Note: Behind this cable and the Embassy effort to bring the Sudanese government into a peace process on Darfur was also my effort to convince Washington to agree to providing support from the US military (in the form of logistics) for the African Union (AU) monitoring effort to be put together. The US regional command in Djibouti (the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, CJTF-HOA) was eager. But in Washington, the Departments of State and Defense plus the NSC were opposed. They didn't want to see any US boots on the ground in Sudan. I argued that the investment could be modest but the impact great. The Sudanese government would take the AU effort much more seriously if the US were supporting it and the AU certainly needed logistic support to be at all effective. The difference of opinion over Darfur (plus the enmity of USAID political appointees who saw Darfur as a side issue or one to use against the government) played a large part in Washington's decision not to allow me to extend for a second year.
