Fears of a Kosovo Partition (July 2006)

By mid-2006, Western concern over the unstable Kosovo situation had come to take the form of UNMIK Pristina worrying over a possible move by the northern Kosovo Serbs to implement a "hard" partition of the north to preempt an expected unilateral move by the Kosovo Albanians south of the Ibar to declare independence from Serbia.  (In the event, the northern K-Serbs never did seek partition -- though they hoped, and still hope, that Belgrade would thus save them -- while the K-Albanians did take the first move by declaring independence in February 2008.)  UNMIK's HQ stood in the middle of the K-Albanian capital of Kosovo -- Pristina -- and was under the direct influence of the Western countries (and especially the US and UK) which fully supported the K-Albanian position.  (At the US Office's July 4th celebration that year, the head of the office publicly called the northerners that UNMIK Mitrovica worked with "troublemakers.)  Under those influences -- channeled by the Office of Political Affairs (OPA) -- the UNMIK leadership grew quite paranoid about a northern partition.  OPA prepared a strategy paper outlining how UNMIK might work to prevent it.  OPA drafted a Code Cable in July to be sent to New York to cover the paper.  I don't remember UNMIK Mitrovica being given the chance to be involved in the preparation.  However, the PDSRSG was not unaware of the realities of the north so the OPA paper had to recognize that UNMIK had little to work with beyond continued diplomacy and peacekeeping.  In the event, in late July, he and I had the opportunity in Vienna to brief senior Western officials and Martti Ahtisaari (the UNSG's Special Envoy for Kosovo negotiations, UNOSEK) on the north.  It became clear that the Western dictum against partition was little more than words.  The draft code cable follows.  (I'm not sure it was sent.)  The full draft strategy paper is too long to provide here.

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The 2013 Brussels Agreement and the Implementation Plan

As noted in Wikipedia, the Brussels Agreement was made between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo on the normalization of their relations. It was negotiated and concluded, although not signed by either party, in Brussels under the auspices of the European Union. The negotiations were led by Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, and mediated by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. The agreement was concluded on 19 April 2013.

Actually there does seem to have been an Implementation Plan initialed by the two leaders.  (I think it's them, but see for yourself below).  And relations have not be fully normalized until now and the plan never implemented.

May 2007 Vienna Meeting on Kosovo

Went to Vienna at the end of May, 2007 to take part in a meeting of UNMIK & KFOR (NATO in Kosovo) top command with the person designated to be chief of the International Community Office (ICO) mission formed by the US and EU and meant to replace UNMIK after the UN leaves.  (Note:  The UN is still there.). Subject, northern Kosovo.  UNMIK North had spent some months trying to educate the EU on the need for a gradual approach and fending off their efforts to get us to do some difficult "chores" -- like dealing with the local Serb's using dinars and Serbian license plates -- before we hand over to them.  I met Pieter Fieth, who would be the head man, when he visited Khartoum as EU envoy for Darfur.  He said he remembered me well.  But I also heard that he did not like Americans.  In any case, once he took over, and with the help of NATO, he proved to believe the best way to "tame" the north was to use force.  (See:  http://www.transconflict.com/2011/11/kosovo-quint-brinksmanship-241/,  http://www.transconflict.com/2011/09/kosovo-nato-actions-illegal-illogical-and-immoral-309/  and related pieces at http://www.transconflict.com/author/gerard-gallucci/.
Here follows the text of the agenda for the Vienna meeting with my annotations for my use as talking points:

Brainstorming on the north of Kosovo

Date: 31 May

Location: Vienna

Participants:

EU

- Pieter Feith, Yves de Kermabon

- Stefan Lehne, Pedro Serrano

- Torbjorn Sohlstrom, Casper Klynge

UN

- Joachim Ruecker

NATO

- Pardew, Naples, COMKFOR

US

- Fletcher Burton

Agenda

1) Preventing hard partition (lead UNMIK+KFOR)

Questions to answer:

• Are all partners fully prepared for all possible scenarios? Basic issue: If northerners try to hard partition (e.g., by crossing UNMIK’s three red lines not simply through rhetoric), choice is to counter it through diplomacy and political work or to assume IC military/administrative control of the north. In the latter case it becomes how many troops and police, readiness to counter/arrest/shoot those who resist and appropriate human and financial resources to administer the north for whatever period of time it takes to find locals and local resources to do it.
• What actions might be necessary during the transition period? How can we ensure full IC support?
• Belgrade handling?
• UNMIK actions to prepare for status implementation, e.g. establishment of new municipality of N. Mitrovica. Underway but need direct and practical support of EU and US to focus UNMIK.

2) Integrating the north over time (lead ICR+ESDP+IMP).

Questions to answer:

• Which measures are needed to integrate the north/parallel structures? Patient diplomacy and political work with local and central officials plus the resources to offer practical cooperation with IC and between communities and to replace over time resources supplied by Belgrade.
• How should these measures be paced and timed?
• Which positive, reassuring, or face-saving measures can be used to accompany ‘hard’ measures? How in the world will you do any “hard” measures without using force? And what will “face saving” look like after taking away ‘their country” and using force to make them submit to the Albanians (which is how they will see it). This strikes me as dangerous thinking because based more on a conception of how things should go rather than an understanding of reality.)
• When and how should the ICR announce the ‘red lines’ for the north? Should there be a clear signal of strength at the start? I think you “signal strength” quietly through presence. Much more useful will be clear signal of understanding and readiness to work with all communities on practical cooperation. The essential redline to signal directly and quietly – within context of assurances of continued cooperation – is that if local Serb officials refuse to engage with ICO at working level, IC will have no alternative but to consider assuming direct control.
• How does the ICR ensure international support for his plan and for measures to be taken?
• Which measures need to be taken vis-à-vis Belgrade, and by whom?
• How does the ICR deal with a full boycott by the north? Having made clear the above redline, a little patience during the “testing” phase of a “boycott” to see how serious they are or if it is just for form sake and how much and quickly it will “leak.”
• Agreed end states after 6 or 12 months?
• How to use the regional EU perspective?
• How to involve donors at an early stage? With money for QIPs on both sides of River and some infrastructure/job creation activity using private sector.

Intelligence: how do we make sure that ICR and ESDP HoM have good intel? Best way is people on the ground in each municipality – including internationals – with locals who will need to be carefully “milked” by their international colleagues.

PR: benefits (and limits) of an information campaign?

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2007 -- Recommendation for a Stepped Process to Kosovo Independence

By mid-2007, it seemed clear that the Kosovo status stalemate could not hold much longer before the K-Albanians took action on their own.  This seemed so to me, though responsible for the K-Serb majority north, as it was to the US, which alone could hold the leash on Pristina.  In consultation with the PDSRSG (the principle deputy -- and a former US general -- to the UNMIK SRSG, a hapless German), I drew an outline for a series of steps the K-Albanian leadership could take leading up to a declaration of independence in 2008.  They emphasized peaceful, reassuring moves making clear that Kosovo could not wait forever.  We hoped at the time that it would coincide with an agreement to implement the Ahtisaari proposals for a unified Kosovo with local autonomy for the K-Serbs.  That didn't happen and in February 2008, the Albanians did declare independence unilaterally.  I discussed the situation with the south Mitrovica (K-Albanian) city manager and passed him the "stepped process" paper in August.  (He later became a minister in the Pristina government.)  This was neither a UN nor US initiative but sanctioned unofficially by the PDSRSG. The paper as passed follows:
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A Stepped Process

The current situation of no status and no sure way forward is unstable. An uncertain process apparently going nowhere – or worse yet perhaps seen leading to partition or continued association to Serbia – increasingly unsustainable vis-à-vis Albanian majority. Maybe by miracle, the parties will reach agreement or the Europeans will discover they cannot simply sit back and let things drift into the rocks. Otherwise, K-Albanian frustration with the lack of prospects – political but also economic, for jobs, electricity, heat, etc – will make control ever more problematic for everyone. Most Albanians will be thinking about how to force events. Some may look to threats and violence, others hopefully for a political way forward. The essential political option would appear UDI.

UDI is a huge step. The Albanians were led to believe they would win independence through the Ahtisaari process and they would have EU and US support at the end. For UDI, they face moving forward without this support. The US cannot act alone and it cannot give a “green light" to unilateral moves by the K-Albanians if it does not have at least minimum support from the Europeans. However, perhaps the US could – however reluctantly – use warnings from the Albanians of intended unilateral moves to push the Europeans forward into the critical mass necessary for a successful launch. The Europeans will only respond to crisis; the key is creating a controlled one unfolding gradually to give the US the leverage and the time to use it diplomatically. The path to UDI means the Albanians must make clear to all that action is necessary but the process will unfold in a way that gives time for diplomacy to produce a UNSC resolution or US/European agreement if possible.

The K-Albanian leadership would have to be united – indeed formation of a new government of national unity (forget elections) would loudly signal seriousness of purpose – and resolute to convince the US and others that they will respond to the political realities of Kosovo even if it means going it alone or with whatever friends they have. Nothing should be presented as a threat but simply as a political course of action forced by events – “we must respond somehow to the dead-end we have been led into” – and to preempt other, less helpful alternatives. The leadership must accept that threats – of violence in Kosovo or Presevo and Tetevo – is exactly the wrong strategy for them (and only serves Belgrade). The right strategy would be a controlled, steady, stepped process emphasizing the maturity of the Albanian leadership and people and their readiness to join the European community. Every move forward would be with open hands to the K-Serbs and accompanied by clear and complete commitment to the Ahtisaari plan. All PISG actions would not only have to adhere strictly to the Standards but be seen as consistent with, and aimed at, implementing the Ahtisaari plan in word and spirit. The goal, the mantra, would be creation of an "independent, fair and just Kosovo for all its people" with full adherence to the Ahtisaari plan including the ICO mission.

To be successful, this strategy requires complete control on the Albanian side and sufficient steps and time to allow everyone to react as positively as possible. The united leadership would signal that they are prepared to take a series of steps leading to the desired end state (no need to constantly say “independence” since all know that) no matter what. Each step would have to be broadcast clearly and ahead of time and carried out in a united, mature, and responsible manner consistent with strong adherence to carrying out the Ahtisaari plan and by doing all possible to pro-actively reach out to and provide for the minority communities. (Bad example new decision on KS plates/KEK.) All other goals must be subject to these.

Tactically, the leadership must remain disciplined and focused. Obsessing about partition or whatever other “trial-balloons” (such as confederation) are raised must be avoided in order to maintain control of the negotiating and broader agenda. Any attempt do divert attention such as these – even if from some in the IC – must be seen as provocations and avoided as such.

Possible Steps

First 15 days

• Reconfirm willingness to hear whatever Serbia has to offer and to judge that on basis of what Kosovo people want and need. Avoid any appearance of conditions for talks. Note special interest in how to best serve interests of non-Albanian communities. (Maybe suggest working group on mechanisms for implementing decentralization/linkages in which K-Serbs, especially from south, might take lead.) Let realities of what can be negotiated or not to emerge from the talks themselves. Go anywhere and raise no procedural problems.
• Stop talking about possible violence or “instability” and about concerns over partition, etc. Start talking about pressing need to begin dealing practically with Kosovo’s political and economic realities to ensure a peaceful future for all.
• Begin visible and genuine effort to form all-inclusive “technical” government, suggest this might take place of near-term elections. Suggest this national unity government will remain in place until Status is achieved.
• Explain quietly to US, Brits, EU, Germans and French – perhaps in that order – that political realities and especially pressure for breaking impasse cannot be put off indefinitely. “We will have to begin responding in a visible way – and participating in elections will not be enough by itself – or risk losing control of the situation. We are exploring political options (not to be specified at this point) but including the “technical government.” We’d appreciate your support for this.” Avoid suggesting deadlines at this point.

Second 15 days

• Continue serious engagement with Troika but be privately honest with US and others about progress or lack in the “negotiations.” Avoid much public comment.
• Announce formation of technical government and decision to not hold elections until Status is achieved. (This is first “unilateral” step and no one can complain if you don’t.)
• Tell US alone what you plan to be doing next few months and explain that it is an effort to manage the process until end-of-year holidays but that this cannot be maintained much longer than beginning of New Year. Tensions will soon outweigh ability to keep things together. US should use this period to get the Europeans ready for declaration.
• Begin holding series of town meetings in various parts of Kosovo (nowhere provocative though) to “learn the people’s concerns.” Keep the IC out of it (including UNMIK-P) and do whatever is necessary to avoid large crowds or events that get out of control. Reps from all parties can attend or they can be delegated on basis of local politics to represent everyone. (Second “unilateral” step.)
• Announce that consultations with the people will continue through early December, so that a clear view will be obtained of public concerns and sentiments. (But don’t once say “about independence.” Very important at this phase is what is not said.)

Next 60 days

• Continue engagement in negotiations.
• Continue town-hall meetings (with perhaps break for Ramadan days, calling for everyone to reflect about the future and the need for peaceful chance during these days, Imams preaching this will be very effective).
• Concentrate fully on making technical government work. Work as much as possible – and as visibly as possible – with the EU and ICO on getting ready to implement Ahtisaari plan. Do as much as possible on getting ready to implement new municipalities. (Perhaps allow UNMIK creation of North Mitrovica as first step and sign of seriousness.) Avoid public disagreements on anything remotely related to status.
• Do everything possible to make Serbs, especially south of the River, as happy as possible. Support any realistic returns project. Resolve any procedural issues, use all possibilities for practical cooperation
• Focus all resources possible on preparing for the winter.
• Keep US and others privately apprised of your views on Troika process. If the process is visibly moribund or going nowhere at some point, urgently ask US and others “what do we do now” but make clear if necessary – and not through the press – that the CG principles cannot be abandoned without great political cost for all.

Next 30 days

• Wrap up town hall meetings in time to prepare a “report” that will go to the national assembly on December 6. Announce that the Assembly will take up consideration of how to respond to what has been learned from these consultations with the people and the results of the negotiations. Give no date.
• Give US and others frank, but private, view of value of negotiations. Explain that you have been working hard to manage political process but things must begin moving forward one way or another early next year.
• Allow “spontaneous” but absolutely controlled public rallies (by party and/or region) in favor of taking next steps, in favor of independence. As large as can be safely held with NO incidents whatever. These must be seen as mature displays of readiness for assuming control over own future. No threatening words or actions.
• Announce travel of unity team (all government parties) to major capitals to consult on next steps consistent with Ahtisaari plan early in new year.
• Encourage and help everyone to enjoy the coming holidays.
• Tell US alone (and maybe Brits) that national assembly will go into session to discuss next steps after holidays and to begin drafting a declaration of independence. You are prepared to discuss but this step will be inevitable. Process will include further consultations and town meetings to vet the document. Declaration would be made sometime early spring. If meanwhile, EU or even UNSC can make decision, so much the better.
• Show IC calm determination. Continue to exercise control, resist all provocations (especially from north) and give UNMIK and KFOR full support for their efforts.

January 2008

• At beginning of month, inform other key countries that Assembly will begin drafting declaration by month’s end.
• Assembly reconvenes and finishes discussion of previous consultations with focus on next steps in line with Ahtisaari plan. All views aired, visibly gauge public reaction.
• By month’s end, national unity government announces that Assembly will next take up task of drafting a declaration of independence while awaiting possible UNSC action. (Big unilateral step but still not the final one).

February 2008

• Make it privately clear to US and Europeans that you have done all possible to give them time but with or without them, you must take next steps to preserve stability. You will do your part to maintain security and to prepare for implementation of Ahtisaari plan. They must get ready to play theirs. Reaffirm your adherence to CG three principles and remind them of theirs. No one can be allowed to veto this process. Declaration – date certain – will be in April.
• Process of drafting Declaration enshrining commitment to Kosovo for all its people and to Ahtisaari plan starts in Assembly. No rallies or demonstrations at this point put serious discussion throughout the land.

March 2008

• Draft declaration is approved and published. New series of town meeting held to consult with the people.
• Continued efforts to publicly reassure and reach-out to non-Albanians.
• Absolute control necessary. No violence, threats or incidents. Resist all provocations while supporting KPS, UNMIK and KFOR as necessary.
• US and others informed of date in April for declaration. Message: the public process so far has helped to channel and contain public sentiments, process cannot now be stopped.

April 2008

• Announce elections for four months after declaration (as called for in Ahtisaari plan).
• Be ready for crisis appeals/demands from IC to give negotiations “another chance.”
• More large but controlled spontaneous marches and rallies for declaration.
• April 23 (?), declaration approved by Assembly.

end text

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A Map for a New North Mitovica municipality in 2006

I prepared this map in 2006 for Martti Ahtisaari, the UNSG Special Envoy for the negotiations over Kosovo status between Belgrade and Pristina.  I was serving as the UNMIK Regional Representative for Mitrovica (and northern Kosovo).  I had met Ahtisaari some 20 years previously while working on Angola.  We met in June in UNMIK HQ in Pristina and had other meetings during the summer.  One of his staff asked me to prepare the map which I delivered to Ahtisaari's team before the year's end.  It was supposed to balance the ethnic realities by giving the K-Albanian South Mitrovica a bit of the north while dividing the territory in a way acceptable to the majority K-Serbs in the north.  It was predicated on an eventual agreement in the UN Security Council on the status of Kosovo, some acceptable form of autonomy or "independence."  Despite Ahtisaari's best efforts, the US and Russia could not agree.  Pristina declared independence unilaterally in February 2008.  Ahtisaari later became President of Finland.

The light red line was the existing border of Mitrovica (which spanned the Ibar River).  The darker red line would have been the new border with the Serb majority North Mitrovica to the east and a mixture of Albanian and Serb villages as part of South Mitrovica to the west.  The area north of the Ibar were other Serb-majority municipalities