenario. 

The majority voiced the preference of no (visible) changes of the IC police deployment and engagement in the area, pointing out a need for fixed locations / check points of the ESDP mission on potentially critical locations (bridges, Three Towers, Bosniak Mahala).

Ad 4) KFOR / IMP

KFOR informed that no changes in deployment are envisaged for a period of 6 months after the status settlement.

Ad 5) ESDP Rule of Law Mission

EUPT briefed on the planning process, pointing out limited retention of executive powers for police and justice. The TF identified some particular problems for Mitrovica: location of the higher-level court (secure access, security in the court), property claims, the issue of personal documents and the parallel structures. The TF supported that vetting process should be completed before ESDP takes over.

Ad 6) What should be role of the KPS?

In Mitrovica, KPS performs only basic police tasks, but not the “ethnicity”-related ones. It was noted that the northern KPS has no capacities for sensitive or more sophisticated jobs, such as forensics, crime-investigation, etc (conversely, parallel structures do). KPS of other ethnicity therefore needs special protection if their job takes place in the North.

Additionally, a problem of potential non-cooperation of the northern KPS was raised upon the status announcement (change of uniforms, not following the orders). The TF supported that the issue should be raised with Belgrade in advance.

Ad 7) How to address information-sharing?

The TF agreed that there is a need for permanent mechanisms among the IC players, sensitive / confidential info included. Information flow can be channeled through: LOs to ICOM, permanent dialogue on different levels and adequate reporting.

Ad 8) Any coordinated public outreach (is there a PISG plan)?

The TF agreed there is a need to demonstrate coordinated international posture during transition and after status. It should be two-fold: 1.) informing officials (on status implementation) and 2.) campaign for people (need to ensure translations of the status settlement proposal with “frequently asked questions” as soon as the status settlement document becomes public).

Ad 9) Role of OSCE?

OSCE sees their role of “eyes and ears” of the ICO in the field all over Kosovo, including reporting on the status implementation. Although it can be assumed that general reporting can be shared and the focus of it determined locally (i. e. by actors in Pristina), the TF supported a more formal arrangement on the issue. Modalities should be discussed asap on the level of HoMs in Pristina first, followed by talks with OSCE in Vienna.

Ad 10) Evacuation planning during transition / post-status?

Till UNSCR 1244 in place, there is the existing UN evacuation plan (with KFOR support if needed so) for all IC players. It was noted that there is no support to local staff (remark: sensitive issue in the case of Mitrovica!).

Ad 11) What is status of transition plans for above areas?

While PISG and IC consult and plan for the transition and following status implementation for the whole Kosovo, particular plans for the North do not exist. As a particular point in this context, DOJ raised the issue of transition of the on-going trials (question of keeping the composition of same panels).

Ad 12) The next TF meeting will take place on November 16 at 11:00 a.m., UNMIK Regional HQ in southern Mitrovica (3^rd floor). Topical focus: returns, property and Trepca privatization.

Kosovo: November 2, 2007 Meeting of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area

In April 2007, the EU began to ready for assuming its role in a "post-independent" Kosovo and sent its EU Planning Team (EUPT) to begin coordinating with UNMIK on its plans to take our place.  In UNMIK Mitrovica's first meetings with the EUPT in Pristina, it was clear that the the EU people believed they were the knights on white horses sent to clean up the mess left by the UN.  They were not much interested in our views and wanted from us only what was necessary to leave the stage for them.  Things didn't work out that way and as of February 2019, both UNMIK and the EU are still there.  Indeed, it was only years later that the EU was allowed to place staff (other than police) in the north.  Here follows the minutes of the first meeting of the Mitrovica Task Force formed to start planning for the establishment of the EU''s International Civilian Office (ICO) that they saw becoming the new boss in Mitrovica.  They proved to be clueless.  (Two more meetings were held and those minutes will follow.)

November 2, 2006

Minutes of the Task Force on the Mitrovica Area meeting

Participants: Gallucci, Efimov (both UNMIK), Daca (OSCE), Carver, Stadler (both ICO PT), Zuccarini (EUPT), Guehenneux, Bruno (KFOR)

Ad 2) The Task Force (TF) agreed on its main goals: to identify and analyze key issues in the region that needed international attention regarding the transition and status periods, and to present policy-makers with options (“TO DO” list) for addressing those issues, namely in 3 areas: 1. list of potential breaches of the status settlement (i. e. parallel structures), 2. list of priorities of implementation of the settlement in the North and 3. tool-box to enforce the implementation (sticks and carrots).

Ad 3) The TF identified and reviewed advantages and disadvantages to locating the International Civilian Office - Mitrovica (ICOM) on either side of the Ibar. Several participants noted the need for access and the value of exposing the two major ethnic groups to each other, which could be more easily achieved by an office in southern Mitrovica. Some participants voiced concern that locating an office in northern Mitrovica could be interpreted as endorsing a partition of Kosovo. Others thought that an office in the northern part sends more proper political message, since the ICOM’s target population would mostly be K/S. The TF agreed that it is difficult to judge the physical security advantages of either location without knowing what the security environment will be under status. It was noted that good coordination with EUPT will be needed when deciding on the physical location of ICOM to plan and deploy ESDP component accordingly.

Ad 4) The TF reviewed possible numbers of ICOM staff members and discussed the option of maintaining ICO personnel in each of the northern municipalities. TF members observed that such a presence could provide the ICO more and better opportunities to intervene in status implementation issues; besides it would actually offer direct help and guidance to K/S locally. Such an ICO presence could also reassure Albanian minorities in those municipalities as well as demonstrate that the ICO would not allow partition of the north from the rest of Kosovo. TF agreed that ICOM would be the only communication link between Pristina and the North. Some participants noted the double standard of maintaining a presence in the northern municipalities while not doing so in the southern ones. The majority of participants supported the option of co-locating one ICO advisor in the OSCE field office in each of the municipalities at least part of every work day with the ICO branch office located in northern Mitrovica.

Ad 5) The TF identified several issues for possible review in future meetings (ranking below does not necessarily correspond to accurate prioritizing):

- property: linked to returns (particularly of K/A to the North), including social housing and rental schemes;

- privatization, with the core case of Trepca, linked to pensions;

- economic decentralization with infrastructure and utilities (electricity, water, phone lines, media transmission);

- economic development and job creation;

- freedom of movement (returns and security issues); transportation; travel documents and licence plates;

- security and the rule of law mission (core case of the Bridge);

- financial transactions and money flows; currency;

- modalities of implementation of the new decentralization: replacing the UAM;

- the university and the hospital: any new arrangements;

- the parallel courts and police;

- future of the KPC (in the North);

- facilitation of inter-ethnic contacts and cooperation;

- public communication strategy and access to the media.

Ad 6) The TF agreed to meet Thursday, November 9, 11:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m., in the ICO PT offices in Pristina to discuss security issues.

Kosovo: August 2005 Briefing on Trepča

The memo on the Trepča issue that follows was prepared for me after my July 2005 arrival in Mitrovica as UNMIK Regional Representive.  (Trepča was under UNMIK management.)  During my time in Mitrovica, I paid special attention to the various economic issues, which in many cases were in contention between Serbia and K-Serbs on one side and the K-Albanians and the internationals supporting them on the other.  These included Trepča -- which had facilities and workers on both sides of the ethnic divide -- as well as electricity production and delivery (KEK and Obilić), water (Gazivoda), telecoms and ownership of Serbian owned entities such as JugoPetrol.  I believed that a final political settlement -- difficult in any case -- could be facilitated by reaching fair agreements on economic matters giving both sides an incentive to make the agreement work.  Thus I encouraged Special Status Envoy Ahtisaari to address these matters in his final status proposal but he decided against apparently under pressure from the pro-Albanian internationals and especially the US.  I believe Trepča status is still unsettled.  

Trepca Mining Complex

Briefing Notes for new Mitrovica Regional Representative

What was/is Trepca.

Trepca was a massive and diverse base metal mining conglomerate operating throughout the former Yugoslavia with its principle assets and activities based in Kosovo, managed from offices in Mitrovica, Zvecan. With operations commencing in the mid 1920’s by a British company, at its peak in the early 80’s, the now state owned business employed over 20,000 workers. With three primary lead and zinc mining centres in Kosovo situated in Leposavic in the north, Mitrovica and Kisnica in the south and metal refining operations in Mitrovica, its operations touched all of the Kosovo population.

Following the conflict years and NATO’s arrival, all operations ceased. However, some 2,000 workers come to work each day and a further 2,500 ex-workers receive a monthly stipend, all paid for from the Kosovo Consolidated Budget. The company is now overseen by a small team of international mining engineers and experts, employed by UNMIK through KTA.

The Trepca Vision Statement

The under explored Trepca Minerals Belt provides a very good potential for finding additional ore resources at and in the vicinity of the existing mines which offers excellent opportunities for a vital, active and viable base metal (lead and zinc) mining company which would provide an estimated 2000 real, direct jobs. Indirectly, according to the experience of the Worldbank, another 4000 jobs will be created in the supply and service sector.

Metallurgical activities, associated with and peripheral to the former primary lead and zinc metal production facilities, form the basis for an industrial company serving industrial and environmental businesses in the Balkans.

Strategy

“Develop and bring into operation promising business units with the limited funds available over the next two to three years. This will enable Trepca management to explore markets, test competitiveness and gradually establish viable businesses. This strategy will determine the viability of each project and lead to the creation of real jobs. Incompetent, uncompetitive companies will have to close. The development of businesses and successful companies will be attractive for investors. This will enhance privatisation opportunities.”

The several recent international expert reviews have confirmed the existence of promising business units within the Trepca complex. The Trepca strategy has therefore found wide support. Generally it is seen to be the only realistic and pragmatic option left which relates to the specifics of Trepca’s position in respect to its geographic location, the current political, social and economic environment, the restructuring and privatization objectives of KTA, the technical status of its plant, equipment and mines, the qualification of its workforce, the expectations of ex-workers and society and, last not least, the lack of funds.

A summary of the Trepca Strategy and current status

1. Core business-mining. Funded through the Kosovo Consolidated Budget and funds from the EAR.

The strategy is unchanged, four mines and concentrators at all 3 mining centres are now ready to start production. Explosives have just been delivered and blasting will commence shortly building up gradually towards target production levels towards the end of the year.

Yet again Trepca suffered severe delays in 2005, partly due to regulatory requirements with respect to the storage and use of explosives and partly due to funding constraints. A request was made for a budget of € 11.1 million only € 8.1 million was approved, in addition a requested carry forward of Capital from 2004 was not given even though verbal approval had been given this caused Trepca to change plans and refurbish existing equipment which will be less productive and less reliable than the new equipment that had been planned. Trepca still does not have sufficient funds to implement the approved plans and this has been aggravated by delays in start up which means a delay in receipt of revenue.

2. Other business. Funded by Trepca Own Funds.

Through funding realized from the sale of existing semi products, wastes and scrap, Trepca has some limited funds of its own. These it is directing into investment in the plant with Action Plans now approved for reactivation of several industrial production units, such as Aluminium Sulphate manufacture at MIP, S. Mitrovica; Battery Recycling at Zvecan ; production of Zinc and Zinc Oxide powder at MIP; Starter Battery manufacture at MIP; Trailer factory; Custom Terminal. The Trailer Factory is already operational as is the Customs Terminal. Limited Aluminium Sulphate production has already commenced against contracts for supply in Kosovo. Investment commenced in the Battery Recycling Plant at the end of 2004 and the plant is due to commence production 1^st September 2005. The sourcing of sufficient used batteries is as expected causing some problems. The rehabilitation of the Zinc Dust/Oxide Plant commenced in April 2005 and is ahead of schedule. However a funding shortfall may prevent completion this year.

3. Environmental Remediation. Funded by Donor Agencies.

Many programs have been completed over the past two years All these funded by individual mission donations including the Dutch Government, DANIDA and SIDA. Trepca is currently negotiating a further donation from the Dutch Government that will, if granted, fund the rehabilitation of Gornje Polje Tailings Dam, Leposavic Tailings Dam, MIP tailings dams and several other projects. The EAR are also examining how to best spend some €10 million during 2006-7 to assist job creation in Mitrovica/Zvecan, some of these funds may be made available to assist Trepca.

Significant Issues

1. Trepca is being pursued by Creditor Claimants

A number of very aggressive creditor claims are being pursued through the courts (Special Chamber of the Supreme Court). In total the creditor claims for Trepca are believed to amount to over € 200 million and there may be over two thousand claims. As Trepca’s assets are believed to be worth less than €85 million, Trepca is (like many SOEs) insolvent.

We are concerned that the claims against Trepca should be dealt with in accordance with international insolvency laws. There are three critical creditor claims which are near judgment stage in the Special Chamber. To address the concern that these will be executed soon against Trepca’s assets – by way of seizure of assets, the SRSG signed an Administrative Direction on 2nd June that stops the execution of all claims for three months whilst a new Bankruptcy and Administration Law is finalized and promulgated. This gives temporary protection to Trepca but the company must be placed in Administration immediately it becomes possible. A successful Administration process is not possible without the co-operation of the Serbs in Zvecan and this will not be gained without at least the tacit consent but ideally the full approval of the Serbian Government. Funding for the Administrator will be required at least in the short term until the sale of assets can generate sufficient funds to pay the Administrator

2. Trepca must obtain longer term budgeting commitment.

The short-term and piecemeal funding is unacceptable for a business that MUST plan ahead for several years. Yet again insufficient funds were provided and even these were late. This caused programme delays.

3. The redundancy of employees past and present has to be resolved.

For 5 years, Trepca has been forced to manage an unpaid workforce of almost 5,000 solely to assure the ongoing social peace and which continues to expect employment and salaries but which is totally unrelated to Trepca’s present or future needs. This is a social issue for Kosovo and has nothing to do with the new Trepca. This issue continues to be a problem.

4. Trepca must receive a business and VAT registration and move towards privatization.

Trepca is now registered as an SOE but has still not been able to register for VAT The lack of definition of the business position of Trepca continues to frustrate all efforts to establish a long-term, viable company, which can be successful in the international business world.

We cannot run a business unless we ARE a business.

Obstacles and Difficulties

• The overriding parameter for a successful new start of some of Trepca’s previous activities is the political will to do so. This will has been lacking or at best not focused and that affects all tasks that management is faced with.
• There is has been no policy on Trepca, therefore the management has had to coordinate on a daily basis, project by project, with UNMIK, KTA, MFE, Government, KFOR and Trade Unions. Coordination work takes time and as time goes by, decision makers change and the management starts all over again. Some progress has been made in unifying policy but there is still incomplete agreement between UNMIK and PISG on the way forward.
• There is no secured financing. The lack of an industrial policy requires the management to present its plans on numerous occasions as if a brand new story has to be told. The different sources of funds (KCB, Donors) appear to be uninterested of each other yet harmonization of these funds is a critical task. Offers of funding are made then withdrawn or delayed this makes planning of programmes impossible.
• The administrative procedures required by the procurement law are bureaucratic, inefficient and not suitable to running a company. This resulted in 6 months delay in expending capital in 2004 and then loss of funds and cancellation of contracts these lead to loss of credibility and a recirculating work.
• There exists a large number of unqualified, over aged and physically unfit workers, who in many cases lack experience, skills and competence whilst we have put most of these on early retirement, a permanent solution remains a problem.

Summary

1. Trepca management has plans to re-start production in the mines in the third quarter of 2005. The production will be limited, traditional operating practices will be applied and modern safety management systems shall be implemented. The timetable for the implementation of the program is subject to many factors outside the control of the management.
2. The pursuit of creditor claims in the courts will stop all activities unless the protection currently afforded by the AD signed by the SRSG on 2^nd June remains in force until there is a new law on Administration and Bankruptcy and the company has been placed into Administration. The Administrator once appointed will be responsible for selling all the Trepca assets.
3. Getting Trepca into the private sector is considered vital to the establishment of any long term viable business since all the businesses need investment in both their physical assets and their human resources. Sale/privatisation is more likely to be successful if the initial viability of selected business units can be demonstrated; thus the strategy of Trepca’s management.
4. Trepca management believes in the excellent mining potential of the “Trepca Minerals Belt”. All efforts in re-starting mine production are also geared at substantiating this perspective which will increase the attractiveness for international investors. A special fund for an exploration drilling program and regional geological investigations would very much support this concept. Funds for this were cancelled by the MFE at the end of 2004.
5. Rehabilitation work on environmental hazards must continue which requires the allocation of funds.
6. Certain metallurgical business units are identified as potentially viable and these will be brought into production as funds become available. These units, which appear to be competitive, will have to establish themselves in a market environment with a distinctive entrepreneurial drive.
7. Last and certainly not least, the operational and managerial capabilities in combination with safety attitudes and knowledge of everyone, be it operators, engineers and managers, Albanians or Serbs, have to be much enhanced. This requires several years of on the job training ideally through qualified contractors.
   
   
   
   

Kosovo: SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities on December 7, 2006*

Memorandum of Conversation

Internal Memorandum

Subject: SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities

Date: 7 December 2006

Venue: Zvečan/Zvecan Municipality

Municipal Assembly Presidents:

Mr. Dragisa Milovic (DM) – Municipal Assembly President of Zvečan/Zvecan; Mr. Slavisa Ristic (SR) - Municipal Assembly President of Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok; Mr. Velimir Bojovic (VB) - Municipal Assembly President of Leposavic/Leposaviq.

UNMIK participants:

Mr. Joachim Ruecker, Mr. Gerard Gallucci, Mr. Dennis Besedic, Ms. Myriam Dessables, Mr. Juozas Kazlas, Mr. Andrei Efimov, Mr. Jean-Luc Sintes, Ms. Lilia Galieva, Mr. Kerim Bardad-Daidj.

DM welcomed the SRSG and introduced his colleagues.

SRSG expressed appreciation of this opportunity to discuss some practical issues with the presidents for the first time since he assumed his current post. He acknowledged a significant number of visitors to the north recently, including SE and representatives of CG and assessed this as a positive development. SRSG then gave a briefing regarding the status process. He explained that UNMIK does not have a direct role in the process but rather acts as facilitator and “voice from the ground” for UNOSEK. He mentioned that he will deliver his next report on Standards Implementation to New York on 13 December. It can be expected that the SE will present status package right after elections in Serbia. Regarding elections UNMIK - like in the past - will neither support nor hinder relevant activities in Kosovo while ensuring FOM, safe and secure environment as it does in any other period of time. As soon as the package is tabled, consultations are envisioned in Belgrade and Pristina followed by presentation of the package in New York. Timely conclusion of the process is expected. The period between the Resolution and “the Status Day” will be transition from UNMIK to a follow-on International Civilian Office which should be well prepared. It can take three-six months. The substantial part of the status package will include decentralization, establishment of new municipalities, protection of cultural sites and minorities, especially of their vital rights. UNMIK can be engaged in explaining these things, particularly the importance of decentralization, which is not yet understood everywhere. The SRSG’s experience as a mayor in Germany showed that decentralization will mean strengthening of local self-government, but also strengthening the cohesion of Kosovo. It will include establishment of new municipalities. The latest Pristina proposal stipulates that up to 90% of K-Serbs will live in predominantly Serbian municipalities in southern and northern Kosovo. It seems that IC accepted “asymmetric” competences, which will be exercised more by K-S municipalities. IC’s intention is to make K-Serbs largely self-governed within Kosovo and managing its everyday life as well as its heritage.

Speaking about practical issues SRSG mentioned that UNMIK had been trying to engage IC more in the northern municipalities, to bring donors to the north. The estimated amount of recent IC funding is about 1.5 million Euros. It could be even more if not for non-acceptance of funding from PISG valued roughly at two million Euros in wages and salaries for healthcare and education, QIPs and some other KCB budget lines. SRSG encouraged the presidents to reconsider this stance because that money belongs to Serbian community. He stressed importance of participation of northern municipalities in 2007 budget process.

SRSG also touched upon the issue of returns. He emphasized the imminent completion of reconstruction in Svinjare and the need not to leave the new houses uninhabited during winter.

DM started from the last topic. He emphasized that the problem of returns exists not only for K-Serb IDPs from Svinjare but also from Obilic, and not only from 2004 but also from 1999. The PISG and the International Community failed to facilitate returns of both. He opined that this situation should be objectively reported in the upcoming UNMIK Standards Report. He also stressed the very difficult situation with regard to those IDPs located in the two unfinished buildings in Zvecan and hoped that the SRSG could help in this regard. DM mentioned that at the same time there are some returns of K-Albanian to their reconstructed houses in the municipality.

DM fully shared SRSG’s opinion regarding importance of decentralization, especially of strengthened local self-governance.

With regard to the municipal funding, DM stressed that despite the fact that part of the budget for 2006 was not spent due to boycott of PISG institutions, this money belongs to the Municipality as it comes from tax collection and border taxation. Furthermore, the northern MAPs have proposed a solution that could be acceptable for both sides and that is to deposit the money in special alternative municipal bank accounts, but UNMIK did not accept this option, though it worked well for EAR, USAID and “Mercy Corp”.

DM added that the only acceptable solution for Serbs with regard to Kosovo Status is a one of compromise between Pristina and Belgrade and that he disagrees with the statement made by the SE that a negotiated solution is not possible between the two parties. Any imposed solution would be unacceptable for K-Serbs, and negotiations should continue. The SCR should embrace basic principles of SCR 1244.

DM thanked the SRSG for his time and his visit and expressed wish to have more of these meetings in the future.

SR, while supporting main points made by the Zvecan MAP, expressed concern that not only UNMIK is not playing role in status process but also IC is not effectively involved. He opined that the entire process is left to the SE who seems not to be interested in finding of negotiated solution. Both K-Serbs and K-Albanians depend on the substance of the status package and it should not be in hands of one individual. It is rather a paradoxical situation: for many years Serbs have been pressured to participate in dialogue and criticized for lack of enthusiasm in this regard, and now they are told that a solution cannot be found through dialogue.

SR pointed out importance of economic decentralization. He cited one example – numerous times explained to previous SRSGs - how Zubin Potok had been economically exploited and discriminated. As we first reported in 2005, the local Serbs believe that company "Ibar Lepenac"-- based in Pristina and made up of K-Albanians -- wrongly claims to represent the Ibar Company which actually runs the Gazivode Dam and Hydro plant in Zubin Potok. “Ibar Lepenac” is nothing more that a group of former Ibar employees who misrepresented themselves as the proper management of Ibar in order to collect the 10 million euros a year in payments for the water and power from Gazivode. In return, the people who actually run the Dam get nothing other than funds for 40 of the 200 people who work for Ibar in the north. SR suggested that “Ibar Lepenac” should be moved to Zubin Potok, where it can manage the supply and distribution network for both sides of the River. SR noted that the Serbs had never thought of stopping the water flow into the south, though they were sure the Albanians would have done it if the situation were vice-versa.

VB noted that they had a number of meetings with the internationals, where they presented their problems and their solutions for those problems. However, the results were not tangible. He reiterated that the IC had stated that first standards should be reached in order to get the status. From all the standards, only the standard which concerns creating of the KPC was achieved. The rest of the standards, such as Freedom of Movement, Returns etc. have not been fulfilled.

Referring to SRSG statement that he would present his report on Kosovo to SC on 13 December, VB pleaded that he present a real picture of Kosovo. He gave an example of a recent celebration of Flag Day by Albanians in the South of Kosovo and in Serbia (Bujanovac), where Serb flag was replaced by Albanian flag.

Regarding the influx of international funding to the North, VB stated that it was true that there had been an increase of funding to the North from IC; however, if it was compared to the funding in the South during the last seven years, the proportion was negligible.

As an example of skewed investments toward Albanian citizens, he presented a case of a return project in three Albanian villages in Leposavic Municipality (so called KBC villages). VB said that according to one Albanian from those villages, some beneficiaries were not real owners of the houses. They left the village after the war, because they had killed some forest man in that area, but now they got the houses as returnees. Also the infrastructure was not installed in proper way. The roads were put along the ridge of the hill, in the opposite direction from Leposavic. Having once served in the military, he could tell that the road had been constructed with a different purpose.

As for the Serb IDPs, nothing was done. Without support from Serbian Government, CCK and Red Cross, all those people would have died. Roma returns have been also discussed for seven years. Mr. Pedersen gave even the date when they would be back, but nothing was done. Currently, Municipality of Leposavic is constructing a kindergarten in the town, and the location is next to a Roma camp. Nobody could guarantee hygienic standards in the kindergarten under those conditions. VB asked that SRSG solve the problem, as his position enabled him to do that.

In regards to final status, VB stated that it should be based on compromise. He further elaborated, that any other decision would not pass. IC can try to convince K-Serbs that cohabitation between K-Serbs and K-Albanians is possible, but not ethnically mixed settlements.

VB also commented that there was an agreement that there would no be customs established on the border crossing, however, currently there is a big sign “Customs Zone”. IC should be honest and see the reality. K-Serbs could not survive if they were left to live together with Albanians. There will be no survival of K-Serbs in the South, regardless of decentralization arrangements. Even now we are witnessing disappearance of Serbs from the South.

SRSG disagreed with the notion that the SE is not interested in negotiations. There were 10 months of intensive negotiations mainly on four topics. Issues like split of former Yugoslavia’s debts had been discussed in great details, a mutually acceptable solution was found, and there was no need for further discussions. SRSG opined that K-Serbs should be interested in keeping momentum and finding solutions instead of maintaining a state of uncertainty.

SRSG also rejected the statement that “nothing had been done” by UNMIK on specific issues mentioned. Regarding unsolved criminal cases, he informed that investigation is ongoing and some arrests had been made and soon UNMIK will be able to report progress. However it also depends on cooperation of people with Police. There are indications that not all of them are ethnically motivated, although that does not make them any better, nor does it mean that we do not need to solve them.

DM fully agreed with the SRSG that there was no sound evidence that the security incidents that took place in April and May, and which led to municipal assembly decisions to suspend all cooperation with the central PISG, were ethnically motivated. However, the concern is that the number of security incidents increased, be they ethically motivated or not, and that none of these cases was solved. They need information, whatever it is.

Speaking about returns, SRSG stated that there was increase in returns after the Protocol between UNMIK and Belgrade was signed in June 2006. While acknowledging regretable delays in Roma return, he informed interlocutors that in January 2007 actual returns to Roma Mahalla could start and there is a need of good cooperation with the K-Serbian community.

With regard to “Ibar Lepenac”(whose HQ apparently has always been in Pristina), SRSG stressed that UNMIK cannot do anything outside institutions. Even if valid, this case should be brought to the KTA Board, where a seat is reserved for a K-Serb and a possibility of consensus decisions exists. This particular case has never been discussed there. It can be fixed not outside of institutions but inside when your voice is heard. It would also be better if privatization of SOEs could have started in the northern municipalities.

DM explained that when saying “nothing” they meant tangible results regarding returns.

About participation in Kosovo institutions, he expressed view that participation of K-Serbs in the past resulted in March 2004. The only outcome of an appointment of K-Serb as minister of MCR was embezzlement of few million Euros and no returns. DM reiterated that K-Serbs would like to take part in institutions that would be democratic and where they won’t be outvoted by the majority community and where they will not simply serve as decoration.

DM raised issue of electricity. He referred to confusing information regarding present status of negotiations in Belgrade between CCK and UNMIK on a possibility for K-Serbs to receive donation of electricity from Serbia. In this regard, SRSG stressed that the negotiations between KEK and CCK are still on-going, despite some premature statements from CCK. However, there is a fairly good chance that an agreement between CCK and KEK will be reached. K-Serbs have been receiving electricity for a long time. The agreement should also deal with this situation. DM fully agreed that K-Serbs should be paying with some special arrangements for IDPs, unemployed and other social cases. But it also true that consumers should have a right to choose distributor, which is impossible with the existing monopoly. Serbs in the north suggested somebody else who could deal with payments and distribution. Kosovo could be an exporter of electricity, but with the way how KEK is running business it cannot provide efficient power even within Kosovo. DM also mentioned problem of telephone communication.

SRSG commended desire to pay for electricity and reassured interlocutors that in accordance with The Athens Agreement there will be a consumers’ choice in Kosovo. He also explained procedure for “Electrokosmet” to start operations in Kosovo: first, it should apply for license; receive license, and then begin operational activities. This process can take time. The same applies for telephone communications: 063 and 064 should apply for license.

In closing, participants agreed on the importance of continued dialogue and committed themselves to further meetings.

(Drafted by xxxxxxxxxxxx, SPA, Mitrovica RHQ, 8 December 2006)

* Note:  See previous for the briefing memo prepared for this meeting:   https://realdiplomacy.blogspot.com/2019/01/kosovo-briefing-note-for-new-srsgs.html

Kosovo: Briefing Note for the new SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities on December 7, 2006*

UNITED NATIONS United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIK

NATIONS UNIES Mission d’Administration Intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo

MEETING WITH

Municipal Assembly Presidents of Zvečan/Zvecan, Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok, Leposavic/Leposaviq

Location: Zvečan/Zvecan Municipal Assembly Building

Time: 10:30 – 11:45

Date: Thursday, 7 December 2006

Participants:

Dragisa MILOVIC – Municipal Assembly President of Zvečan/Zvecan

Slavisa RISTIC - Municipal Assembly President of Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok

Velimir BOJOVIC - Municipal Assembly President of Leposavic/Leposaviq

UNMIK

SRSG

Gerard Gullucci - UNMIK Regional Representative

Juozas Kazlas - UNMIK Deputy Regional Representative

Kerim Bardad-Daidj – UNMIK OIC Zvečan/Zvecan

Jean-Luc Sintes - UNMIK Municipal Representative Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok

Lilia Galieva – UNMIK Municipal Representative Leposavic/Leposaviq

Background

There is strong unity between three northern Municipal Presidents (MAP). With very few exceptions, they come out with consolidated positions on main issues (security, freedom of movement, cooperation/non-cooperation with PISG, etc) usually guided by Belgrade and the SNC. Such conformity not only relates to their affiliation with the same political party (DSS) but also to similarity of every day problems they face. As of June 2006, following several security related incidents against K-Serbs, presented by the SNC as inter-ethnic, all three municipalities introduced boycott of PISG. Boycott stalled developing relations with central level and, together with non-acceptance of salaries from PISG, cost local population some two million Euros. The boycott also led them to mostly refuse SRSG Contingency Fund support (though Zubin Potok accepted and is utilizing).

Talking Points

SRSG message: now and through transition period UNMIK will continue to work with all communities helping them to address daily problems

Status process and continued role of UNMIK

• UNMIK not part of the negotiations process but is assisting the Special Envoy.
• SE postponed submission of his proposals until after Serbian Elections
• UNMIK will neither support nor prevent the elections to the extent it does not endanger calm and public order; we expect local authorities to exercise responsibility and mature behavior during this and following period.
• UNMIK will continue working with local authorities during the coming month and through transitional period, and support them in tackling practical issues important for every day life of all communities.
• Other priorities for UNMIK include decentralization, transfer of authority, security sector review, restructuring, ensuring stability.
• Emerging package will include substantial decentralization, new municipalities (including north Mitrovica), protection for cultural sites, minority rights and continued involvement of international community.
• UNMIK will continue efforts to bring attention of international donors to the north. So far we have been successful in this regard and managed to generate more than 1.5 millions Euros for economic development in northern municipalities.
• We believe that continued dialogue and cooperation will be essential after the status determination and pledge our readiness to do so.
• What else do you feel you need to remain secure and increase your well-being in your communities?

Cooperation between northern Municipalities and PISG

• UNMIK did not react politically to your boycott of PISG despite our strong disapproval of this action. Not only UNMIK but IC as well has been encouraging you to revisit this decision.
• Since June 2006, the International Security Presence in Kosovo has introduced additional measures to enhance security arrangements in Kosovo and specifically in minority areas. You have seen these changes in the north as well.
• It should be recognized that the general security situation has improved. The specific cases that you cited in your decision to cut ties with PISG remain very much under investigation.
• Meanwhile, the northern community has lost some two million Euros from the Kosovo budget during this period. This money is not “Albanian” or “Serb” but everyone’s.
• It is regretful that you did not accept funding for Quick Impact Projects from SRSG’s Contingency Fund. This was not even from. KCB.
• Against this backdrop, we ask that you reconsider your decision regarding the boycott at least partially, regarding budgeting. We are ready to assist.

Electricity

• In line with UNMIK’s general efforts to improve every day life of local communities one of greatest concerns is power supply especially during coming winter.
• UNMIK has been engaged in series of consultations with Belgrade authorities to address electricity issue more broadly. Recent contacts in this regard proved to be encouraging and in the near future most probably you will see practical results.

Return to Svinjare (Background: All essential repairs and reconstruction are on track to be completed by 14 December, following which, on 15 December, there is scheduled to be the final Svinjarë/Svinjare Decision Making Board held in Svinjarë/Svinjare, signalling the successful completion of the project. However, few IDPs appear willing to return at this time).

• Reconstruction of houses in Svinjare is almost complete. Next week IDPs can start returns and this is a very good development. The OKPCC will be able to provide those who return this year with wood stoves, firewood, and fencing. Necessary security arrangements will be in place. It’s time for the IDPs to make up their mind.
• No one can question their right to make a choice in good will and without intimidation. They can return, or sell, or use those houses for rent.
• A realistic concern, however, is that if the houses are left unoccupied over the winter, they will be vulnerable to thefts and weather damage. Such scenario is not acceptable. By finishing reconstruction and handing over the premises to the owners, UNMIK will complete its part of the job and will not carry further responsibilities of maintaining them in order or with regard to additional renovation after the winter.
• We are ready to assist IDPs in every reasonable way as soon as they make decision. It may be possible, for example, to facilitate a rental scheme for those properties. This way the houses will be taken care of, but IDPs would maintain the right to return to their property.

Return to Roma Mahalla

• After many years of delay Roma Mahalla reconstruction is developing in a very satisfactory way. The actual return could start in January 2007.
• Municipal authorities in Mitrovice/a actively cooperate to help the process.
• UNMIK expects that K-Serbian community can contribute to the ERA returns in positive way.

Reactive (municipal concerns likely to be raised during the meeting)

Security (Background: MAPs continuously criticize lack of progress in investigation of incidents which happened earlier this year (killing of one K-Serb from Zitkovac and shooting at two young Serbs at gas station, attack of a Priest and his family, throwing of a hand grenade to a family in Rudare, hand grenade attack at “Dolce Vita” Café); they claim that this situation presumes impunity for K-Albanians and provides grounds for new attacks. They may also criticize KPS for lack of professionalism, experience, and equipment, for presence of K-Albanian KPS in the north especially near the administrative boundaries in the north and in traffic control unit).

Suggested response:

• Security related issues top priority for UNMIK.
• But security issues should be separated from politics.
• In order to perform effectively, Police needs support and cooperation from local leaders and community.
• There are a lot of cases when investigation cannot be done properly because of lack of cooperation from locals.

Zubin Potok MAP may raise the long-standing issue of Water/Electric Company "Ibar Lepenac" (Background: the local Serbs believe that this company -- based in Pristina and made up of K-Albanians -- wrongly claims to represent the Ibar Company which actually runs the Gazivode Dam and Hydro plant in Zubin Potok. According to the MAP, Ibar Lepenac is nothing more that a group of former Ibar employees who misrepresented themselves as the proper management of Ibar in order to collect the EU10 million a year in payments for the water and power from Gazivode. In return, the people who actually run the Dam get nothing other than funds for 40 of the 200 people who work for Ibar in the north [the rest getting salaries from Serbia].)

Suggested response:

• UNMIK has done the best it can on economic and business issues but much needs the clarity that future status will bring.
• We are look into the issue you raise.

MAPs may raise issue of unspent funds due to boycott of KCB municipal budget and quire about possible ways of spending it next year or suggest deposit into a separate bank account.

Suggested response:

• UNMIK must follow established procedures and you have had time to consider for yourselves the implication of the refusal to accept your money through the KCB.
• However, with our basic approach of helping UNMIK can consider your official request to make an exemption from the established deadline.

Additionally MAPs may rise questions related to privatization (allegedly unfair for Serbs), cuts of telephone lines in enclaves. 

*NOTE:  The Memorandum of Conversation will be in next post. 

Kosovo: SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities on December 9, 2005

Memorandum of Conversation

Internal Memorandum

Subject: SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities

Date: 9 December 2005

Venue: Zvecan Municipality

ISSUES REQUIRING FOLLOW UP:

.

• Establish further contacts on the Decentralisation Program.

Municipal Assembly Presidents:

Mr. Dragisa Milovic (DM) – Municipal Assembly President of Zvečan/Zvecan; Mr. Slavisa Ristic (SR) - Municipal Assembly President of Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok; Mr. Velimir Bojovic (VB) - Municipal Assembly President of Leposavic/Leposaviq

UNMIK participants:

Mr Søren Jessen-Petersen, Mr Gerard Gallucci, Mr Petr Ivantsov, Mr Henrik Villadsen, Mr Devender Singh (Note taker), Mr Jean-Luc Sintes, Mr Detlef Beisiegel, Mr Lameck Kawiche.

The SRSG briefed the participants on the beginning of the status process noting that UNMIK is not part of the status process but would support it within its mandate. While the Status process will focus on politics, he would like to focus on the people. He underlined that there will be many concerns and preoccupations in this crucial period. UNMIK will promote closer collaboration with Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs to focus on key issues so as to reassure Kosovo Serbs that any status outcome would focus on their future. He was not prepared to accept that people should be let down if there was an unfavourable outcome.

The SRSG determined that there were five key areas to reassure Kosovo Serbs in next few months: i) Standard Implementation process and how UNMIK can push it; ii) Decentralisation as a fundamental issue with the ongoing comprehensive reform focussing on minorities needs to be reassured that they can manage their own affairs; iii) Freedom of movement and focussing on Kosovo Albanians to do more in this area; iv) Belgrade getting involved focussing on Kosovo Serbs residing in Kosovo; v) Kosovo Serb representatives playing their role in key areas through involvement in institutions and on practical issues. The SRSG noted encouraging results from the recent meetings held on practical issues and felt there was scope for doing more in that area. He touched upon the modest support provided by the SRSG to the Municipalities given their enormous needs and hoped that it will lead to more.

The SRSG then stressed that security was basis of everything discussed in the meeting and said that he was aware of immense concern about it. He stated there had been deeply regrettable incidents over last weeks and he condemned them. While it was important to resolve these crimes, it could not be concluded if these were inter-ethnic or who was responsible for these incidents. Nevertheless, psychological fear was growing as a result of these incidents leading to diminished freedom of movement. He informed that, after the bus incident near Prizren, intensive additional steps are envisaged by Police and KFOR. The SRSG hoped that it will have the desired effect even though there were some senseless people on all sides and it was difficult to stop it altogether.

DM thanked the SRSG for providing a general overview on Kosovo. He agreed that while status talks are ongoing, they have to think of the people and address their problems. He concurred with the SRSG that security and freedom of movement are key problems. He claimed that the level of violence was increasing and KFOR, Police and the Municipality have to stop it. In this context, he referred to a bomb thrown in a house in Mali Rudare in Zvecan Municipality. Recalling recent release of Fatmir Limaj, DM averred that it would encourage extreme Albanians to continue with their designs. He affirmed that decentralisation was the key issue needing resolution and characterised it as “a precondition for all preconditions”. He favoured creation and establishment of Municipalities with Serb majorities or with Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians together with competencies about Health, Education, Culture, Police etc. He called for horizontal connection between the Municipalities and institutional linkages with Serbia. Referring to Romas in Zitkovac camp and IDPs from Svinjare and Obilic displaced in Zvecan, he asserted that it was time to provide possibility for IDPs to return to their homes. DM argued that it was difficult to get into the institutions while two thirds of the population is displaced elsewhere. Highlighting high unemployment rate (60%), he urged all concerned to provide new opportunities so that people can stay here. He mentioned that he was interested and sensitive to the problems of North Mitrovica because many of these impacted on Zvecan. DM underscored that status problem could be solved in Kosovo with compromise and respecting the interests of both sides. Finally, he thanked the SRSG for his support for the project, which he said was important for their municipality.

VB expressed agreement with DM and stated that they have to be prepared for a decision that they may not like. He expressed fear that status of Kosovo may be resolved as a future for Albanians but not for Serbs. He recalled the meeting of 13 Kosovo Serb representatives with the Status Envoy where all of them expressed their unanimous view that any decision other than independence could be accepted. He opined that relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs had been negative all their lives, not just last six years. Recalling that his municipality was connected to the then autonomous province of ‘Kosovo and Metohija’, he wondered how a Municipality with 99% Serb population could be called an ‘Albanik’ Municipality. VB said he could not accept that Kosovo Albanians were asking for independence only and nothing else. Referring to disrespect of human rights for last six years, he claimed that Kosovo Albanians would behave better as status talks progress but it was not in their hearts. Taking out a map, he reminisced how his father had to leave Suva Reka Municipality to settle in North Kosovo and now his grandson may have to do the same. He contended that any unsuitable decision from the international community would not create stability in the region. VB felt that if final status is independence, not a single Serb will remain in this area; hence a solution to somehow satisfy both sides should be found. Pleading for objectivity on both sides, he mentioned that there were many models which could be followed so that both communities could live a normal life.

SR mentioned that while burden of status talks had shifted to Mr Ahtisaari, UNMIK has obligation in non-status areas. He specifically referred to Standard Implementation, which he admitted was a process that can’t be accomplished overnight. He stressed that UNMIK will have to be very determined to make concrete progress on decentralisation and it was SRSG’s obligation. He felt that the Albanian’s wish for an independent state is really to have central power over the Serbs. The IC must prevent creation of that kind of central power. He elaborated decentralisation as transferring authority and power from central level to local levels and not only creating new Municipalities. He added that diminishing budgetary support every year does not augur well for good future. SR mentioned two villages (Banjë/Banja and Suvogërll/Suvo Grlo) in Skenderaj / Srbica Municipality, which want to be connected to Zubin Potok Municipality not only for security but other reasons as well. These were multi-ethnic villages and if a decision in the context of decentralisation allows this, he would have no objection. He also pointed out that there were many such villages, where Serbs no longer reside but will return if connected to Zubin Potok. He claimed that he had no territorial ambitions. Finally, he said they were ready for all solutions to status issue. SR also appealed to his colleague from Leposavic to not leave the rest of them alone in Kosovo.

The SRSG concluded the meeting by thanking all the participants for their contributions and responded that he had not come with any message about a decision that they may not like but that it was good to prepare for whatever may come. Appreciating their comments about decentralisation, he said he was convinced that it will be a key feature of any status outcome. Kosovo Albanians will have to realize a decentralisation program that leads to a Kosovo for all communities. If such decentralisation does not emerge, the Status Envoy will ensure that decentralisation is integrated with status process with a strong focus on what communities need. He welcomed all comments especially on multi-ethnic municipalities. The SRSG recognized that while regular progress could not be made on returns, UNMIK was making progress on Romas in lead affected camps. Camp Oesterode is being prepared as a transit facility for those Romas in the camps, who want to move there. It will be a step on way to their formal return to Roma Mahalla

12 December 2005