Kosovo: SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities on December 9, 2005

Memorandum of Conversation

Internal Memorandum

Subject: SRSG’s meeting with the MAPs of Northern Municipalities

Date: 9 December 2005

Venue: Zvecan Municipality

ISSUES REQUIRING FOLLOW UP:

.

• Establish further contacts on the Decentralisation Program.

Municipal Assembly Presidents:

Mr. Dragisa Milovic (DM) – Municipal Assembly President of Zvečan/Zvecan; Mr. Slavisa Ristic (SR) - Municipal Assembly President of Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok; Mr. Velimir Bojovic (VB) - Municipal Assembly President of Leposavic/Leposaviq

UNMIK participants:

Mr Søren Jessen-Petersen, Mr Gerard Gallucci, Mr Petr Ivantsov, Mr Henrik Villadsen, Mr Devender Singh (Note taker), Mr Jean-Luc Sintes, Mr Detlef Beisiegel, Mr Lameck Kawiche.

The SRSG briefed the participants on the beginning of the status process noting that UNMIK is not part of the status process but would support it within its mandate. While the Status process will focus on politics, he would like to focus on the people. He underlined that there will be many concerns and preoccupations in this crucial period. UNMIK will promote closer collaboration with Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs to focus on key issues so as to reassure Kosovo Serbs that any status outcome would focus on their future. He was not prepared to accept that people should be let down if there was an unfavourable outcome.

The SRSG determined that there were five key areas to reassure Kosovo Serbs in next few months: i) Standard Implementation process and how UNMIK can push it; ii) Decentralisation as a fundamental issue with the ongoing comprehensive reform focussing on minorities needs to be reassured that they can manage their own affairs; iii) Freedom of movement and focussing on Kosovo Albanians to do more in this area; iv) Belgrade getting involved focussing on Kosovo Serbs residing in Kosovo; v) Kosovo Serb representatives playing their role in key areas through involvement in institutions and on practical issues. The SRSG noted encouraging results from the recent meetings held on practical issues and felt there was scope for doing more in that area. He touched upon the modest support provided by the SRSG to the Municipalities given their enormous needs and hoped that it will lead to more.

The SRSG then stressed that security was basis of everything discussed in the meeting and said that he was aware of immense concern about it. He stated there had been deeply regrettable incidents over last weeks and he condemned them. While it was important to resolve these crimes, it could not be concluded if these were inter-ethnic or who was responsible for these incidents. Nevertheless, psychological fear was growing as a result of these incidents leading to diminished freedom of movement. He informed that, after the bus incident near Prizren, intensive additional steps are envisaged by Police and KFOR. The SRSG hoped that it will have the desired effect even though there were some senseless people on all sides and it was difficult to stop it altogether.

DM thanked the SRSG for providing a general overview on Kosovo. He agreed that while status talks are ongoing, they have to think of the people and address their problems. He concurred with the SRSG that security and freedom of movement are key problems. He claimed that the level of violence was increasing and KFOR, Police and the Municipality have to stop it. In this context, he referred to a bomb thrown in a house in Mali Rudare in Zvecan Municipality. Recalling recent release of Fatmir Limaj, DM averred that it would encourage extreme Albanians to continue with their designs. He affirmed that decentralisation was the key issue needing resolution and characterised it as “a precondition for all preconditions”. He favoured creation and establishment of Municipalities with Serb majorities or with Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians together with competencies about Health, Education, Culture, Police etc. He called for horizontal connection between the Municipalities and institutional linkages with Serbia. Referring to Romas in Zitkovac camp and IDPs from Svinjare and Obilic displaced in Zvecan, he asserted that it was time to provide possibility for IDPs to return to their homes. DM argued that it was difficult to get into the institutions while two thirds of the population is displaced elsewhere. Highlighting high unemployment rate (60%), he urged all concerned to provide new opportunities so that people can stay here. He mentioned that he was interested and sensitive to the problems of North Mitrovica because many of these impacted on Zvecan. DM underscored that status problem could be solved in Kosovo with compromise and respecting the interests of both sides. Finally, he thanked the SRSG for his support for the project, which he said was important for their municipality.

VB expressed agreement with DM and stated that they have to be prepared for a decision that they may not like. He expressed fear that status of Kosovo may be resolved as a future for Albanians but not for Serbs. He recalled the meeting of 13 Kosovo Serb representatives with the Status Envoy where all of them expressed their unanimous view that any decision other than independence could be accepted. He opined that relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs had been negative all their lives, not just last six years. Recalling that his municipality was connected to the then autonomous province of ‘Kosovo and Metohija’, he wondered how a Municipality with 99% Serb population could be called an ‘Albanik’ Municipality. VB said he could not accept that Kosovo Albanians were asking for independence only and nothing else. Referring to disrespect of human rights for last six years, he claimed that Kosovo Albanians would behave better as status talks progress but it was not in their hearts. Taking out a map, he reminisced how his father had to leave Suva Reka Municipality to settle in North Kosovo and now his grandson may have to do the same. He contended that any unsuitable decision from the international community would not create stability in the region. VB felt that if final status is independence, not a single Serb will remain in this area; hence a solution to somehow satisfy both sides should be found. Pleading for objectivity on both sides, he mentioned that there were many models which could be followed so that both communities could live a normal life.

SR mentioned that while burden of status talks had shifted to Mr Ahtisaari, UNMIK has obligation in non-status areas. He specifically referred to Standard Implementation, which he admitted was a process that can’t be accomplished overnight. He stressed that UNMIK will have to be very determined to make concrete progress on decentralisation and it was SRSG’s obligation. He felt that the Albanian’s wish for an independent state is really to have central power over the Serbs. The IC must prevent creation of that kind of central power. He elaborated decentralisation as transferring authority and power from central level to local levels and not only creating new Municipalities. He added that diminishing budgetary support every year does not augur well for good future. SR mentioned two villages (Banjë/Banja and Suvogërll/Suvo Grlo) in Skenderaj / Srbica Municipality, which want to be connected to Zubin Potok Municipality not only for security but other reasons as well. These were multi-ethnic villages and if a decision in the context of decentralisation allows this, he would have no objection. He also pointed out that there were many such villages, where Serbs no longer reside but will return if connected to Zubin Potok. He claimed that he had no territorial ambitions. Finally, he said they were ready for all solutions to status issue. SR also appealed to his colleague from Leposavic to not leave the rest of them alone in Kosovo.

The SRSG concluded the meeting by thanking all the participants for their contributions and responded that he had not come with any message about a decision that they may not like but that it was good to prepare for whatever may come. Appreciating their comments about decentralisation, he said he was convinced that it will be a key feature of any status outcome. Kosovo Albanians will have to realize a decentralisation program that leads to a Kosovo for all communities. If such decentralisation does not emerge, the Status Envoy will ensure that decentralisation is integrated with status process with a strong focus on what communities need. He welcomed all comments especially on multi-ethnic municipalities. The SRSG recognized that while regular progress could not be made on returns, UNMIK was making progress on Romas in lead affected camps. Camp Oesterode is being prepared as a transit facility for those Romas in the camps, who want to move there. It will be a step on way to their formal return to Roma Mahalla

12 December 2005

Kosovo: Answering Some Questions in 2010

After I left Kosovo in 2008 (and East Timor in 2010), I continued to follow events there and to respond to questions and comment.  The three items below are the responses to questions from someone doing a masters thesis and from the European Voice plus a lette to the European Voice.  (I believe the European Voice is now defunt.) If the last item was ever published, I don't have it. (Btw, you can click on these documents to read them in full original and download them.)

 

Kosovo: March 2007 -- property Issues in Bosniak Mahalla

On March 16, 2007, I had to call upon our police to stop illegal construction by a local Serb in Bosniak Mahalla,  I don't remember the details but  the person involved must have been trying to build a large dwelling in a mixed area which the local Albanians and/or others found threatening as well as illegal.  (Legality was not a leading motif in the Mahalla.) Below is the complaint from the CCK (I don't speak Serbian and cannot remember what it said) and my reply.

On March 28, I sent this report to HQ:  

Re following Police report of last night:
"On Tuesday 27th of March 2007 at approx. 19.45 hrs, an Unidentified Explosive Device exploded at the junction of "Oslobodena Str.' and "Nemanjina Str." in Little Bosnia - Mitrovica North.

Consequences: 03 individual cars slightly damages by parts of the explosive device. No people injured. "

This was apparently a "black grenade" (i.e., a fairly small device) and may have been thrown by a disgruntled young Albanian who had previously in the evening had a altercation with civpol on north side of Bridge. He reportedly threatened the police with further action. Police are still investigating but everyone at the scene -- Albanians and Serbs -- remained calm and apparently already attributed the attack to this "crazy Albanian" and not to inter-ethnic tensions. Nevertheless, police (including UNMIK-P) increased patrols in other mixed areas of north Mitrovica. UNMIK also informed CCK and Mitrovica CEO to assure that things were under control. We also drank tea with mixed group of locals at a small cafe at the scene. Everyone there was calm, including one of the damaged car owners.

Comment: The north shore and especially Bosniak Mahalla remains tense but there have been no more indications of conflict over ongoing construction. However, it is vital that UNMIK-P Enhancement Force be kept at full strength (at least 130) over the next months. We are in deep trouble if we lose control during any reaction to almost certain continued acts of isolated violence.

I should add that while I was drinking tea and smoking a cigar the owner gave me -- everyone was quite uncomfortable with my not smoking -- I heard the men joking in a mix of Serbian and Albanian.  Not many places this happens in public in Kosovo.  I joined in with the little common language we had and we all laughed in agreement that Kosovo is a crazy place and Bosniak Mahalla the craziest of all.  When I got home and was reading in bed, I heard a prolonged burst of automatic weapon fire plus the firing of a pistol.  Jumped out of bed and opened by door to the balcony.  Scared a poor fellow across the street taking a piss.  But I guess it was nothing.  Took my heart a little time to slow down enough to permit sleep. 

Kosovo: An UNMIK Police Report on the March 17, 2008 Coutrthouse Debacle

The document below is an UNMIK Police report prepared on the events leading up to and on the day of March 17, 2008.  It should be read in conjunction with the prior piece.  I was kept in the dark about UNMIK HQ's planning for re-taking the Court.  Suspecting something was afoot, I pressed for confirmation and was finally given a briefing the night before the action by the UNMIK Police Regional Command in Mitrovica. They had by then been superseded by UNMIK HQ.  They joked that the entire plan was simply to go and arrest Serb thugs.  Indeed, UNMIK HQ had disregarded our warnings about the likely violence that would surround any use of force against the Courthouse and UNMIK Police (and KFOR) was woefully unprepared for events that day.  I later learned that the initial seizure of the Court appeared to have been allowed by UNMIK police sent by Pristina HQ to guard the building.  I believe that the UNMIK Pristine leadership provoked the entire sad episode.  None of this is reflected in the police report which apparently made it into my hands on May 5, 2008.

 

Kosovo: The March 17, 2008 Coutrthouse Debacle

Despite our warning to UNMIK HQ Pristina  (acting according to guidance from the US) and to UN DPKO New York (unwilling to "second guess" the clueless leaders of UNMIK), UNMIK launched an action on March 17, 2008 to retake the courthouse in north Mitrovica.  Here follows my email the following day sent to everyone in UNMIK and DPKO I could think of to make clear the damage done to our peacekeeping efforts in the north and along the Ibar and to forestall further ill-considered actions.  

Balkanalysis.com has my fuller account of the background events leading up to what happened that day.

 

2011: Kosovo: Time for a New Approach

I left Kosovo in October 2008 with some encouragement from the UNMIK leadership and DPKO.  (I transferred to UNMIT in East Timor as chief of staff.)  But I continued to follow events in Kosovo, contributing pieces to TransConflict, and had visited northern Kosovo in June, 2011.  I can't quite remember how the invitation came up to testify in November to the US Congress on Kosovo but I did.  Here follows the text of my comments to the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representative.  (Note:  The Quint refers to the Contact Group on Kosovo -- the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia -- without Russia, which opposed Kosovo independence.  EULEX is the EU's rule of law entity in Kosovo and its police.)

(Note:  All documents posted in this space can be and enlarged and downloaded by clicking on them.)



 

Kosovo 2007: Understanding the North

Following up the previous entry, from my journal for November 27, 2007.:


Had to go to Pristina today for lunch with the chief DPKO guy for Europe, who encouraged me to keep doing what we are doing and to let them know when UNMIK HQ strays into anything that will upset the apple cart in the north. They liked my dissent messages and share our view that the basic thing is to get the UN out of here before the real crisis hits. That means before Kosovo becomes a failed state and the north fully partitions. The UN New York plan is to somehow squeeze between competing pressures from the West and Russia to leave five months after the UDI expected in the 2nd half of January, turning things essentially over to the EU, before it fully understands what it will be getting. I suggested we won't be able to last five months.


The second code cable I drafted follows here:

Kosovo 2007: UNMIK HQ Gets the North wrong

From my 2007 journal:

October 23:  Today was a difficult day.  Went down to Pristina early to meet the DPKO Assistant Secretary General and brief him on the way up for meeting in Mitrovica.  I think the briefing -- which I used to broach the perceptions of reality from up here and how they differ from UNHQ Pristina -- and the meetings -- in which he could see and feel the intractable situation we face -- went well.  But I have been blindsided before by a polite hearing that hid an already established agenda.  Yesterday I saw a "code cable" to New York that was blatantly misleading about Serb "parallel institutions.  I had the ASG meet with my whole senior staff so he could hear from them.  He encouraged me to put our views down on paper through a cable to NY.  I already keep a number of NY people on my email list.  He is inviting me to help correct the picture before a Nov 6 meeting to be chaired by the Secretary General.  All and all, I'd say we are reaching some internal "cleansing of the spears."  

November 5: ... Had an inconclusive meeting with the SRSG this afternoon.  He is clueless but not absolutely stupid.  He understands that I cannot be run down or over but still doesn't know what to do with me and still doesn't understand the depth of the lake of shit all around us and what we need to do to keep from having it flood the little Potemkin village we live in.

I drafted two code cables per the ASG's suggestion, the first follows below the second will be in the next post.  Both were sent.
 

 

Fears of a Kosovo Partition (July 2006)

By mid-2006, Western concern over the unstable Kosovo situation had come to take the form of UNMIK Pristina worrying over a possible move by the northern Kosovo Serbs to implement a "hard" partition of the north to preempt an expected unilateral move by the Kosovo Albanians south of the Ibar to declare independence from Serbia.  (In the event, the northern K-Serbs never did seek partition -- though they hoped, and still hope, that Belgrade would thus save them -- while the K-Albanians did take the first move by declaring independence in February 2008.)  UNMIK's HQ stood in the middle of the K-Albanian capital of Kosovo -- Pristina -- and was under the direct influence of the Western countries (and especially the US and UK) which fully supported the K-Albanian position.  (At the US Office's July 4th celebration that year, the head of the office publicly called the northerners that UNMIK Mitrovica worked with "troublemakers.)  Under those influences -- channeled by the Office of Political Affairs (OPA) -- the UNMIK leadership grew quite paranoid about a northern partition.  OPA prepared a strategy paper outlining how UNMIK might work to prevent it.  OPA drafted a Code Cable in July to be sent to New York to cover the paper.  I don't remember UNMIK Mitrovica being given the chance to be involved in the preparation.  However, the PDSRSG was not unaware of the realities of the north so the OPA paper had to recognize that UNMIK had little to work with beyond continued diplomacy and peacekeeping.  In the event, in late July, he and I had the opportunity in Vienna to brief senior Western officials and Martti Ahtisaari (the UNSG's Special Envoy for Kosovo negotiations, UNOSEK) on the north.  It became clear that the Western dictum against partition was little more than words.  The draft code cable follows.  (I'm not sure it was sent.)  The full draft strategy paper is too long to provide here.

________________________________________________________________________

 

The 2013 Brussels Agreement and the Implementation Plan

As noted in Wikipedia, the Brussels Agreement was made between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo on the normalization of their relations. It was negotiated and concluded, although not signed by either party, in Brussels under the auspices of the European Union. The negotiations were led by Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, and mediated by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. The agreement was concluded on 19 April 2013.

Actually there does seem to have been an Implementation Plan initialed by the two leaders.  (I think it's them, but see for yourself below).  And relations have not be fully normalized until now and the plan never implemented.