91 STATE 388774: DAVIDOW HAVANA MEETING WITH GPRA DELEGATION

 

89 Harare 0599: MATABELELAND: STILL WAITING FOR THE FUTURE

 

88 HARARE 6792: SECURITY IN THE EAST

 

88 HARARE 3798: SECURITY ON THE EASTERN BORDER

 

 

Kosovo: Crafting A Special Status For Northern Kosovo

A piece from 2010 that may be more relevant today as the parties -- especially the US, and the Europeans -- may be more ready to push the parties off dead stopped: https://www.rferl.org/a/Crafting_A_Special_Status_For_Northern_Kosovo/2148191.html

Kosovo: Report to the UNSG on the March 17, 2007 Events in North Mitrovica

On May 21, 2008, Judge Francis M. Ssekandi delivered to the UN Security Council a report on his investigation into UNMIK's actions around the March 17, 2007 events in North Mitrovica.  On that date, UNMIK's Pristina HQ ordered the use of force against former Serbian court officials occupying the courthouse in the northern part of the city.  We in the region -- UNMIK, UN Police and the local NATO elements, had argued against pursuing that course of action.  The report has not, to my knowledge, ever been released.  But it highlights the need for the UN to not take sides in resolving political issues during its peacekeeping mission.  A former UN New York staff member gave me a copy some time ago. 

Judge Ssekendi interviewed me and many others for the report, which was the background to the UNSG's eventual decision to replace the top UNMIK leadership -- the SRSG and his principle deputy -- by not renewing their contracts.  The report contains some comments from the disgraced UNMIK leadership suggesting that I improperly was in contact with some member governments and passed my debacle report to the Serbs.  I did, of course, have frequent contacts with member state representatives -- especially with those from Security Council countries -- in an effort to help them understand the complexities of the north.  I made a special effort to do this with the US office in Pristina as its staff were forbidden to even visit north Mitrovica to see for themselves.  I did not release my debacle report to anyone not of the UN international staff in Kosovo and New York.  I learned later that one of my officers had done so because he thought it would prove useful in convincing the northern Kosovo Serbs that the UN staff in the north was not part of an effort to subject them to the new "independent" Kosovo government.  The Ssekandi report did in fact note UNMIK Pristina's apparent tilt toward using its UNSCR 1244 peacekeeping mandate to assist instead Pristina's efforts to subject the northern Serbs to its control, thus abandoning status neutrality.  UNMIK Pristina was pushed in this direction by the US, UK and Germany.

The Scekandi report noted that UNMIK HQ would have been better served by taking into account our warnings from the north.  But by the time of the March events, I had become a perceived problem in Pristina because of our repeated efforts to caution against use of force and instead urging dialogue with the K-Serbs and elements of the Serbian government in a position to assist in gaining a peaceful outcome to the court seizure.